ENTRY INTO COMBAT—SECTOR TOULON

MARCH 10th, 1918, had been fixed as the date for the Division to end the first elementary phase of its training and to move into a quiet sector for the second phase. It is worthy to note that this was one of the few times where from estimates made during this confused period the schedule was followed.

The first official notice to the troops of this move was conveyed by a Division memorandum dated March 5th,¹ followed by an order on March 10th, directing a movement of the Division to the front.² The move included not only troops in the Bourmont area but also the artillery at le Valdahon; all were to go by rail except the motor transport which went by road. The precise destination of the troops was not yet announced, but the new location of division headquarters was given as Sommedieue, post office Dieue, ammunition depot, Heippes, and railhead Suippes—all in the Department of the Meuse and Arrondissement of Verdun, in the old province of Lorraine. The movement was to begin on March 13th from the Bourmont area; the new division headquarters were to open at noon, March 16th; the last train was scheduled to leave the old area on March 18th. The entrainment of the artillery began March 18th and the last train left le Valdahon area on the 21st. This was the first movement of the Division as a whole and its first experiment in dealing independently with French railway transportation, so the orders were very full of details that did not appear in later similar orders. In addition, special instructions were issued giving suggestions as to the methods of entraining and information on the transport system.

The equipment and train crews were entirely French and operated under French orders. The medium of communication at each entraining station was the American Railway Transport Officer.

The French standard military train consisted of 30 box cars, 17 flat cars and one coach, with a caboose or two for the train crew. The cabooses were always placed at the ends of the train, the flat cars in the middle and the box cars between. This was the standard train intended to carry a battalion of infantry or a battery of artillery with all of its transportation and equipment. Others used the standard train when possible or with certain modifications, known in advance. The American organization differed greatly from the French our large division, with its twelve infantry battalions, its strong machine gun and artillery units, and its complete trains, was generally reckoned as equal to two French divisions and required transportation accordingly—58 trains in all, of which 26 were for the artillery. The smaller units, however, conformed nearly enough to French types to permit the use of standard trains. Thus an infantry regiment required five trains—one for each battalion, one for regimental headquarters, headquarters company and machine gun company, and one for the supply company.³

The region into which the division had now come lay between St. Mihiel and Verdun, along the Meuse River which here runs a little west of north. The distance between these two cities is about twenty miles. The Cotes de Meuse, a strip of rugged, wooded hill country three or four miles wide, follow The eastbank; beyond is the broad plain of the Woevre. There had been heavy fighting here at several periods, notably in the Fall of 1914 when the Germans broke through at St. Mihiel to form the famous salient in the Spring of 1915 when the ridge of Les Eparges was retaken by the French; and in the Spring of 1916 during the German attack at Verdun. Since that time this front had been generally quiet.

In March, 1918, the St. Mihiel front was held by the French Eighth Army; the Verdun front by the French Second Army (Hirschauer). The boundary was at Maizey, about two miles north of St. Mihiel. The right flank element of the Second Army was the X Corps (Vandenberg), which occupied the entire front from Maizey to Verdun, connecting with the XVII Corps at Haudiomont, just east of that city. The northern or left section of the corps line ran along the eastern crest of the Cotes de Meuse about seven miles from the river, overlooking the plain. The artillery and the camps for troops not in line, were concealed among hills and woods. This was known as the Toulon Sector, the name apparently an arbitrary one since no place by that name is found in this region; its front, following the windings of the line, was six miles. Just south of Les Eparges the line bent back obliquely through the hills to the Meuse, forming the northern face of the St. Mihiel salient. This was organized as two sectors, named after towns just behind the lines; Rupt Sector to the north, Troyon Sector to the south, with fronts of five and eight miles respectively. The distance in a straight line from Haudiomont to Maizey is fourteen miles. In the Troyon Sector the line was so closely backed up against the Meuse that a large part of the artillery had to be placed west of the river. The line was in low ground with scant cover, and the Germans in the Foret de la Montagne had the advantage in observation.⁴

In the north, the Germans lay a thousand yards or more out in the plain. In the center, through the woods, the lines were in very close contact. In the south they were separated by the valley of a little stream and were a mile or more apart in some places. Each sector was held by a French Division—Toulon by the 33d (General Buat, later Tanant); Rupt by the 34th (Savatier); Troyon by the 52d (Boyer).

The Americans found the new sector occupied by French troops. The general scheme of defense was that in use on most stabilized fronts. A "sector" technically speaking was the front and depth held by a division. It was divided into "sub-sectors", each normally held by a regiment; the front of a sub-sector was made up of several "centers of resistance" designed for a garrison of about a battalion.

The battalion occupying a center of resistance organized several "strong points"; fortified and provided with wire entanglements and other obstacles in their front. There was an elaborate system of firing trenches in the front, dugouts in rear, communication trenches (boyaux) from rear to front and connecting trenches to flank groups. The strong points of a center were mutually supporting, and formed a sort of redoubt. A series of small posts covered the front. The rule was to hold as many men as possible in the dugouts with a company or two in battalion reserve. Such was the modern system of a defensive line developed in the World War. The system that preceded it, long since abandoned, was a line of raised redoubts, placed in flanking positions and at supporting intervals, connected by open trenches; the front covered by such obstacles as chevaux de frise, abattis and, when practicable, by a wet ditch.

When the 2d Division reached the Verdun region their northern positions were in the area of heavy fighting of the old Verdun battles, but the Americans saw few new shell holes. Kindly nature had already begun to hide these scars as weeds and second growths were beginning to clothe the nakedness of the mangled red fields.

In rear of the first position, a second was marked out well to the rear of these centers of resistance; this was partially fortified to hold should a break in the front line occur. To localize such a break "switch lines" were marked out along defensive ground diagonally from first to second positions. Near the second line were camped the second battalions of the regiments. Towards the rear of the sub-sector, well beyond ordinary danger, were the third battalions. Artillery and machine guns were so located that a standing barrage, or line of fire, could rapidly be placed in front of any threatened point of the line. The large supply and hospital installations were placed in a corps area in rear of the divisional areas. At every stage care was taken to provide reserves for counter-attacks. Certain rear battalions or parts of battalions were left at the disposal of the regimental commander; others were for the use of the colonel commanding the divisional infantry, the division commander, or corps commander.

For supply, the corps depended upon the railway running back from the Meuse at Dugny through Souilly, and upon the Verdun highway to Bar-le-Duc, known since the great German attack on Verdun as the "Sacred Way", built, in the words of the defenders, upon the bones of the French dead. Within the corps area reliance was placed upon the Meuse Canal for lateral communication and upon light railways and trucks for distribution.

As noted above these were "quiet sectors". Tired troops from both armies were sent here to rest and to refit. Here war had become a routine. By air observation and patrolling each side obtained and kept up to date the most minute information of the other. Every detail of the hostile trenches, every battery position, every road and winding trail, was accurately located; and on the other hand, each side exhausted all ingenuity to maintain secrecy. On these quiet sectors serious operations were not undertaken—a few shells a day, an occasional raid for identification of hostile units—these sum up the activities. From the Troyon Sector one could see with field glasses the people in the streets of St. Mihiel within the German lines pursuing their normal life; and the southern elements of the line regulated the posting of their guard by the St. Mihiel clock.

It was arranged between the French and American headquarters that one battalion of each American infantry regiment after a few days' reconnaissance should relieve a French battalion in some center of resistance, passing under the command of a French regimental commander. A second battalion, under the supervision of a divisional infantry commander, was to work in the second position and to prepare to relieve the leading one, after a tour of a week or ten days. The third battalions would take station further to the rear for instruction; later they would relieve their second line battalions and would be relieved by those from the first line. The artillery was attached by battalions to the French artillery commands. After a time, the command would be turned over to regimental and higher American officers; for the present they were attached for instruction to French headquarters of appropriate grade.

The American troop trains began to arrive on March 14th at Dugny and Souilly. The increased railway traffic was evidently noted by the Germans for the Dugny station was shelled by long range guns on the 15th and 16th; a man of Company "H", 23d Infantry, was wounded—the first casualty of the Division. All subsequent trains were stopped at Souilly.

Division headquarters were established with those of the French 33d Division at Sommedieue on March 17th. The same day the 5th Marines and the 23d Infantry occupied their positions in line; on the 18th, the 6th Marines and the 9th Infantry. The artillery arrived between March 19th and 23d and took their positions.

The Americans were no sooner arrived than their eagerness and inexperience led them into trouble. Early in the night of March 18-19 two men of Company "A" 23d Infantry were sent forward to locate a German sniper whose activities during the day were annoying. At the edge of the German wire they ran into a hornet's nest, twenty or thirty of the enemy coming out to cut them off. Assisted by automatic fire from their own trenches, the men made their way back; but meanwhile both sides had called for an artillery barrage. Private Stanley Dobiez of Clottnpany "A" 23d Infantry, an automatic rifleman on outpost, was instructed by his corporal to retire before the barrage fell, but Dobiez shouted in reply: "No. I no go back." He remained at his post and was killed, the first man of the 2d Division killed in action.

One battalion in taking-over naturally occupied the lines in the same manner as the French troops whom they relieved. It became evident at once that this disposition was inappropriate. Our fresh companies were so much stronger that the front line was too densely held. Corps commanders directed division commanders to examine the situation and arrange a reduction.

The great German offensive movement, started on the Somme on March 21st, materially affected plans for the training and use of American troops. French troops and divisions were withdrawn from quiet fronts and directed toward the new points of danger. The X Corps staff had to consider the possibility of losing some of their divisions; and on March 31st they began to hint that the 2d Division, having done well, might be called upon to take over a divisional sector of its own. In spite of some misgivings that such action might delay the formation of our own Army, every American was anxious to do whatever was most useful to the common cause; and it was agreed that the responsibility of the 2d Division should be increased.⁵

The necessity came very soon. The 34th Division holding the Rupt Sector was withdrawn from the X Corps, and the 131st Division from the corps on the left. The X Corps had to take over the Moscow Sector on a front of about five miles from its old left boundary at Eix.

On March 28th the 34th Division began to move to the rear; the 23d Infantry extended its front taking over the Center of Resistance Turin on the left of Riga, to assist in the relief.⁶ But clearly such changes could be only provisional measures; a complete reorganization of the defensive system was necessary.

On March 29th the corps commander called upon General Boyer of the 52d Division to prepare a plan for taking over a part of the Rupt Sector and forming an enlarged Troyon Sector, using his own division and the American troops already there, and giving American colonels command of sub-sectors.⁷ The plan was approved March 31st; orders were issued for its execution on April 1st.⁸ Under these orders the 9th Infantry put another battalion into line and took over the Bizerte Center of Resistance.⁹ The 23d similarly took over Marie Louise Center.¹⁰ A French infantry battalion and three light batteries were withdrawn to corps reserve.

The 131st Division began to withdraw on March 30th, and on this flank a greater readjustment had to be made. The 5th Marines and a French regiment were withdrawn from their old positions and took over the old Moscow Sector; all other units in the Toulon Sector extended their fronts and rearranged the dispositions of the centers of resistance. Corresponding alterations were made in artillery dispositions.¹¹ The entire 328th Infantry was in reserve.

By this time patrol activities were constant and habitual. As the men gained experience they claimed the mastery of "No Man's Land".¹² Most of these activities were routine, but two episodes deserve mention.

The German 82d Reserve Division lay opposite Troyon Section with headquarters at Vigneulles. In spite of rigorous patrolling, the division commander felt his information was incomplete, especially in view of the evidence that Americans were arriving. It had been reported that men wearing brown overcoats (the French overcoat was blue) were seen. On March 23d, 2d Lieutenant Moses W. Taylor of the 9th Infantry, mortally wounded while commanding a patrol, had been captured and identified as an American. On March 31st a Frenchman straggled from a patrol and was taken alive entangled in the German wire, and upon being questioned he admitted the arrival of an American battalion. Therefore increased activity by both infantry and artillery was now ordered on April 7th, and a raid on a large scale planned. An officer of the 8th Landwehr Division reported on April 24th: "Yesterday afternoon strange uniforms were observed in this region (mud-colored breeches, short jackets and light caps). The troops were carrying full field equipment—probably Americans." On April 28th it was reported that "troops were seen with flat steel helmets—probably Americans."

A report was received April 24th by the 10th Landwehr Division that "our patrols praise the crawling ahead of the American patrol which was carried out very much in the manner of the Indians", and on May 4th: "The Americans have offered embittered resistance with their machine guns, some even with their bayonets; a great many of them died fighting heroically".¹³

The German infantry division, like the French, had three regiments of infantry organized into a brigade, and three battalions of artillery regularly assigned. Each of the three infantry regiments of the 82d Reserve Brigade (Colonel von Wedel) had a permanently organized raiding detachment —a plan quite usual with the Germans, and one particularly insisted upon by General von St. Ange, commanding the division. These detachments consisted of two officers and sixty or seventy men each. They had taken part in no considerable action since their formation in February, so it was proposed to use them in this raid. They were attached for this purpose to the 272d Reserve Infantry, whose commanding officer (Major von Grothe) was made responsible for the raid, and reinforced by details from five companies of that regiment with trench mortars, engineer and signal platoons, to a strength of 23 officers and 649 men. Twelve batteries were assigned to fire in support and to form a box barrage about the selected point of attack.

The point selected was opposite Rouvrois, where the line was backed closely up against the river, and therefore sensitive. The Allied defenses were marked out on the ground to scale in the German rear area where the raid was rehearsed in every detail according to a prepared time table.

The German artillery increased its activity and swept the area of the 3d battalion, 9th Infantry. On April 10th this fire became more intense and it was estimated that 350 hostile shells exploded along the line of the advanced posts in front of Center of Resistance Marie Louise. Next day the same number fell mostly on the boyaux leading up to the line. On April 12th 930 shells, some of heavy caliber, were thrown into the town of Maizey and on the front trenches of the center of resistance. The French artillery commander in the sector sent a warning that a storm battalion would probably attack the Americans in the Bois de Bouchot, which was in the Center of Resistance Bizerte, now held by the 3d Battalion, 23d Infantry (Major Elliott). Colonel Malone, commanding the 23d, warned his battalion commanders to sleep on their arms." During the 13th, steady shelling continued, most of it on Maizey and the rear areas. At about 10.45 P.M. the German fire increased in intensity, over the entire regimental area, covering advanced posts and the front line of both Marie Louise and Coralie, extending through the parallels in rear and the communicating trenches.l5 A few minutes later, about 11.00 P.M., a box barrage was laid around Yvonne and Odette positions, reaching back along the boyaux through which supports must approach. This continued until 12.30 A.M. Meanwhile, warned by the intensity of the shelling, and discovering that all wire communications had been broken by gun fire, the company commanders in Yvonne and Odette called by rocket signals for a barrage. The assigned artillery at about 12.00 o'clock laid down fire in "No Man's Land". At 12.30 the German barrage lifted and settled on the communications to the rear, centering around the canal courses. The garrisons of Yvonne and Odette, emerging from their dugouts where they had taken shelter from the shells, found their trenches full of Germans. The enemy raiders, close behind their barrage, had effected entry in four places, their pioneer detachments breaching the wire already damaged by shells. One party in a wave formation reached the rear of the Americans. Companies "L" and "I" of the 9th Infantry were attacked from front and rear in the dark and for two hours the combat was furious—man-to-man in the darkness, within the confines of the box barrage. While these companies were cut off by the hostile shells one of their runners managed to work his way to the rear and the report spread that Companies "L" and "I" were wiped out. This rumor reached the rolling kitchens. Thereupon Mess Sergeant Wiggins, Company "I", 9th Infantry, an old regular over forty years old, grabbed a rifle in one hand and a long carving knife in the other and, deserting his kitchen, hurried forward shouting, "Hell! 'I' Company's never wiped out as long as I am here". He reached his company and assisted in clearing the trenches of the invaders.

The Germans examined their prisoners at great length after this raid and drew certain conclusions duly set forth in their intelligence bulletins. They were most favorably impressed with the physique and personal courage of the Americans, but they lacked training and discipline. The Germans considered them excellent material, yet undeveloped. This conclusion was correct and natural as the 2d Division was still in the process of training and not yet ready for combat.

In the meanwhile a rocket signal brought down the American barrage behind the Germans to close their way of retreat. The attack penetrated half a mile behind our first lines and swept across the whole front of the center of resistance; then at a prearranged signal—a bugle call—the raiders began their way back. Many prisoners were taken and several machine guns carried off; but the American barrage, while too thin to prevent the German withdrawal, so seriously delayed and hampered it that half of the prisoners overpowered their captors and escaped, and most of the captured guns were abandoned. Although the raid was over at two o'clock in the morning the artillery fire continued until daylight.

The American loss was seven men killed, three officers and thirty-six men wounded, all from the 9th Infantry; one medical officer, nineteen men of the 9th Infantry and six of the hospital corps captured; one machine gun captured. The Germans lost one officer and fifty-nine men killed and eleven men captured. The enemy succeeded in evacuating his wounded.

Immediately following this raid Colonel L. S. Upton, 9th Infantry, reporting on the affair said as follows:

"This action is an excellent example of what determined men can do to win success even when almost everything is to the advantage of the enemy. Attention is invited to the list of names of those who rendered conspicuous service. It will be noted that many of these are of foreign origin. In this brigade there are not less than 25% of this class. In the training area, organization commanders almost gave up hope of ever making soldiers of them, not through any lack of willingness on the part of the men themselves, but on account of their lack of knowledge of English. Since arriving in this area, this class of men have in every engagement with the enemy fully demonstrated that they have a fierce fighting ability and that they will stick to their work to the bitter end. . . . It is evident that with patience and painstaking effort in the training of this class, we can develop fighters who will measure up to our best American traditions."¹⁶

A detailed plan for a raid upon the Germans by the 23d Infantry was prepared by Colonel Malone and approved at Division Headquarters on April 14th.¹⁷ The purpose was to capture prisoners and, incidentally, to damage the hostile works. Captain Otto F. Lange, designated to command, was given a detachment of nine officers and a hundred and fifty men from the regiment at large. Artillery support was furnished by three light batteries of the 15th Field Artillery, four heavy batteries of the 17th and five French light batteries. A German salient in front of Vaux-les-Palameix, where the trenches were known to be weakly held, was selected as the point of entry. The detachment was assembled, the enemy's defenses marked out on suitable ground behind our lines, and the raid was rehearsed. After six days of training Captain Lange reported himself ready and the time was fixed as April 21st at 4.10 A.M., just before daylight. The raid was executed as planned and was valuable as a matter of training, but the German trenches were found unoccupied and no prisoners were taken. However, a German patrol which came out immediately after the return of the raiding party, was intercepted, its leader killed and one man captured. These Germans belonged to the 217th Reserve Infantry of the 225th Division which confirmed existing information on the hostile order of battle.¹⁸

The men of the 2d Division had been fortunate in the small number of men lost from gas, but on April 13th there occurred an unfortunate event. The 74th Company of Marines at Fontaine-St. Robert, placed in support of the 1st Battalion of the 6th Marines, occupied an open camp about a mile from the front lines. They were in Adrian Barracks sunk about three feet in the ground, with no adequate shell protection. Their bunks were in double tiers with chicken wire springs and mattresses. In the early hours of April 13th this camp was heavily bombarded, gas shells breaking into the barracks. One shell exploded in a barrack where sixty men were sleeping. Gas masks were not put on promptly or were removed too soon and the mustard gas took a toll of two hundred and ninety five, including all officers. The total deaths eventually reached forty. This event served to improve the gas discipline of the division.

On April 17th an important change was made in the command over this front. The X Corps Headquarters were withdrawn and sent to the region of the Oise. Headquarters of the II Colonial Corps (General Blondlat) were established in their place. One of the first orders of the new commander provided for a further increase in the responsibilities of the 2d Division. This order divided each sector into halves, grouping the American infantry by brigades. Each French division then became a little army corps, having a French and an American brigade sector. This was effected by movements of regiments; no change was made in the centers of resistance.¹⁹

Preparations were immediately commenced for the next step—the formation of an independent sector for the 2d Division. This was ordered by the Second Army on May 1st. It was intended that the division should remain in position not to exceed a month, to assure smooth working of all headquarters and to continue maneuvers in the open fields; then to move to an active front.²⁰

The necessary troop movements began, but were never completed; the French 127th Division was assigned to the II Colonial Corps on May 9th to replace the 2d which was ordered withdrawn to the rear areas in anticipation of its assignment to another army. Commenting on the occupation of this sector, General Eugene Savatier of the French Army, said the sector had been a quiet one, but when the Americans arrived this all changed. "They (the Americans) were irrepressible ! If the night relief took place without a hitch and in the deepest silence, as soon as the sun was high enough some of the doughboys, who had no place in the front line, wanted absolutely to 'see the Boche' and 'to kill the Boche'. They climbed like cats into the highest trees (the sector, as I have said, was in the woods), and began to fire on the enemy sentries or on the platoons which from the heights of their observation posts they could see running between the first and second line trenches."²¹

On May 9th an advanced section of 2d Division headquarters was opened at Robert-Espagne, six miles west and south of Bar-le-Duc, and the troops were gradually drawn into quarters scattered over a wide area between Bar-le-Duc and Vitry-le-Francois. The first regiment to move was the 9th Infantry; the last, the 12th Field Artillery which reached its new position on May 15th.²²

During its tour in the lines, there had been numerous changes in the officers of the division. All the brigadiers were new—General E. M. Lewis in place of General Murray in the 3d Brigade; General James G. Harbord for General Doyen in the 4th; General William Chamberlaine for General Irwin in the artillery. Colonel Merrill had turned over the 15th Field Artillery to Lieutenant Colonel J. R. Davis. At Division Headquarters Colonel Preston Brown had relieved Colonel Tebbets as Chief of Staff.

The training of the division had been of two kinds—prac-tical experience by battalions in line and support, formal instruction for those in the third line; this formal instruction directed entirely towards preparation for service in the trenches.²³ There was among our men and junior officers a strong inclination to rashness and carelessness of exposure and much uncertainty as to the proper degree and methods of protection against gas. Many orders and memorandums dealing with these points are found among the papers of units of all grades. As the men acquired facility and confidence in the trenches, however, the American preference for maneuvers in the open reasserted itself. The division staff seems to have been studying all reports that could be obtained of the heavy fighting in the Northwest; notes on the method used were prepared from time to time and issued to the regiments. In these, emphasis was laid upon absence of defensive works and reliance upon holes dug by individuals—the old Civil War hasty entrenchments; upon mobility and flexibility of the infantry, and development of fire power by mobile light machine guns; upon the use of large numbers of heavy machine guns as an intermediate link between the infantry and the artillery; upon artillery preparations for attack by short concentrations upon select key points; upon the difficulty and necessity of maintaining communications during action and upon means for accomplishing it; and upon the need for simplification and lightening of headquarters and staff work. This tendency towards mobility was much encouraged by General Pétain's instructions of April 9th, already quoted. General Pershing at once took advantage of it to reiterate his instructions as to training along these lines, and directed that all troop units not in line should be continually exercised in maneuvers of this nature.²⁴

An interesting result of experience in the front line was the recommendation sent in from headquarters of the 23d Infantry looking towards the organization of special assault units.²⁵ It suggested independent assault battalions, each of six companies.

The Indian Head Divisional insignia was originated during the stay in Lorraine. The Supply Train commander, Lieutenant Colonel William F. Herringshaw, had been attracted by the devices used by the French to identify their trucks, so he called upon his train to submit designs for a 2d Division insignia. The Indian Head, submitted by Sergeant Louis B. Lundy, Company "A", 2d Supply Train, modified by a design submitted by Sergeant John Kenny, Company "B", 2d Supply Train, was adopted. This device appeared upon the trucks in April, 1918 and was later accepted as the insignia of the Division and was officially recognized shortly after the Armistice.²⁶