AT THE opening of the year 1918, the Allies were playing a waiting game, their eyes turned toward America. As early as July, 1917, General Pétain had written:

"The Allies will not acquire numerical superiority until the American Army is in a position to send a considerable number of divisions into the lines. Until then we must if we are to avoid ruinous losses maintain a waiting attitude, with the definite intention, at the proper moment, to resume the offensive, which alone can secure us the final victory."

The collapse of Russia made this necessity the more urgent. From December, 1917, to March, 1918, the Germans were transporting divisions from east to west at the rate of ten per month, all the railways could carry.¹ The French estimate was that for the opening of the 1918 campaign the Germans would have two hundred divisions against the Allies' one hundred and eighty, counting in the four American divisions (1st, 2d, 26th and 42d) which could be considered as available and counting them each as equal to two French divisions.²

The French plan was to avoid operations until the Americans appeared in force; meanwhile to concentrate their efforts upon increase and reorganization of artillery, air service and tanks.

In such minor operations as might be undertaken it was intended that the artillery play the principal part; this would minimize losses in the infantry, give them easy, if small, victories, and tend to restore the confidence which they had in some measure lost.³ But the German opportunity, if actual, was transitory. They also had their eyes fixed upon America. They must strike at once if at all. The internal situation in Germany was alarming. The training and discipline of the garrison army was unsatisfactory and the drafts for the field army were inadequate.⁴

An early offensive was the only hope. And so the army, so carefully trained in the defensive to hold during active operations on other fronts, had now to be trained anew for the attack. All the old principles of the pre-war regulations had to be reinculcated, and the point of view changed from the trenches to the open.⁵ This training was begun early in the winter and by February fifty-eight divisions had passed through the course, a number closely corresponding to the total number in reserve.⁶

The attack came on March 21st. It was directed upon Amiens, the junction point of the railway system of central and northern France. If the Germans could control this point they would bring about a tactical separation of the French and British fronts. This tactical separation they hoped to exploit strategically and politically, breaking the alliance and so ending the war.⁷

For a time success seemed almost within the grasp of the Germans—almost, but not quite. They overran the great triangle nearly sixty miles wide along the old line and thirty miles deep, with its apex just short of Amiens. The British Army on the active front was badly shattered, but new lines were established with such forces as were available, including railway and labor troops from the lines of communication. The French sent support to the danger point and also extended their line to the north to release British troops.⁸ This narrow escape brought about several important changes. The first we have already seen; American divisions began to assume greater responsibilities on quiet fronts, releasing French divisions for the great battle. The decisive change, however, was the establishment of unity of command on the entire Allied front.

In 1914 the several Allied armies were completely independent. The British and Belgian commanders conformed in general to the plans of General Joffre, but he was without authority over them. For a time General Foch acted as his representative with the Armies of the Allies, to present his point of view and to promote cooperation. Later, a system of conferences of the separate commanders was instituted. In the Spring of 1917, the British Armies were temporarily placed under the orders of a new commander-in-chief, General Nivelle; but his campaign failed and the single command ended. Later in that year, a Supreme War Council was created. In February, 1918, attempts were made to organize an Inter-Allied Reserve, under the control of this Council, but without success. In March the only semblance of such a reserve was an agreement between Marshal Haig and General Pétain for mutual support in emergencies.

But the attack of March 21st compelled action. On the 24th both the French and British commanders made to their governments propositions looking toward a single command. On the 25th General Pershing visited General Pétain at Compiegne and definitely arranged for the separate use of the American divisions ready for service, under French command, setting aside for the time being the formation of American larger units. He mentioned also the other American troops in France or to arrive and offered their assistance.⁹

On March 26th, in a meeting held at Doullens, an agreement was reached under which General Foch was given certain powers for coordinating the action of the French and British forces. On March 28th, General Pershing visited him at Bombon, and placed all of the American forces unreservedly at his disposal.¹⁰

The American point of view had always been that single command was essential. General Bliss, our representative on the Supreme War Council, felt it so strongly that he had advised making American military assistance conditional upon it. A new meeting was now held at Beauvais on April 3d at which representatives of all the governments were present, and General Foch was designated as actual Commander-in-Chief on the entire front.¹¹

The new command system dealt with the final phases of the Amiens attack but was immediately tested again in a new place. On April 9th the Germans attacked again, this time on the Lys. They calculated that all British reserves had now been drawn south; that the new point of attack was so far north that French aid could not reach it; and that their own remaining fresh divisions might gain there the victory that had not been obtained at Amiens.¹²

The new Commander-in-Chief was able to send French reserves in time, and American divisions were moved to replace them. The common peril had brought the single command into existence; only American reserves could make it effective. General Pershing's work then had but just begun. He had now, on the one hand, to furnish the necessary troops; on the other, to see to it that they were not so disseminated that an American army could never be constituted.

The constant demand of the Allies on General Pershing was for infantry in the largest number possible, but in the smallest possible units. Their real aim was to incorporate our men into their units as replacements for their own losses. We consented to the idea of expediting the transport of infantry at the expense of other arms, to meet an emergency; we accepted the necessity of delaying the complete assembly of our divisions and of their formation into higher units; but we never brought ourselves to the abandonment of our program.¹³

As an illustration of what might have been the result had we accepted the policy advocated by the Allies the following is pertinent. Four regiments of colored infantry intended for the 93d division had arrived in France, but the rest of the division had not been organized. These regiments were placed at the disposal of the French and had been scattered from Alsace to Champagne in different French corps, with no divisional organization to bind them together. They remained isolated French units until the end of the war, and few of our people today know that they ever existed.

No sooner had the regiments of the 2d Division assembled about Robert-Espagne than they began a movement to the region of Chaumont-en-Vexin in the Department of the Oise, south and west of Beauvais which is midway between Paris and Amiens.¹⁴ This move was by rail except the motor transportation which went by road. Final destinations were to be communicated to the motor column at Pontoise; to the troops at the regulating stations. The first train left in the morning of May 15th, the last, early in the morning of the 22d. Advanced headquarters was opened at Chaumont-en-Vexin at noon on the 19th; old headquarters closed on the morning of the 21st. The movement was completed on the 23d.¹⁵ The completion of the movement called for marches by the troops to their billets. The weather had turned warm and fair and regimental diaries mention that the men suffered from the heat, burdened with heavy packs and articles of trench warfare.

The division at once resumed training, taking up what had originally been conceived as the third and fina l phase—that is, operations of the division as a whole. Stabilized positions were now forgotten; free maneuver was the order of the day. General Foch was now issuing training orders along the same lines as Pershing and Pétain—simplicity, flexibility, boldness, speed, and unlimited objectives for the larger commands.¹⁶ But training did not continue long; brigade maneuvers held on the 29th ended this phase. On the 30th orders were received to move by marching to the vicinity of Beauvais establishing headquarters at Auneuil.¹⁷

The moment the attack at Amiens was checked, the Allied Commander-in-Chief had begun preparations for a counterattack on a large scale.¹⁸ This operation was delayed by the second attack on the Lys, but it was not abandoned and again took definite form late in May. Execution of it was assigned to the French Group of Armies of the Reserve (General Fayolle). The attack upon the south face of the German salient was to be made by the Third Army (General Humbert), upon the point by the right of the First Army (General Debeney); and upon the north face by the remainder of the First Army and by the British Fourth Army (General Rawlinson), supported by the French Tenth Army (General Maistre). The date was set tentatively for June 15th, and several small preliminary operations were undertaken, one of which, the Cantigny attack of our 1st Division, is of special interest to Americans.¹⁹

The 2d Division was being moved up towards a point of the salient, with a view to its use in this operation; the general impression was that it was to relieve the 1st Division in line. This speculation in no wise interferred with the training of the 2d Division who continued their daily terrain exercises and the practice of mimic warfare over a peaceful countryside. May 30th was Memorial Day and there was no drill. Regimental bands played "Departed Days" at noon, and appropriate exercises were held commemorating the dead of past wars. On this same day orders were issued with the necessary march tables and administrative orders for the movement to Beauvais²⁰ and parties were sent forward in trucks to arrange for quarters. But in the afternoon these orders were countermanded and the parties recalled. A serious emergency had arisen. The Germans had launched a new attack farther east.²¹

The attack on the British front had, it is true, come to a standstill, but the reason for making it was still valid. Reserves had been drawn north to such an extent that immediate resumption of operations there promised nothing. It became necessary for the Germans to strike the French front so as to draw reserves south again. This having been accomplished, the Germans could then return to their original purpose—the blow toward the Channel and the defeat of the British.

The region of Paris was, of course, the sensitive part of the French lines. The front selected was between Soissons and Reims—the Chemin des Dames. This front was very strong both naturally and artificially; but for this very reason it had been weakened in troops. Along it had been placed British and French divisions, exhausted in the battles of the North, for rest and recuperation. On the German side of the line the roads and railways were conveniently arranged so that troops about the railway centers of Maubeuge, Hirson and Mezieres could be shifted easily to that of Laon. In view of the purpose of the operation, its scope was limited; the line of the Vesle was regarded as the limit.²²

Early in April the Army Group of the German Crown Prince was called upon to submit a plan. Divisions that had fought on the Somme and on the Lys were to be used again; since these could not be ready before the end of May, the attack had to be deferred until then, although it was realized that the Americans were becoming more of a menace every day.²³

The front was held, on the German side, by the Seventh Army (General von Boehn); on the French, by the Sixth Army (General Duchene). The attack was made early in the morning of May 27th. The concentration had been skillful and the surprise was almost complete. By evening the Germans had penetrated twelve miles and reached Fismes, where they held the line of the Vesle River on a front of six miles. The French had engaged all reserves within reach, eleven divisions in all; the Germans had not had to strengthen their line materially.²⁴

On the 28th the advance continued and the Germans gained the high ground south of the Vesle, from Rheims to Soissons. Thus the original intention had been carried out with little loss and the attackers were agreeably surprised at their own success. It was decided to exploit the success to the utmost and to go on to the Marne.

Accordingly, on the 29th, the front of the attack was extended, and attacks were directed toward Soissons and Rheims; the former was successful, the latter failed. The advance in the center continued, and on the 30th reached the Marne near Mont-St.-Pere. As for attracting French reserves success had been complete; divisions had been sent from as far as the Vosges and beyond Amiens.

The Germans had secured a foothold on the Marne and control of the railroad to Verdun, so the reason for directing the axis of the attack south had ceased to exist. The operations tended now to exploitation of the success both eastward and westward. They included an effort to establish a bridgehead at Château-Thierry, further attempts to encircle Reims, and moves to cut off the Forest of Villers-Cotterets by driving wedges south and east of it.²⁵

The German reserves had been fully absorbed, and in the ordinary course of events little further progress was to be expected, but the situation was of grave danger to the French. The German lines were close to Paris; air raids and long distance bombardments were breaking the spirit of the city; the Germans on the Marne were confident and jubilant; the French badly demoralized. As for French reserves, the situation was alarming enough. On June 1st General Pétain summed it up thus: Since May 27th thirty-two French and five British divisions had been engaged on this front. Of these seventeen had been completely exhausted, two or three so badly that it seemed hopeless ever to reconstitute them. Other troops to become available within the next few days were the four divisions of the Tenth Army coming from the North; one division, the last reserve in Alsace; three divisions in process of relief in quiet sectors by others badly shattered on the Somme and on the Lys; and one Italian division. Nine in all. "Et c'est tout."²⁶

In this situation any further German success, even a local one, might lead to the most serious results. A new, fresh force was urgently needed and only the Americans could furnish it.

First came the attempt to establish the bridgehead. The Germans occupied that part of Château-Thierry north of the river but failed to cross. Here the American Third Division went into action; its divisional machine gun battalion, motor equipped, preceded the rest of the division and took part in a defense of Château-Thierry Bridge on May 31st.

Meanwhile the Germans began to reach westward between the Marne and the Forest of Villers-Cotterets, and here the American 2d Division was arriving from the direction of Paris.