AS WE have seen, orders for the 2d Division to move toward Beauvais had been countermanded on the afternoon of May 30th. At 5.00 o'clock a dusty automobile stopped at Division headquarters and a French staff officer got out. He gave a short summary of the critical situation and delivered orders for the division to start for Meaux, which is on the Marne twenty-five miles west of Château-Thierry and about fifty-six miles from Chaumont-en-Vexin. Trucks were to be provided for the infantry; no transportation for other troops or trains. Later another French staff officer brought word that the troops would go by rail except motor transport which would move by its own power.

Work was at once begun preparing the necessary march tables. To save time, instructions were sent to the troops by telephone and courier, later to be embodied in formal orders.¹

The movement began at 5.00 o'clock in the morning of the 31st. The Division Chief of Staff, Colonel Preston Brown, went ahead by motor to prepare for the arrival of the troops at Meaux. On the way he stopped in Paris, went to the American Provost Marshal's office and reported the new dispositions by telephone to Colonel Malin Craig, Chief of Staff of the I Corps at Neufchateau. He requested that rations, ammunition and hospital supplies be sent immediately to Meaux, for this move separated the troops from their trains.

At Meaux, Colonel Brown met the Division Adjutant, Colonel Bessell, who had already established a temporary office; then he went on to Trilport, two miles further east, to report-at headquarters of the French Sixth Army. Excitement ran high here, and no staff officer was able to explain clearly the situation or to give any definite orders. Finally he found General Duchene, the Army commander, and reported the troops of the 2d Division on their way. He pointed out that the roads were filled with an ever increasing stream of refugees and that there would be great confusion if the trucks carrying fifteen thousand American infantry ran into Meaux; he recommended that these trucks be routed north of that town to the vicinity of May-en-Multien, and that the troops prepare to occupy a defensive line along the Clignon Brook facing north toward Soissons, its left on the Ourcq.²

General Duchene approved this plan, which would bring the division into the territory of the VII Corps. It would appear that he thought later in the day of sending one brigade to the XXI Corps, further east; but this idea was never communicated to the division.³ The only trace of it is in a note from the XXI Corps directing the 4th Brigade to bivouac for the night at Domptin, about six miles west of Château-Thierry. This order was never carried out. During the evening a pencilled order from General Duchene was received confirming the assignment to the VII Corps and giving further details as to the line to be occupied.

Now to return to the troops.

The first train got away on schedule; then delays began. Finally at 2.00 P.M., the division entraining officer was informed that only thirty-two of the allotted fifty trains could be furnished. Assignments were modified so that the artillery could be transported, but the machine guns and animal-drawn trains had to move overland.⁴

The last day of May was clear, but sweltering hot. The night before, long trains of motor trucks arrived in the division area driven by Tonquinese, Annamites and men from Madagascar.

The infantry and engineers formed at dawn, breakfasted from their rolling kitchens and boarded the trucks. All motor transportation moved away under their own power.

The route of the truck trains, one for each battalion, was through Marines, Pontoise and St.-Denis.

Their infantry of the 2d Division began to arrive at May-en-Multien at 4.30 P. M. and all were in before midnight. Orders were issued for their distribution and for the reconnaissance of the proposed defensive line. A later order designated another line a little farther west, its right instead of its left on the Ourcq but as will appear later, events prevented the movement in this direction.⁵

These dispositions of the 2d Division had been made with the belief that the German advance was from the direction of Soissons, but during the afternoon pressure began to be felt from Château-Thierry. As a consequence, the division was withdrawn from the VII Corps, assigned to the XXI Corps (General Degoutte), and ordered to concentrate in the region of Montreuil-aux-Lions in reserve behind the threatened front. Division orders⁶ were issued accordingly, assigning the 3d Brigade to the area east of Montreuil and north of the Paris Road, the 4th Brigade to a corresponding area south of this road and the artillery to the Cocherel area in rear. The troops moved by forced marching, and their weary columns began to arrive at Montreuil just after daybreak, the 9th Infantry leading.

The division commander had now come up and joined his chief of staff at Coupru where Corps headquarters was operating. Here Captain Mattfeldt, Adjutant of the 9th Infantry, reported, bringing the glad tidings of his regiment approaching and seeking orders—much to the relief of the French staff officers, who had seen the column in foreign uniform and thought the Germans were in their rear.⁷

Firing could be heard from both the north and the east from small bodies of French troops fighting rear-guard action. The danger to the east, however, seemed the more pressing. German infantry was already on the 204 Meter Hill west of Château-Thierry, only four miles from Corps Headquarters. The Americans should be used there—but how?

The French plan had been to send their fresh troops as they arrived straight into action. Here, "overwhelmed by numbers, they evaporated immediately like drops of rain on white-hot iron." ⁸ The emergency seemed so urgent that the French proposed the same thing for the fresh regiments coming up. The Americans demurred. They pointed out that the artillery and machine guns were not yet up; that the men now arriving were tired from long truck travel and from an all-night march; that their ammunition was limited to that carried on their persons; that an attack by a few unsupported battalions could accomplish nothing. They proposed that the troops

General Degoutte still seemed doubtful. Could the Americans hold? Colonel Brown, the Division Chief of Staff told him: the words set at the head of this narrative:

"General, these are American regulars. In a hundred and fifty years they have never been beaten. They will hold." ^8a

The most seriously endangered part of the selected line semed [sic] to be the right. Hence the leading regiment, the 9th Infantry, was ordered to deploy south of the Paris Road, its left at le Thiolet, the Corps orders' read in part as follows:

"The enemy is attacking on the front Etrepilly—Hill 190—la Gonetrie and a little farther south. We have lost la Gonetrie and the enemy is gaining ground in the direction of Bouresches. Hence it is absolutely necessary that the line agreed upon this morning be occupied without a moment's delay by one of your regiments. If the 23d has not yet arrived, I beg that you direct your first available regiment to that line. As agreed upon with you this morning, this regiment will be under the orders of General Michel, commanding the 43d Division, until you take over command of a part of the front."

In transmitting this order to General Michel the French corps commander added:

"The mission of this regiment will be to organize and if necessary to defend the support line indicated above. It will not be engaged for any other purpose."

The regiment there was to extend the right of the French 43d Division. Immediately in front elements of the French 164th Division (General Gaucher), mingled with several others, were engaged in desultory fighting, gradually falling back. The deployment of the Americans was observed by the Germans but not seriously disturbed; their artillery was too far behind.' The position was occupied quietly and at leisure. By noon two battalions held (if that word can be used of so great an extension) the line from le Thiolet to Bonneil, five thousand yards; the remaining battalion was in reserve. The prompt arrival of American troops was so urgent that (June 1st) General Harbord took possession of a section of the divisional supply train, which at the time was unloading rations and small arm ammunition in the area and went back along the highway toward Montreuil, picking up the nearest marching battalion of the 6th Marines. General Harbord himself rode in his car ahead of the leading truck.

The next regiment to become available was the 6th Marines. They had been the last to leave the Chaumont-eri-Vexin area, hence had not been diverted to May-en-Multien. By the time it reached Meaux the new dispositions had been made and its trucks came direct to Montreuil. It marched to the front as soon as the road was cleared by the 9th, and deployed in the territory of the French 43d Division (General Michel) on a front of seven thousand yards, two battalions in line and one in reserve. Thus two American regiments formed a skeleton line stretching across the entire front of the XXI Corps, supporting the scattered and mixed French detachments in their front.

The positions, it will be noted, were the reverse of those specified in Field Order No. 5 of the day before: the 3d Brigade was now on the right, the 4th on the left.

The 5th Marines and the 23d Infantry had gone to May-en-Multien where they bivouacked. On the morning of June 2d these regiments marched forward and were placed in reserve. Meanwhile, the supply trains were distributing ammunition and rations; the machine gun battalions, the artillery and the engineers were arriving division headquarters had been established at Montreuil. Corps headquarters moved back seven miles to Chamigny. Written orders were issued at 6.00 P. M., June 1st, describing all these dispositions in detail.¹⁰

Emergency movements were not yet completed however. At midnight orders were received to reestablish connection with the VII Corps on the left, where a gap of two miles existed. The 23d Infantry, with a battalion of the 5th Marines, part of the 5th Machine Gun Battalion and a company of engineers was placed under the orders of General Michel, commanding the French 43d Division, and sent to the vicinity of Gandelu in the territory of the VII Corps. In the course of the morning it had established the connection with its right at the Bois de Vaurichart and its left at Brumetz.¹¹

Out of the Division's total strength of 25,614 men, 13,000 were infantry which were thus distributed along a front of eleven miles. Fortunately, there was no attack though a few men were wounded by German artillery fire.

Early in the morning of June 1st between May-en-Multien, Montreuil and the Ourcq towns, the marching troops had picked their way through the last of the tide of refugees, but when they left the road in the afternoon and went into position the country before them was drained of human life. Around the farm houses they found cows, rabbits and fowl left behind unfed. At Cocherel, where the artillery went into position, a message was found scrawled on the door of a deserted home: "Papa, nous sommes parties a Rue—Lizy-sur-Ourcq." The mother and children had been obliged to abandon their home while their man was laboring in the fields.¹² In the area where they deployed were groups of French artillery and scattered infantry. "Which way," said a young soldier as they left their trucks and went across the fields from the highway, "is this here line?" "Line, Hell," an old sergeant replied. "We're going to make a line." ¹³

The situation on June 2d was critical. Corps orders¹⁴ defining and organizing the new line said: "No retirement will be thought of on any pretext whatsoever."

On the 3d, German progress was limited to rectification of lines—occupation of ground flanked by other advances, and hence yielding easily. The French showed more spirit with the arrival of the Americans and now made several small counter-attacks.

During the night of June 3-4 the 2d Division took over the right sector of the Corps front, relieving the 164th Division. Detachments in front withdrew through its lines except parties of dismounted cavalry in the Bois de la Marette who were attached to the 3d Brigade. The line was shortened slightly on the right, where the XXXVIII Corps extended to la Nouette relieving a battalion of the 9th Infantry. A battalion of the 5th Marines had gone into line on the left of the 6th.

The front of the division was now nine thousand yards; but the 23d Infantry with its attached machine guns and engineers was still in the territory of the VII Corps. The division's artillery and machine guns were all in position and six battalions of French artillery had been attached.¹⁵

Château-Thierry on the Marne was about four miles east of the center of the American front lines and fifty miles east of Paris. The American troops were in a sun-drenched countryside of rolling wheatlands set with woods that crowned the hills and followed the valleys of the small streams. Low, sprawling farm houses and wide substantial barns with stone walls and roofs of thatch and tile were set among the fields of wheat. Orchards and pastures were here and there. Crossing this landscape was the Paris-Metz Road between tall poplars. Obscure stone villages, nestled in the fold of the hills, were soon to give their names to history. Country roads, passable in dry weather, wound between them and fed into the highway. To the west was the Ourcq flowing in a curved line to join the Marne at Meaux, and a small stream soon to be known to the 2d Division, the Clignon Brook, ran westward to the Ourcq, confined within a narrow valley. The northern heights of the Clignon overlooked the southern crest. The dominating feature of this landscape was the 204 Meter Hill (so named from its elevation given on the French maps where it stood) at the bend of the Marne just west of Château-Thierry. This hill towered over Bonneil and the Marne Valley south, looked along the Paris-Metz Road as far west as the Coupru-Lucy-le-Bocage Road, the very center of the American position, and it commanded Bouresches and the Bois de Belleau.

During the day the rolling kitchens arrived and messing was once more established on a systematic basis. The men had had no regular hot meals since leaving Chaumont.¹⁶ They had been compelled to draw upon their reserve rations, though the more fortunate found abandoned fowl and vegetables which immediately went into the pot.

On this day occurred the incident about which has grown up the "Retreat, Hell—we just got here !" story. The Division Journal of Operations says "in one case a retreating French officer gave a written order which was not obeyed." This happened in the 6th Marines. The original message reporting it is as follows: "3.10 P. M. To Battalion Commander, 2d Battalion. The French Major gave Captain Corbin written orders to fall back. I have countermanded the order. . . . Lloyd W. Williams, Capt., U. S. M. C." Another similar incident occurred in the 82d Company (Company "I") 6th Marines, but the details are not of record.¹⁷

June 4th was quiet. There was artillery fire on both sides and the German air service was active, but infantry movements on either side were unimportant. That night the French 167th Division relieved the 43d, permitting the 23d Infantry with its attached troops to return to their own division. The 167th extended slightly to the right taking over territory from the 5th Marines.

The 23d Infantry went in on the left of the 9th, taking over from the 6th Marines the front from le Thiolet to Triangle Farm. All four infantry regiments were now in line, each on a front of about two thousand yards with two battalions in line and one in reserve; all properly grouped by brigades. The only French troops remaining were three battalions of artillery—two of 75 mm guns and one of 155 mm howitzers—attached to the 2d Field Artillery Brigade. The second line of the 23d Infantry and the 5th Marines were at the disposal of the brigade commanders; that of the 9th Infantry, with the 4th Machine Gun Battalion, was held in Division reserve, and that of the 6th Marines as a Corps reserve. The engineer regiment was divided between the brigades for entrenching work. The 12th Field Artillery, as usual, supported the 4th Brigade, the 15th, the 3d Brigade; the 17th was in general support. The French light guns were grouped with the 12th, the howitzers directly under orders of the Artillery Brigade commander.

These new dispositions were announced in written orders at 10.00 A. M., June 5th.¹⁸ There had, however, been a definite identification of the Division, for German patrols on June 4th in the Champillon picked up the corpse of a 6th Marine which they carried back to headquarters. It was the first American they had seen. The emergency period with its shifts and expedients was now over. The Germans showed no disposition to advance. In fact the German IV Reserve Corps which was opposite the Americans was preparing a defensive line.¹⁹ The active front was now farther north in the region of Noyon and Montdidier. The 2d Division occupied a line in full force, with normal dispositions ready to undertake orderly operations. The French 167th Division, on the left of the 2d was in a similar situation.