GEN. DEGOUTTE, the Corps Commander, felt able to assume the initiative on a small scale, and issued orders at 3.00 P. M. on June 5th for a general advance the next day to rectify the line and to secure stronger ground.¹ The 167th was to move at 3.45 in the morning and seize the high ground south of the Clignon; the 2d Division would advance its left accordingly. Later in the day, and upon completion of this operation, the 2d would attack in turn, straighten out the German salient at Lucy-le-Bocage, capture the Bois de Belleau and occupy the high ground overlooking Belleau and Torcy.

Both of these operations were in the territory of the 4th Brigade (General Harbord) . Having secured his instructions at Division Headquarters, Harbord issued his orders at 10.25 P. M., directing an advance by his left battalion—the 1st Battalion of the 5th Marines (Major Turrill) —guiding on the French. Its front was to be about eight hundred yards, both flanks well marked by ravines and roads; the depth of advance about a thousand yards to a crossroad shown on the map. Two machine gun companies were to support the attack. The 3d Battalion of the same regiment (Major Berry) was to advance its left, keeping touch. A half hour artillery preparation was provided for, and support by all of the artillery of the division. Two companies of the 1st Battalion were still in the territory taken over by the 167th Division, but these were expected to rejoin during the morning.²

These companies did not arrive, however, and Major Turrill moved out with only half his battalion. The machine gun companies also were late, so support was arranged for by another company from the 6th Machine Gun Battalion in position north of Champillon.

The road was reached about 6.30 A. M. and the men dug in. Some parties crossed the road and went on as far as Torcy, but were killed or driven back. The missing companies came up, and more machine guns, and the regimental commander sent an additional company from the reserve battalion to assure connection with the French on the left. An engineer company joined and served with rifles as well as with entrenching tools. The 3d Battalion had advanced but slightly, and the right of the 1st was badly exposed, but fortunately the two German companies which were in position to enfilade its line were themselves in danger and well satisfied to be left alone. Our losses had been ten officers and four hundred men; about twenty prisoners had been taken.³

The American attack had fallen upon the junction point of the German 197th and 237th Divisions. Both report the action severe all along the line; all local reserves were used, and two battalions with a battery from Corps reserve had been moved up in readiness behind the 197th. The American part of the attack included a battalion of the 460th Infantry and one of the 462d, both of the 237th Division; a battalion of the 273d, and one of the 7th Saxon Jäger, both of the 197th Division. Their losses are not reported in sufficient detail to determine those at this time and place.⁴

The French 167th Division had made satisfactory progress towards the Clignon, although connection with the Americans was faulty; and about noon the Corps commander directed the 2d Division to take up its part of the program—the reduction of the German salient at Lucy-le-Bocage.⁵

General Harbord with his 4th Brigade planned to carry out this operation in two phases; first, the capture of the Bois de Belleau, then the establishment of a line connecting with the French near Bussiares, thence running along the river overlooking Torcy and Belleau, and including the town of Bouresches. Written orders covering both phases were written shortly after 2.00 P. M.⁶

Northwest of Château-Thierry, in this same Marne country that had witnessed invasions since the time of Attila, the 2d Division was about to meet the German IV Reserve Corps and here the striking feature was the Clignon Valley.

Clignon Brook is small, nowhere very wide or very deep. It rises above Bonnes flowing southwest to Monthiers and Licy-Clignon, then due west to Ourcq. It has a narrow, deep valley hidden between abruptly rising slopes; hills that have some wooded areas, but are mostly under cultivation. Small brooks flow into the stream from both the north and south, meandering in narrow wooded valleys.

On the day the 2d Division arrived in their present area, June 1st, the French 43d Division was trying to hold the line of the Clignon, but having been driven back from the northern heights they undertook the defense of the southern covering the exits from the valley. They stood in the villages of Bouresches, Belleau, Torcy, Bussiares, and Gandelu; but the Germans forced them out. This Clignon Valley was necessary to the Germans as a sheltered line parallel to the Paris—Metz Road and only four miles north of it. Two of these exits demand special attention — those from Bussiares and from Belleau.

Belleau is very old, dating from the Eleventh Century. It had a church, then in ruins, but since restored, and about forty houses constructed in a deep depression. The ground to the south of the village rises abruptly to a bluff twenty feet high where one finds a clear, cold spring from which the village takes its name. Belleau had been in the track of the invasion in 1914 when the inhabitants were caught before they could run away.

Belleau Wood—Bois de Belleau—begins half a mile south of Belleau Village upon ground elevated from the surrounding wheat fields. It extends about two miles from north to south and a half a mile across at its widest part. When viewed from the air or on a map it reminds one of a kidney or an oyster, narrow in the middle.

In June, 1918, the forest of Belleau was in full leaf and in a state of nature. Tall hardwoods grew thickly; underneath in dense shadow was heavy underbrush and second growth. A. deep ravine cut the southern half. Within the woods are concealed a variety of contours unguessed from the map; knolls rise abruptly; great jagged boulders suddenly thrust themselves from the ground; particularly is such an outcropping seen crowning the heights on the southern face of the woods— grey, enormous stones, festooned with moss, a veritable citadel for the defense.

Such was the Bois de Belleau which was to be the object of General Harbord's attack.

The German 237th Division occupied this wood on June 3d.7 The American patrols had learned nothing as to the hostile force there, but from French sources the brigade commander had gained the impression that the defense was weak and that it would be possible to take the wood by a surprise attack without much artillery preparation.8 It must be remembered that at this time the Americans were not provided with good French maps. He therefore directed Major Berry to move his battalion at 5.00 P. M. straight east from the position it occupied after the morning's work, leaving one company to connect him with the battalion on his left. This would give him a front of about a mile and lead him through partly wooded ground against the northern mass of Belleau Wood. The 3d Battalion 6th Marines (Major Sibley) was to advance on his right, just north of Lucy-le-Bocage, and pass nearly lengthwise through the southern extension of the wood. Colonel Catlin, 6th Marines, was to command the attack.

The first phase being completed, Major Sibley's battalion was to continue its advance and take Bouresches; Major Berry's, farther to the left, was to take the ridge west of Torcy, and to maintain connection with the French. The 2d Battalion 6th Marines (Major Holcomb) formed the hinge to connect the 4th Brigade with the 3d, which remained in place; it was to send a company to Major Turrill, whose battalion had suffered heavily earlier in the day, and who, it will be remembered, already had one of Berry's companies. Colonel Catlin was to retain command of Berry's and Sibley's battalions; Lieutenant Colonel Feland, 5th Marines, was to direct Turrill's attack.

The written order merely confirmed and made of record verbal orders already given at conferences of commanders that had been held. Nothing is said of machine guns, since companies of this weapon had already been distributed along the line and no battalion was without them. Artillery support was to be arranged by the artillery brigade commander. Few details of it are of record, but according to the original plan all the guns were available.

But far from being weakly held, Belleau Wood contained a whole German regiment, the 461st of the 237th Division, with an effective strength according to the Division report of 28 officers and 1141 men.⁹ Its commander was Major Bischoff, an old colonial soldier who had seen much bush fighting in Africa.¹⁰

He had two battalions along the western and southwestern face of the northern wood, strengthened with machine guns and trench mortars. The long strip reaching out toward Lucy-le-Bocage was only lightly held. The reserve battalion was in the northern part of the wood. His front line was strongly held, local supports small and close his idea, as he explained it, was that counter-attack from any distance was impossible in this tangle.

At 5.00 o'clock the artillery opened fire on Belleau Wood and upon the roads and ravines in rear of it. The German reports indicate that the fire upon the wood was ineffective, but counter-battery work was good. At the same time, Colonel Catlin's two battalions moved out in four successive skirmish lines, smartly and regularly, too smartly and regularly for their own good, for the Germans report they afforded excellent targets. This regularity did not last long. Berry's battalion met machine gun fire in the open and was badly shattered. It reached the edge of the wood, but had to be withdrawn at night.

Major Sibley's battalion was a little more favored by the ground. Starting on a narrow front it opened out a little as it cleared the line, and advanced with an extension of about half a mile. Passing through the southern strip of the wood, its left came upon the German main position and was checked. The right went on, and the whole line pivoted to the left, extending along the south face of the northern wood.

Colonel Catlin had been wounded soon after the advance began. Learning of this a little before six o'clock, the brigade commander sent Lieutenant Colonel Lee of the same regiment to take his place. Hearing nothing from him, the brigade commander sent him urgent orders shortly before nine o'clock to push the attack. But it had taken time for Lee to find and consult with Catlin, and then locate his scattered troops and familiarize himself with the situation. At 9.15 he reported from the southwest corner of the wood. Sibley was there holding on, but unable to advance farther into the wood without the help of artillery. Berry's right company was with him. This report reached the brigade at 11.10. The brigade commander then ordered him to dig in; two companies of engineers, in Lucy, were placed at Lee's disposal for this purpose.

The first phase of the operation being at a standstill, the second was never attempted. Colonel Feland and Major Turrill, in the north, stood fast. In the south there was an advance to the second objective in Bouresches.

It will be remembered that Major Holcomb's battalion (the 2d of the 6th Marines) had been directed to maintain connections between the moving 4th Brigade and the stationary 3d. For this purpose, by Colonel Catlin's order, he advanced a second line company to follow up Sibley's right. When Sibley's line swung in against the south face of the wood, this company went on, found Bouresches in its front and entered the town. The left company of Holcomb's first line followed, reinforced the troops in the town and organized it for defense. For several hours the Bouresches group was isolated, under a heavy fire of artillery and machine guns, but the Germans made no attempt to retake the town. After dark, Sibley heard from Holcomb that his men were there and needed support, so he at once sent the right half of his battalion to the town, bringing its garrison up to a strength of six hundred men. Soon after midnight, a party of volunteers with a truck succeeded in reaching them with rations.¹¹

The total loss for the day in the 4th Brigade had been thirty-one officers and one thousand and fifty-six men, killed, wounded and missing.¹² This loss was chiefly in the rifle companies; losses were lighter in the machine gun companies. The German 237th Division, holding Belleau Wood, lost thirteen officers and two hundred and sixty-eight men; the 10th Division, about Bouresches, a hundred and fifty men in all. The 197th Division, farther to the north and west, lost more heavily, but the bulk of that division was engaged with the French 167th Division, only its left flank being engaged with the Americans.

The 3d Brigade had been informed early in the afternoon of the operations planned for the 4th, and had been instructed to conform. At 3.15 P.M. the brigade order was issued directing the 23d Infantry to advance its left battalion "where necessary to prevent a reentrant angle in the line near Triangle Farm." The regimental commander visited both battalions in line (the 3d, Major Elliott, on the right, and the 1st, Major Waddill, on the left), and marked for them on a map the line they were to occupy. The intention was that the movement should guide on the right element of the 4th Brigade; no special arrangements were made for artillery support since the operation was not regarded as serious. The plan was understood in the left battalion, but Major Elliott gained the impression that the advance was unconditional. He therefore moved out soon after five o'clock and at once became hotly engaged with the 398th Infantry of the German 10th Division which held Bouresches and the line immediately south of it on a front of two thousand yards, and with the extreme right of the 47th Infantry of the same division. Major Waddill, finding that the troops on his immediate left were not moving, made no advance until seven o'clock when, seeing that Elliott's left was exposed, he moved up to support him. Orders were sent forward directing a return to the original line, which was accomplished before daylight. The loss of the regiment was twenty-seven killed and two hundred and twenty-five wounded or missing.¹³

From the German point of view this attack looked serious for a time. The 398th Infantry had been engaged along its whole front—with the Marines at Bouresches and with the 23d opposite the Triangle. Neither attack was pressed, of course, and there was no real danger; but all available artillery and machine guns were called upon. The regiment was all in line and exhausted its rifle ammunition entirely. Two battalions of the 6th Grenadiers were placed at the disposal of the regiment, and were moved close up in rear of the left flank, bringing with them the needed ammunition for the 398th.¹⁴

The 9th Infantry also had some share in the operations of the day. The French XXXVIII Corps, on the right of the XXI, was to advance the 10th Colonial Division, and desired the 2d Division to push it right flank to a point half-way between. Vaux and Monneaux. This required a wheel by the right battalion of the 9th, pivoting on its left and pushing its right about half a mile forward. This was accomplished without serious resistance, but the regiment lost seventy-six men, chiefly from artillery fire.¹⁵

June 7th was quiet. The 4th Brigade was engrossed in preparations for a resumption of its attack upon Belleau Wood. On the German side, reliefs were in progress. The 197th Division from Bussiares to Torcy, and the 10th, at Bouresches, were relieved during the next few days by the 5th Guard and the 28th Divisions, respectively. The 237th, between them, remained in place, but its line was shortened five hundred yards, the 28th Division coming in a little to the right of the old position of the 10th and taking over a part of the line through Belleau Wood.¹⁶

In the early morning of the 8th the Germans showed some activity from Bouresches south, but attempted nothing serious. Our artillery shelled Belleau Wood during the night and at four o'clock in the morning Major Sibley made an effort to advance his line into the wood from the south, supporting his attack with Stokes mortars. Some little progress was made, but Major Bischoff's machine guns were skillfully placed, and as soon as one was taken another took the captor in flank. About noon the line was withdrawn to its former position on the edge of the wood. In the afternoon, by order of the brigade commander, it withdrew entirely from the wood and was placed under cover in a ravine to permit artillery fire upon the wood.¹⁷

During the day the artillery commander had visited 4th Brigade headquarters where a plan had been agreed upon for a systematic combined attack on the morning of the 10th. Meanwhile artillery fire was maintained continuously upon the wood and its vicinity.¹⁸

Orders for the attack¹⁹ were issued early in the morning of June 9th. The 1st Battalion, 6th Marines (Major Hughes), then in reserve, was designated to make the attack, and was moved after dark to a position facing the south edge of Belleau Wood. The attack was to be straight north, on a front of about a thousand yards, and was expected to clear out the southern extension of the wood and bring the lines up against the northern hill. Artillery was borrowed from the 164th Division, in reserve, and from the 197th Division on the left; in all, thirty light batteries and twelve batteries of 155 mm howitzers prepared and supported the attack. Fifteen light batteries and six heavy were to fire beyond the wood, from Torcy to Bouresches; the other fifteen light batteries fired a rolling barrage, passing the objective line in fifteen minutes from the start, continuing through the entire wood in seven minutes more, and resting thereafter a little beyond the northern and eastern boundaries; the six remaining heavy batteries superimposed their fire upon the light gun barrage. The program called for an ammunition expenditure of 28,000 rounds light and 6,000 heavy.²⁰

Guns from the brigade machine gun battalion at Bouresches laid a barrage along the road east of the wood, and others went forward with the attack. The battalion advanced at 4.30 A.M., June 10th. Lieutenant Colonel Lee reported to brigade headquarters that all was going well. The brigade liaison officer with the 6th Marines reported to the same effect. Major Hughes, commanding the attack, reported that the barrage was effective, requesting fire on the machine guns that covered the line of advance. At 5.20 the Marines notified Brigade that all was well and few machine guns were firing. From the message sent to Brigade it appeared that the artillery had completely cleared the wood. Major Hughes informed Brigade at seven o'clock that the artillery had "blown the Bois de Belleau to mince-meat", and the brigade commander transmitted this message by telephone to Division, substituting "Hell" for "mince-meat". By eight o'clock the battalion reported itself on the objective lines with the position consolidated. The loss was about forty. A nest of machine guns still held out in rear of its right; this had to be taken the next morning at a cost of twenty-five casualties.

It would appear that the line was actually about four hundred yards short of the objective. The Germans had made little resistance in the southern part of the wood, but their main line before which Major Sibley stopped was still intact.²¹

During the day, in response to a request from Division headquarters, the brigade commander expressed his desire to keep the borrowed artillery for another day, as he intended to attack the northern wood. Orders to this effect were issued the same morning, but it was found impossible to retain the three battalions of light guns from the 164th Division.

The 2d Battalion, 5th Marines (Lieutenant Colonel Wise), which had relieved the 3d Battalion in the Bois de Champillon, was directed to attack at 4.30 the next morning and to clear out the entire wood. The left flank of Major Hughes' battalion was supposed to be on the 169 Meter Hill, in the reentrant angle of the wood. The two battalions were to make contact and push their combined flanks northeast to the farther edge. Colonel Wise's left was to follow the road along the western edge. There the attack, starting on a five hundred yard front, would reach an extension of one thousand yards as it progressed, occupying the whole of the northeastern border. Artillery and machine gun support were provided substantially as for Major Hughes' attack, except for the absence of the nine light batteries above mentioned.

But the expected result was not accomplished. Major Hughes' flank was not where it was expected to be. The attacking battalion worked to the right looking for it and the intended extension of a thousand yards was not attained. The attack struck the boundary between the German 28th and 237th Divisions, which had been strengthened by a company of the 461st Infantry of the latter division, that had been posted in rear of the junction point expressly to maintain connection.

The hot resistance here drew the left flank of the attack in. When the line finally reached the farther edge of the wood, the company commanders, depending on imperfect and out-of-date maps, and mistaking their landmarks, reported themselves on their objective. As a matter of fact, its left was about where its right was expected to be and the larger part of the northern wood had not been touched. Reconnaissance made later developed this fact and the left of the line was bent back for defense. The position finally established was across the narrow neck of the wood about where Major Hughes had believed his line to be the day before. The loss had been seven officers and two hundred and twenty-two men, mostly from Colonel Wise's battalion. Many prisoners and machine guns had been captured. The German 461st Infantry had generally held its position; the 40th, of the 28th Division, had been almost driven out of the wood. The German loss was seventeen officers and seven hundred and sixty-three men, mostly in the 40th Infantry.²²

The night of June 11-12 was quiet. On the morning of the 12th, at a conference at Brigade headquarters, it was the feeling that while the Germans had not been dislodged from the northern wood, their hold there was precarious. Colonel Wise, whose battalion had received a hundred and fifty replacements and had been reinforced by two companies of engineers, believed that with some artillery support he could take the whole wood. Orders were issued accordingly—the 12th Field Artillery to shell the wood from 4.00 to 5.00 P.M., and Wise to move straight north at 5.00, extending across the whole wood. At 4.30 Colonel Wise asked that the artillery fire continue another hour, which was done. But light guns can do little execution in dense woods, and in this case the fire never even reached the German front lines, which were in close contact with ours and farther south than was supposed. Hence when Wise advanced he found the enemy ready for him. As the front broadened, connection along the line was lost, and soon all organization disappeared. Groops [sic] of men, under any officer or sergeant who happened to pick them up, worked forward independently, attacking gallantly each machine gun group as they found it, firing from the hip as they moved. In this manner they progressed, penetrated the German main line, and then what was left of the battalion actually came out on the northern edge of the wood. The German organization was completely broken; real resistance was at an end. A battalion of the German 110th Grenadiers, come to replace one of the 40th in the 28th Division, was dislodged completely. Fragments of the 461st, however, remained among the boulders in the north end of the wood.²³

At 8.40 Colonel Wise reported his battalion on its objective—the north end of the wood.

During the course of this action while the 2d Battalion of the 5th Marines was readjusting itself, a wounded German officer and forty-two men of the 461st Regiment, cut off in the thickets, surrendered under a white flag. The officer informed his captors that the Germans planned a counter-attack for the following morning. This news was immediately sent to Colonel Neville and on to the brigade.
The position in the wood evidently could not be held. The thin lines closed to the right to make contact with Major Hughes who had moved his left up in support. The northeastern border was held, but not the northern. The Germans soon returned from the north, and the remaining detachments of the 461st were strengthened and reorganized. Wise's line began to feel the pressure and was bent back to face north, forming the position later known as the Hook.

The loss in Colonel Wise's battalion on the 12th had been a hundred and fifty; in Major Hughes' battalion, fifty-four. During the two days' fight over four hundred prisoners had been taken, with sixty machine guns and ten mine throwers. Wise had three hundred men left for duty, besides his replacements, and one officer per company. Hughes had seven hundred men.²⁴

The Germans now opened an intense bombardment of the wood, the batteries of all three divisions between Bussiares and the Paris Road participating. Prisoners stated that a counter-attack was planned and preparation was made accordingly. The attack came at 4.00 A.M., along the whole eastern front of the wood, but was serious only at Bouresches. It was reported at first that the town was taken, but this proved to be an error.²⁵

On the 13th there was little activity, though during the night of the 13-14 and on the 14th German artillery continued harrassing [sic] fire, combining mustard gas shell with high explosives. The 1st and 2d Battalions of the 6th Marines had four hundred and fifty men gassed; the 3d Battalion, 23d Infantry, a hundred and fifty men.²⁶

The battalion last mentioned had come in at Bouresches during the night of the 13-14 in the course of a readjustment of lines. Ever since the 10th the condition of the 4th Brigade had been causing great anxiety; officers and men were exhausted, and kept up on sheer nerve. Early relief seemed necessary.²⁷ But no relief was available, but on this night the 3d Brigade extended its left to include Bouresches, correspondingly shortening the line of the 4th Brigade.²⁸

In the readjustment the 9th Infantry held the line from Monneaux to the woods north of Le Thiolet, facing nearly north; the 23d from there to include Bouresches, facing nearly east.²⁹

In the 4th Brigade regiments were completely intermingled, and the brigade commander had been compelled to deal directly with his battalions. The 5th, originally on the left, had a battalion at Bouresches; a battalion of the 6th had been loaned to the 5th and was on the extreme left south of Boussiares. A battalion of the 5th was next on its right in the Bois de Champillon, facing east towards the Bois de Belleau. In the Bois de Belleau were two battalions, one of each regiment. The remaining battalion of the 5th was in reserve in Lucy.

An attempt was now made to form regimental sectors with the boundary line north and south through the middle of the Bois de Belleau. The right sector was assigned to the 5th, the left to the 6th. The battalion of the 5th in Bouresches, when relieved by the 23d, was ordered to Lucy in brigade reserve; the battalion of the 6th at Lucy to relieve Colonel Wise's battalion of the 5th in the wood; that battalion, upon relief, was ordered farther west in division reserve.³⁰

But the adjustment was not actually made. The 3d Battalion, 5th Marines (Major Shearer), came from Bouresches as planned and took station at Lucy. But the 2d Battalion, 6th Marines (Major Holcomb), moving from Lucy to relieve the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines (Colonel Wise), was caught in the German gas and only fragments of it arrived, not enough to permit Colonel Wise to bring his battalion out. Making a virtue of necessity, the brigade commander constituted the three weak battalions in the wood a separate command under Lieutenant Colonel Feland of the 5th.

Knowing that the Germans could not intend a serious attack upon a position that had just been gassed with mustard, the brigade commander directed the eastern edge of the wood to be lightly held, and most of the men to be brought to the western edge at the reentrant angle.³¹

The situation in the wood was recognized as precarious, but no one realized how extremely precarious it was. The general impression was that the Germans held only a small strip in the northwest corner. As a matter of fact, the wood was fully open to them, our men holding a narrow strip on the eastern edge, with left and rear absolutely open. The Germans seemed to have been aware of this condition, but took no advantage of it. The reason was undoubtedly their weakness. The 237th Division had only 3,200 infantry on June 4th, the day before the American attack began. Their losses had been heavy and the condition of health poor, On June 12th the 461st Infantry had in the Bois de Belleau only nine officers and one hundred and forty nine men for duty. On the 13th the entire division could muster a rifle strength of only 47 officers and 1482 men. On the 14th the division commander ordered all office work suspended and all clerks, signal men, orderlies and so forth (2 officers and 349 men in all) to be sent to the front.³² The 5th Guard Division on the right and the 28th Division on the left were in no condition to help, and the Corps had no fresh divisions.

But while the complete dislocation of the American line was not fully understood, it was evident that no contact existed with the battalion in the Bois de Champillon so while Colonel Feland and Colonel Wise reconnoitered the northern part of the wood and planned measures for its security, Major Turrill, whose battalion (1st, 5th Marines) was now in the Bois de Champillon, sent a company to establish the connection. Following a preliminary reconnaissance on the 13th, a thin continuous line was extended across the wood from east to west.³³

The necessity for relief of the 4th Brigade continued to be a subject for discussion between the division and corps commanders. The division commander had already given what assistance he felt was permissable [sic], by extending the front of the 3d Brigade to include Bouresches. On the night of June 15-16 the corps commander took a similar measure on the opposite flank, by extending the right of the 167th Division so as to relieve the 3d Battalion of the 6th Marines (Major Sibley).³⁴ Four battalions of the brigade were still in line.

This order was almost the last official act of General Dégoutte as corps commander, for on the same day he assumed command of the Sixth Army, relieving General Duchêne. General Naulin, who took the XXI Corps, saw nothing that he could do his only suggestion was that the 3d Brigade take over the entire front line, letting the 4th supply all reserves. The division commander insisted that the front line was not stable and that it was unsafe to be without fresh and intact troops. He pointed out that the American 3d Division was in Army reserve on the Marne nearby, and that a regiment from that division might be borrowed. General Naulin demurred but finally when General Bundy insisted he yielded. The 7th Infantry (Colonel Anderson) was placed at the disposal of the 2d Division for the period from June 15th to the 22d, and one battalion was ordered to go into line each night, commencing at once. One of the four battalions thus relieved was to be placed in reserve in the division area and the other three take over the rest quarters of the relieving battalions. All machine guns and all transportation—kitchens, water carts, and so forth—were to remain in place and be temporarily exchanged .³⁵

The relief was accomplished without incident on the next three nights. Upon its completion the 2d Battalion of the 7th (Captain Hurley) occupied the right of the brigade line along the east face of the wood, connecting with the 23d north of Bouresches and extending to the eastern tip of the wood. Next came the 1st Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel Adams) bending around the Hook and extending westward and southward to the western edge. The 3d Battalion (Major Gaston) held the north face of the Bois de Champillon. Colonel Neville of the 5th Marines retained command of his regimental sector with Lieutenant Colonel Feland in active command in the wood. Major Gaston relieved Lieutenant Colonel Lee in command of the other sector. Colonel Anderson, his regiment being thus broken up, exercised no active command, but was present, and was used by the brigade commander for inspections. Artillery and supply arrangements were unchanged.³⁶

The Germans were making a relief at the same time. The 87th Division, in reserve of the the First Army on the Vesle near Fismes, was transferred to the Seventh Army on the 13th, assigned to the IV Reserve Corps and directed to relieve the 237th Division. Army orders of the same date having announced the definite termination of the offensive and the assumption of a defensive attitude pending preparations for a new advance elsewhere, the division boundaries and dispositions were modified. The 87th was not only to take over the front of the 237th, but to extend its left as far south as Bouresches, so as to relieve the 110th Grenadiers of the 28th. This relief was made as planned between June 15th and 19th.³⁶

All divisions had been ordered to reorganize in depth for defense. The two flank regiments of the 87th put one battalion each in line, one in support and one in reserve. The 347th Infantry, in the center, put one battalion in the Bois de Belleau, one west of it and one in reserve. The battalion holding the wood had three companies in line and one in reserve at the village of Belleau. The division commander regarded the position in the north edge of the wood as a weakness in his defensive line and suggested withdrawal to Belleau Village, but the corps commander disapproved. The lines of defense were strengthened and new obstacles constructed. In their final form they constituted a well organized line of trenches, developed from the original shallow individual pits. It was calculated that two weeks' work would make it possible to withdraw another company to Belleau Village, leaving only two in the wood. The 347th Infantry reported the Americans in close contact and very active.³⁷

On the east face of the wood no further advance was contemplated by the Americans, and wire entanglements had been commenced on June 14th.³⁸ The 2d Battalion of the 7th continued this work, but was called upon for nothing more. The 1st and 3d Battalions made reconnaissances and sought to rectify their lines on the night of the 18-19. The 3d had no difficulty; it established a satisfactory position and patrolled well to the front, finding no German activity south of the Torcy-Belleau Road. The 1st, however, came against the German main defense, lost twenty men and returned. It began to wire-in its position, but was directed by the division commander not to do so, since an advance was intended. An effort was made on the morning of the 20th to envelop and crowd out the Germans without a formal attack, but no substantial gain was made. Next it was planned to have artillery preparation so the battalion commander drew back his lines and the artillery fire was placed upon the entire area of the wood north of the old line. This fire continued from 2.00 to 3.15 A.M.

The area to be covered, however, was about half a mile square. Neither the artillery brigade nor any regiment reports any unusually heavy firing on this day and according to the German reports the greater part of the shells landed in rear areas. The shelling in the wood was light; the German 347th Infantry reports its total casualties for the entire day as fifteen wounded. The battalion advanced with two companies in front line, each in two waves, one company in support and one in reserve. One of the front line companies lost touch entirely and finally came out of the wood in the territory of the 3d Battalion, on the left. The support company took its place. The two companies making the attack found the position intact, and were repulsed with a loss of a hundred and eighty men. The reserve was not engaged. The Germans had in the wood three companies with an average strength of something over a hundred and fifty, and another company was borrowed from the battalion on their right. During the attack a protective barrage was fired by six German batteries.³⁹

While these operations were going on in the wood, the 3d Battalion, to the west, had advanced the left of its line without opposition to the high ground overlooking the Torcy-Bussiares Road. Its right was bent back toward the Bois de Belleau.⁴⁰

At 7.00 A.M. on the 21st General Naulin and his XXI Corps headquarters were relieved, the III Corps (General LeBrun) taking over the front.⁴¹ As the 7th Infantry had been loaned to the division for a fixed period only, its relief began on the night of June 21-22, when the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines (Major Shearer), replaced the battalion in the wood. On the next night the 3d Battalion, 6th Marines, relieved the battalion on the east, and on the night of 23-24 the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines (Major Keyser), relieved the one on the West. The 4th Brigade had been rested and reorganized, had received replacements, and was in condition to resume operations, although its clothing and equipment were not yet what they should be. The 7th Infantry during its occupation of the line had suffered three hundred casualties, mostly in the 1st Battalion.⁴²

The left battalion of the 7th Infantry had advanced its line very materially, but unopposed. In the wood the lines were unchanged. The reconnaissance incident to this relief, and the information given by an Alsatian deserter, who, when brought to Division headquarters and questioned by Colonel Brown and Colonel Conger, pointed out on the map the German lines in the Bois de Belleau, gave the brigade commander a clear understanding of the position of his lines in the wood and convinced him that he still had a problem here. Pending the drawing up of plans for a new attack, parties were sent to work opening trails for an advance.⁴³

The attack was made at 7.00 P.M. on the 23d. All four companies were in line, and the two center companies, with a platoon from each flank company, moved forward after a preparation with trench mortars and rifle grenades. About two hundred rounds from the heavy howitzers had been fired into the German area during the afternoon. Machine guns supported the attack. Groups of grenadiers led the way, followed by skirmish lines. Machine guns were assaulted by bombing, followed by attacking riflemen. It was observed that as soon as a German machine gun was involved its crew fell back, taking with them some part of the gun and any casualties that they had incurred; immediately a new and unexpected fire opened upon the attackers flanking their advance. The ground was rocky and it was impossible to dig in under the heavy fire. The German artillery fired barrages.

Finally the attack halted with no ground gained. Some machine gun positions had been overrun, but the surviving crews generally escaped with their pieces. At 11.20 the attack reached a standstill and the companies were back on their old ground having suffered a hundred and four casualties.

This attack demonstrated the defensive strength of the Belleau Wood. The Germans had taken full advantage of the many natural obstacles, improved them by artificial means and held them courageously. The Americans were now thoroughly familiar with the ground; they had advanced in order, maintaining good connections everywhere. The battalion commander reported that he could see no improvement to be made in the tactics; that infantry alone could not take this formidable citadel.⁴⁴

Belleau Wood. Unknown Soldiers' Memorial. August 14, 1930.

It was evident that the task was one that could not be accomplished without strong artillery support. A conference was held, including the commanders of the division, the 4th Brigade, the artillery brigade, the 5th Marines and all three battalions of this regiment.⁴⁵ The French artillery with the division was now two battalions of the 37th Light and one of the 333d Heavy, giving nine light batteries in support of each infantry brigade and nine heavy in general support. For the artillery preparations of the attack, all the heavy batteries were assigned, as well as the nine light batteries normally firing in that sector. In previous attacks preparation had been very short and the heavy howitzers had placed the greater part of their fire in back areas. Now for a new attack the preparation would last fourteen hours—from 3.00 A.M. to 5.00 P.M., June 25th. Only the French batteries would fire upon the rear areas; all the American guns, light and heavy, would concentrate upon the northern end of the wood and the ground immediately adjacent. The number of rounds actually fired by the light guns is not of record, but the heavy batteries fired 2,300 rounds into the north end of the woods as against 700 in the same area in the preparation of June 10th.⁴⁶

The artillery fired according to the schedule given. German records speak of the great shells bursting in the trees, raining down upon them in small fragments. They also mention the trench mortars that opened their fire late in the afternoon.

Major Shearer's line across the wood was withdrawn slightly to give the artillery a free hand. The battalion west of the wood which, it will be remembered, held their line considerably in advance, extended its right to a point where it could observe the German approaches from Belleau Village. At 5.00 P.M. the preparation merged into a rolling barrage, and Major Shearer's battalion advanced with three companies in line and one in reserve.

The German position was held by the 1st Battalion, 347th Infantry, which had relieved the 3d Battalion on the night of June 22-23. As before, three companies were in line but at the time of relief the support company had been placed in the northern tip of the wood instead of in the village of Belleau. The resistance was energetic, but the losses from artillery fire had been so heavy that it was inadequate. The attack covered the entire front of the 1st Battalion, and seriously included the connecting company of the 2d Battalion, to the west. At six o'clock the battalion commander put in his support company, calling by radio for reinforcements. Two companies from another regiment were placed at his disposal, but they did not begin to arrive until eleven o'clock. By that time the fight was lost to the defenders, and they served only to assist in establishing a rallying position on the Torcy-Belleau Road. At 9.30 Major Shearer reported that he had possession of the entire wood, except for a few scattered machine gun groups, and that he had organized a position on the northern edge. He said, however, that he could not hold out against a serious counter-attack, so the brigade commander directed Colonel Neville to give support with both the battalions on the flanks. But the Germans had no thought of an attack, and since 9.15 had been devoting themselves to preparation of their new positions along the road.

The American loss was four officers and a hundred and nineteen men killed and wounded. A few men had been taken prisoners at the beginning of the attack, but were recaptured before they could be removed from the wood. The German loss was seven officers and four hundred and twenty-three men; of these about two hundred and sixty were captured, together with twenty-five machine guns.⁴⁷

This ended active operations on the front of the 4th Brigade. As the situation cleared, the strength of the occupation was gradually reduced, until on July 2d each regiment had only one battalion in the front line. The 6th Marines held the Bois de Belleau and the 5th held the front from there to the French division on the ridge a thousand yards southwest of Torcy, both supported by the brigade machine gun battalions and by the artillery as before.