DURING this period of fighting for the Bois de Belleau, the front of the 3d Brigade, with the exception of the movement by the 23d Infantry on June 6th, had been comparatively quiet. However, the brigade had not been inactive. Trench construction was pushed vigorously, and aggressive patrols dominated the enemy's front. Artillery and machine gun fire raked the lines nightly, and by day took their toll on individuals or groups under observation. The losses in the brigade during June were 17 officers and 302 enlisted men killed, and 36 officers and 1414 men wounded. A notable incident was a German gas attack on the night of June 23-24 which caused over four hundred gas casualties. The weight of the concentration had fallen to the north and south of the Paris-Metz Road, near le Thiolet. Company "B", 9th Infantry, which occupied the Bois de Clerembauts, with headquarters in le Thiolet, suffered casualties of 11 men killed and 159 men wounded by high explosive shells and gas during the three day period, June 21st to 24th.¹ The position of this brigade had never been satisfactory, forming as it did a deep reentrant. This gave too long a line, required too many men to hold it, the field of view was poor and the defensive organization lacked depth. For these reasons the corps commander had directed the division commander to undertake operations at the proper time to straighten out this angle. On June 14th when General Degoutte was turning over command of the corps to General Naulin, both generals called at division headquarters to consult as to this operation. The idea was a series of partial operations, each well supported by artillery, which should culminate in the attack of the village of Vaux. This was confirmed and slightly elaborated in one of General Naulin's first orders.²

The plan took definite form and was enlarged in an order issued by the III Corps a few days after it had taken over command from the XXI Corps.³ This contemplated concerted action by the III Corps and the XXXVIII Corps on its right, for advancing the line in a single operation to include the 204 Meter Hill overlooking Château-Thierry, Vaux and the adjacent Bois de la Roche. The advance was to be made by the American 2d Division and the French 39th Division on its right; this division, together with artillery and air troops from the XXXVIII Corps, was placed under the command of the III Corps for the operation. Both divisions were directed to submit their plans by June 25th.

The 2d Division had consistently maintained that it should conduct only one operation at a time, and therefore that nothing should be undertaken here until the Bois de Belleau was clear. But the problem had been continuously studied, and now that the 4th Brigade front was settling down, plans were ready for the 3d Brigade to take the offensive.

The ground was familiar to the troops, for there had been constant observation of it for a month. Patrols had been sent out regularly, and all ordinary means of ground and air observation had been used. A most minute study began on June 8th when Colonel Conger joined the division as intelligence officer. Conger had been a former instructor at the Fort Leavenworth schools, who had lived several years in Europe, had been a student at a German university, and spoke both French and German fluently. Former residents of the town of Vaux, now refugees in back areas, were collected and brought to headquarters for interrogation; German prisoners and captured documents were examined. For the village of Vaux, a solid stone-built place, detailed information was secured from French refugees; among these was the village stone-mason, who had worked in every house in the village. Diagrams were prepared showing every one of the eighty-two houses, with floor and cellar plans, the thickness of house walls, and dimensions of all garden walls. The location of all German troops and their defenses were carefully noted. This completed study was a little masterpiece; from it commanders of troops in the attack could assign in advance the task of their smallest units, with even more confidence than in a trench raid.

The command of the German troops opposite the division was now exercised by the VIII Army Corps (General Schoeler) which relieved the IV Reserve Corps on June 21st. On the front to be attacked, the 201st Division had relieved the 231st on June 17th. The German divisional sector included Château-Thierry on the east and extended westward to a point midway between Vaux and Bouresches. It was divided into three regimental sectors—"Stadt" (city) in and about Château-Thierry, held by the 403d Infantry; "Hohe" (hill) across the 204 Meter Hill, held by the 401st; and "Wald" (wood), from the northwestern tip of the woods on that hill, through Vaux and the Bois de la Roche, to the small patch of woods on the 192 Meter Hill just west of it. This last named sector held by the 402d Infantry was the one that interested the Americans.

The 1st Battalion of the 402d occupied "Wood Sector East", with one company in Vaux and one running up the slope of the 204 Meter Hill; the other two companies were in the wood half a mile to the rear. The 2d Battalion, holding "Wood Sector West", had two companies in the Bois de la Roche, one close behind, and one in the smaller patch of woods on the 192 Meter Hill. Mine throwers and other supporting weapons were distributed through the woods, and one group of four mine throwers was in the eastern edge of the village of Vaux. The reserve battalion was in rest camp five miles in rear. The total effective strength of the regiment, exclusive of attached troops, was sixty nine officers and two thousand and sixty two men on July 1st. Beside its own regiment of light artillery—nine batteries—the division had attached to it six light and three heavy batteries; six of the light batteries were in support of the 402d Infantry, and all three heavy battery positions were in rear areas.

The 231st Division, apparently, had not done much in preparation of defenses, for the Army order discontinuing the offensive had not been issued until June 13th; but the 201st had been working energetically ever since its arrival. Trenches and splinter proof shelters had been constructed and the village of Vaux prepared for a strong defense.

All of the dispositions in general and parts of them in detail were known to the Americans.⁴

Division orders for the operation were issued at 9.00 A.M. on June 30th, followed by brigade and regimental orders.⁵ These, however, were merely the final summary of previous instructions; the plan had been discussed by the division staff with General Lewis, commanding the 3d Brigade, Colonel Malone of the 23d Infantry, Colonel Upton of the 9th Infantry and Colonel Bowley of the 17th Field Artillery, who now commanded the artillery brigade, General Chamberlaine having been relieved on June 27th. All details had been worked out in the regiments and communicated in full to battalion commanders on June 28th.⁶

The 9th Infantry was on the right, connecting with the French at the road culvert two hundred yards south of Vaux and with the 23d at the Triangle brickyard southeast of le Thiolet. The left of the 23d was just north of Bouresches. The battalions in line were the 2d (Major Bouton) and the 1st (Major Whitley) of the 9th, then the 1st (Major Waddill) and the 2d (Major Whiting) of the 23d.

The attack was to be made by two battalions, directed about north-northeast. Major Bouton's battalion of the 9th was to move forward from its old position on a front of eight hundred yards, against Vaux and the eastern extremity of the Bois de la Roche. Attached to it were the regimental machine gun company and a company of the 2d Engineers. The 3d Battalion of the 23d (Major Elliott) which had been relieved from the front line on the 27th, was to move up in rear of Major Whitley's battalion of the 9th, form for the attack in the ravine there and advance through Major Whitley's lines. With Major Elliott was a company of the 2d Engineers and machine guns from the brigade machine gun battalion (5th, Major Lewis) . Its front of attack was about a thousand yards, including the rest of the Bois de la Roche and the detached wood on the hill west of it. The machine gun companies were to install part of their guns so as to support by overhead barrage fire, and further support by trench mortars and one-pounder guns was provided for.

To the artillery brigade were attached twelve French batteries—nine of 75 mm guns and 3 of 155 mm howitzers. The 12th Field Artillery (Colonel McCloskey) was too far to the left to contribute much, but six of its guns were able to reach this front. The support plan included a 12-hour preparation by all the heavy batteries, during which the French light guns were to make their adjustments for a rolling barrage and to cut the wire entanglements south of Vaux. Three hours before the attack, four American light batteries were to fire mustard gas upon a strip of ground just beyond the Bois de la Roche. The other light batteries were then gradually to join in the preparation, firing upon selected areas. Three minutes before the start, a rolling barrage was to open, fired by the nine French light batteries all the other guns were then to shift their fire to the rear areas. The rolling barrage was to reach the objective in half an hour, thereafter a standing barrage would be placed just beyond, and remain for another hour and a half, gradually decreasing in its intensity. The total ammunition expenditure was to be 21,000 rounds light and 7,600 rounds heavy. The division trench mortar battery had just come up to join the division and four of its guns were able to take part, firing over 100 rounds each. The extreme limit of the divisional artillery fire was about 3000 yards from the infantry line of departure counter-battery and long range fire were handled by the corps artillery.⁷ General Bowley says in a memorandum on file in the Historical Section, 2d Division: "On June 30th, Major Follett Bradley, 17th FA, from a shell hole on the side of the hill overlooking Vaux, adjusted all of the batteries of the 17th Field Artillery and the French battallion [sic] of 155 mm's".

Dispositions of the infantry were careful and complete. Major Bouton put two companies in line, one in support and one in reserve. The leading companies were to follow the barrage to the objective and consolidate the position there with the assistance of the engineers. The support company was to clean up Vaux and to prepare it for defense according to a very detailed program based upon the diagrams of the town. Major Elliott had three companies in line and one in reserve.

Special groups followed the line to insure connection. A platoon from Major Bouton's fourth company was assigned to keep touch with the French. A composite platoon from the flank companies of the assaulting line of the two battalions maintained connection there. Similar groups connected the companies all along the line.

Reconnaissance was completed on June 30th. Early that afternoon the hour for attack was fixed at 6.00 P.M., July 1st. The 23d Infantry battalion moved into the Bois de la Marette that night. All advanced positions were evacuated and the artillery preparations began at 5.00 A.M. Its maximum intensity was reached at 5.00 P.M., when the infantry took the attack formation. At 5.57 the rolling barrage fell; at six o'clock it began to move forward, a hundred yards every two minutes, slowing down slightly after passing Vaux. The infantry followed closely. The artillery had done its work with remarkable thoroughness and had driven the enemy to cover. Groups that attempted serious resistance were promptly flanked and taken. Within one hour after the barrage was placed beyond the objective, all Germans remaining within it were killed or captured, and the Americans were digging in on the line as planned.⁸

The Germans had noticed activity along the whole front and reserves in both "Hill" and "Wood" Sectors had been warned as early as midnight, June 30-July 1. German prisoners said that rumors of an American attack had been discussed in the 402d Infantry on June 28th and on June 30th; special arrangements were made in Vaux to receive an attack. The mess caterer of the 4th Brigade HQ. on June 30th reported a French vegetable vendor in La Ferte as saying that "the 23d Infantry will attack soon".⁹ Telephone communications with the front lines went out immediately upon the commencement of the artillery preparation, and runners could seldom get through. A messenger dog did good service between battalion and regimental headquarters.¹⁰

The German artillery reaction was weak, and French planes held control of the air. Soon after noon wounded men from Vaux reported that the company there was annihilated, and the battalion commander began to move support in that direction. At 3.00 P.M. the commanding officer of the 402d Infantry warned his reserve battalion to be ready to move, and at four o'clock ordered it forward to some patches of woods about three miles from the line. The division commander realized a severe attack was coming along the whole line, and called upon both adjacent divisions for artillery support, which was given; the division on the left covered the ravines in which the French 39th Division, was forming and the one on the right fired heavily upon the Americans in the Bois de la Marette and ravine south of Vaux.

At 5.40 a message from Vaux reached battalion headquarters reporting that the village was under furious artillery fire and that an attack was expected any moment. Nothing further was heard from there. Soon after, infantry was seen advancing, and observers on the hill who could see into Vaux ravine reported that the advance was general. Wounded men from the Bois de la Roche said that Americans had broken through the line there.

Both battalion commanders in the front line decided to hold along the railway north and east of the old front. There were a few men to hold it, but everyone in sight—staff officers, telephone men, orderlies and clerks—took their place in the line with rifles and machine guns. They reported that they came under heavy artillery fire but succeeded in repulsing an American attack; actually, the artillery fire was our standing barrage and we made no attack upon the railway line.

Progress of the 3d Battalion, the reserve of the 402d Infantry, had been slow on account of artillery fire in back areas. About 7.30 orders met it to assemble in the patch of woods not far from regimental headquarters; thence it was directed forward again for a counter-attack upon Vaux. About eleven o'clock it came to the edge of the woods north of Vaux and prepared for attack; a company of the 401st Infantry was attached to it as a support. The other two battalions of the regiment, each reinforced by a company from the 28th Division, were to join in the attack, extending its line to the right. Artillery support was arranged for.

Later, however, the regimental commander apparently realized that the attack could not succeed and sent orders suspending it. These reached the two front line battalions in time, but the 3d advanced as ordered shortly before 3.00 A.M. It reached the railway, but could gain no ground beyond. Those who crossed were killed or captured. The remainder of the battalion remained there, filling a gap in the line.¹¹

Meanwhile, on the right, the 153d Infantry of the French 39th Division had met stubborn resistance. The German "Hill" sector was very narrow, only a thousand yards, and was held by the entire 401st Infantry. All four companies of one battalion lay along the wood road which crosses the hill top; the support battalion was at the foot of the north slope, and the reserve battalion hardly more than a thousand yards further back. The French met with resistance as soon as they left their original front lines; some of them reached the road, but could not hold there. The line was finally established in the woods not far ahead of the old one. The right flank of the 9th Infantry was exposed for some time, but connection was finally established.¹²

On the left there were no difficulties. The 1st Battalion of the 23d Infantry was not called upon for an advance. It remained in position and by means of patrols kept continuous touch with Major Elliott's left.¹³

The Americans lost in this attack one officer and forty five men killed, six officers and two hundred and sixty four men wounded, one officer and eleven men missing; a total of three hundred and twenty eight, chiefly of the 23d Infantry. The German 402d Infantry reported the loss of one officer and two hundred and fifty three men killed, three officers and one hundred and fifty nine men wounded, ten officers and five hundred men missing, nearly all of whom were accounted for as prisoners in our hands.¹⁴

The position having been consolidated, the battalion of the 23d Infantry was withdrawn on the night of July 2-3, and the 1st Battalion, 9th Infantry (Major Whitley), resumed its former place in line.¹⁵

A provisional battalion consisting of one company selected from each infantry regiment of the division went to Paris on July 3d to take part in the celebration of American Independence Day.

Further attempts were made later to improve the position of the French 39th Division, but everything that was planned for the 2d had now been accomplished. Its position was organized for defense according to the most recent instructions from the French General Headquarters.¹⁶ In the orders for this organization appears the first official mention of the name "Pas Fini" Sector. It appears that on June 1st when the division was marching to the front, retiring French soldiers called out despairingly that la guerre was fini. The Americans replied that la guerre was pas fini as long as they were in it; hence the soldiers' nickname, now taken up as official.

The sector was divided into sub-sectors, "Regular" on the right and "Marine" on the left; each sub-sector was again divided into two regimental sectors. The existing front (Vaux-Bois de la Roche-Bouresches-Bois de Belleau) was designated as the outpost line. The zone just behind it, about a mile deep, was to be held by one battalion of each regiment, each with a machine gun company, a 37 mm gun and two Stokes mortars. The defenses were to consist, not of continuous trenches, but of strong-points in a staggered line, with numerous combat groups and machine gun positions, covering all possible lines of approach, mutually supporting and fully concealed from ground and air observation; brigade and regimental commanders were made responsible for the details. The duty of the troops here was to maintain constant contact with the enemy, and in case of attack to hold their ground and to stop or break up the movement. At least one company in each battalion was held back for counter-attacks.

The main line of resistance, to be held at all costs, ran in rear of le Thiolet and in front of Lucy-le Bocage. A zone here, extending back as far as Domptin and Coupru, was to be organized in three lines of defense. The centers of resistance were to be connected by communicating trenches, and shelter was to be prepared capable of affording protection against heavy bombardment to be expected in case of a serious attack. Each regiment was to have a battalion in this zone with a machine gun company, two 37 mm guns and four Stokes mortars. Defenses here were planned and directed by the division commander.

The remaining infantry battalions, one from each regiment, were in brigade reserve, except one from the 4th Brigade which was held at the disposition of the division commander. One battalion of the 2d Engineers, at work in the 3d Brigade sector, was available to the brigade commander as a reserve; the other engineer battalion and the divisional machine gun battalion were in division reserve.

Artillery support was as usual—the 12th Field Artillery behind the 4th Brigade and the 15th behind the 3d Brigade. To each of these light regiments there remained attached one battalion of the French 37th. The heavy regiment, the 17th, was in general support; also available was the 1st Battalion (three batteries) of the French 333d, 155 mm long guns, and the 2d Battalion (three batteries) of the French 103d, 105 mm guns.¹⁷

As work was being commenced upon the new dispositions two orders appeared from the headquarters of the French Sixth Army, of especial interest to the Americans and to the 2d Division. One of them dated July 2d, directed the American I Corps (General Liggett) to take over from the French III Corps the front held by the 2d Division and the French 167th Division on its left, command to pass at 10.00 A.M., July 4th. The American corps was already established in this region and exercising administrative control. Now it was to assume tactical command of the sector.¹⁸ The other order, issued a little earlier on the same day, provided for the relief of the 2d Division by the American 26th Division, whose headquarters were then at Nanteuil-lès-Meaux. Corps and division orders were issued at once, fixing the details.¹⁹

The 52d Brigade was to be brought forward in trucks on the morning of July 3d to the vicinity of Montreuil-aux-Lions; reconnaissances were to be made that night and on July 4th, and the 4th Brigade was to be relieved on the night of July 4-5. The 51st Brigade was to start forty-eight hours later to relieve the 3d Brigade in the same manner. The 101st Field Artillery, relieving the 12th, was to put one platoon of each battery into position on the night of July 5-6 and to complete the relief the next night. The remainder of the artillery and all other units of the division were to move on the same date, and command was to pass at 8.00 A.M., July 9th. The troops thus relieved were to be quartered about Meaux and the division was to take over the headquarters installations of the 26th.

The 4th Brigade was relieved as directed, but on July 5th relief was suspended.²⁰ Heavy troop movements had been observed on the German side of the line so the Army commander directed that until the situation became clearer both divisions should be ready for action, one in the "Pas Fini" Sector as already described, and the other on the second or "Army" line running from Charly on the Marne through Montreauil-aux-Lions [sic]. The 2d Division therefore continued to hold the front line with the 52d Brigade in place of the 4th. The 26th Division with the 4th Brigade attached occupied the "Army" line.

As the corps front remained quiet, reliefs were ordered resumed the next day.²¹ The diligence of the German information service as well as their sense of humor was shown on the evening of July 4th when a balloon came down in the American lines with a quantity of German propaganda. It contained a message written in English: "Goodbye, Second—Hello, Twenty-Sixth".

The troops as relieved did not go back to Meaux, but took their places on the Army line; indications still pointed to a German offensive on a large scale, from Château-Thierry east, and sudden emergencies might arise here. Command passed at 11.00 P.M. For the convenience of friendly units and for the confusion of the Germans, code names of the troops were interchanged. The division which had been known as "Custer", gave up that name to the 26th, taking in return that of "Santiago"; and so on for all subordinate units.²²

In this new position the division had the opportunity to clean up, rest and refit—its first such opportunity for over a month. It was not relieved from assignment to a front line corps, however, and proceeded to organize its defenses as if in direct contact with the enemy.²³

The front of the Corps, held by the American 26th and the French 167th Divisions, extended from Vaux to Hautevesnes. This was organized in depth a-3 described above. The Army line was about six miles from the enemy, and the 2d Division occupied it across the entire corps front of nine miles. Connection on both flanks was maintained with other American divisions—the 28th on the right and the 4th on the left, which were second line divisions of the French XXXVIII and VII Corps respectively. The orders were, in case of a break through in front, to hold at all costs until the arrival of Army reserves.

The 4th Brigade took post on the right, the 3d on the left, regiments abreast. Each regiment put two battalions in line and one in local support. This was a thin chain; the idea was to have the line prepared for two divisions, in such a manner that each regiment in line could withdraw a battalion to reserve, then close in to a flank and let a reinforcing division come in beside it. The French 161st Territorial Infantry Brigade was attached to the Corps for various duties in rear, and a battalion from this brigade was designated as permanent guard for the Army line to furnish information and guide incoming troops. The 12th Field Artillery was placed in support of the 3d Brigade, the 15th Field Artillery in support of the 4th Brigade. The 17th, now commanded by Colonel J. R. Kelly, was in general support, together with two battalions (six batteries) of the French 281st Heavy Artillery, 220 mm mortars, attached to the artillery brigade.

Troops were required to be near their positions, so that the defenses could be fully manned within three hours after an alarm. It was prescribed also that the division should be ready to march in any direction at any time; especially were all to have in mind the possibility of a movement to the left to the vicinity of Étavigny, to protect the left flank of the Sixth Army. Division headquarters were established at Chamigny, not far from Corps headquarters at La Ferté-sous-Jouarre.

During the period—June 1st to July 10th—the division had suffered a loss of two hundred and seventeen officers, and nine thousand, five hundred and sixty men.²⁴ This included, however, men slightly wounded and returned to duty, and men wounded twice. Replacements had been received currently during this period and had been immediately incorporated in companies, so that the net reduction in effective strength was a hundred and one officers and two thousand, three hundred and thirty-nine men.