AN IMPORTANT crisis in the war was impending, and the 2d Division was now being transferred from the territory of "Operation C" to that of "Operation B."

The first phase of the attack of the American First Army, called by the French the battle of Montfaucon, included the period from September 26th to October 3d. The German first, or "Hagen" position from Forges to Vaquois, had been carried. On the right and in the center the second, or "Volker" position through Montfaucon, also had been carried, and the army was in contact with the Kriemhilde or Hindenburg position in the region of Brieulles and Nantillois. On the left, flanking fire from the Argonne ridge held the advance at Apremont; similarly, fire from across the Meuse, prevented further progress on the right.

On October 4th a new attack was made in the Aire valley, and the left of the army brought up to Fleville. Between the 6th and 10th, the active front was extended to the right bank of the Meuse, and the battle of Haumont-Pres-Samogneux opened the river as far down as Consenvoye. Meanwhile, the battle of Romagne rectified the line on the left bank. The northern point of the Argonne was reached and contact was made with the Kriemhilde line along the whole front.

On October 11th General Pétain issued a new directive for the further action of all the forces under his command.¹ For the American First Army, the task was to continue the attack on both sides of the river, gaining possession of the Grandpre gap, and breaking the Kriemhilde line on the whole front. This would bring the army in contact with the Freya line on the west bank of the Meuse, from Dun-sur-Meuse to Briquenay, and on the east bank from Dun to Damvillers.

This operation was undertaken at once. Local successes were gained, improving the positions, but there was no general advance. In the meanwhile important changes had been made in organization and command.

The First Army was holding a front of over eighty miles, and its strength was over a million men. The burden of command had become too heavy for a single commander. Moreover, there was a lack of unity of objective along so extended a front. The left flank was in the midst of an active campaign, directed against the Mezieres-Montmedy railway. The right flank was for the moment not actively engaged; its natural objective was the Metz-Briey region. General Pershing therefore reorganized his forces as a group of armies.

On October 12th the newly organized Second Army under General Bullard, took over that portion of the front east of the Cotes de Meuse, about thirty miles, and began preparation for operations in the direction of Metz and Briey. General Liggett was placed in command of the First Army with a fifty mile front and General Pershing established the advanced headquarters of the group at Ligny-en-Barrois.²

The First Army attacked again on October 14th, and continued until the 16th. Slight progress was made, all along the line, for the fighting was now on the main Kriemhilde, or Hindenburg, line; but a firm foothold was gained in that position on the Romagne and Cunel heights. The rest of the month was devoted to a series of local operations, designed to facilitate the next general attack.

These operations, on the right, extended the breach made at Romagne through the Bois de Bantheville, so as to threaten the flank of the German positions at Landreset-St. Georges [sic]. On the left, they brought the line forward to Talma Farm, in the southern edge of the Bois de Bourgogne, giving full control of the Grandpre gap and permitting the right of the French Fourth Army to move up.³ It was at this time that the 2d Division arrived in the First Army area.

The First Army line now crossed the Meuse at Sivry. Just north of this place the river makes a sharp bend west, and turns north again at Liny-devant-Dun; the line here lay along the river bank. At Dun the Barricourt Ridge comes down from the northwest to the Meuse. The Freya position lay along this ridge, to Buzancy, then cut across lower ground to the northern extension of the Argonne Ridge at Briquenay and passed on into the territory of the French Fourth Army.

The next step clearly must be a general attack with the principal weight upon that portion of the Kriemhilde line which was still holding—from Landres-et-St. Georges through Champigneulle to the Bois des Loges. This would open the way for a new contact with the French Fourth Army at Boult-aux-Bois, for the capture of the Barricourt Ridge, and for a crossing of the Meuse in the region of Dun. This plan was indicated in General Pershing's directive of October 16th, issued on the occasion of the transfer of command of the First Army.

Marshal Foch's directive for the American First and French Fourth Armies was in the same sense.⁴ He gave the Americans the direction of Buzancy, the French that of Le Chesne. Each was to advance without regard to the other, maintaining connection through the Grandpre gap, and establish a new connection at Boult-aux-Bois. On October 24th the two army commanders met for consultation, and all details for their concurrent action was settled. November 1st was set as the date of attack.⁵

Detailed orders for the attack of the First Army were issued on October 27th.⁶ The troops east of the Meuse were to continue operations as before, at the same time making artillery demonstrations and in particular neutarilizing [sic] the hostile guns east of Dun-sur-Meuse. West of the river, General Summerall's V Corps, in the center, was to push straight ahead to and across the Barricourt ridge. General Hines' III Corps was to support the right of the V, pushing its own left upon the ridge at Villers-devant-Dun and preparing to cross the Meuse. General Dickman's I Corps was to protect the left of the V, and at the proper time push forward to Boult-aux-Bois. As was naturally to be expected, the 2d Division had been assigned to the V Corps. Notice of this assignment reached the division on October 24th. At the same time orders came in from the Corps, outlining the proposed attack and explaining the division's part in it.⁷

General Lejeune in his "Reminiscences of a Marine," p. 371, says that on October 24th he visited First Army Headquarters where he saw General Drum, the Chief of Staff. "He told us that the 2d Division was being brought back to the First Army to be the point of the wedge in the great attack for which preparations were then being made. He further said the division had been assigned the post of honor and the whole Army relied on it to bring the stalemate to an end by breaking through the center of the German Army and thereby forcing it to retreat to the east bank of the Meuse."

The corps front extended from the Bois de Bantheville to St. Georges. The right half, held by the 89th Division, was beyond the Kriemhilde position; the left half, held by the 42d Division, was in contact with that position. In reserve were the 1st and 2d Divisions. The 2d was to relieve the 42d, break through the Kriemhilde position and go ahead, with the 89th Division on its right and the 80th Division, of the I Corps, on its left. The objective was the Freya position on the Barricourt Ridge, with exploitation beyond the ridge to Nouart.

It was too early to issue final orders for the attack, but a tentative plan was made up in considerable detail, and conferences held at which all officers became familiar with it.⁸

The formation was to be in column of brigades in line of regiments, each regiment in column of battalions; the front was two and a half miles. The 4th Brigade was to lead for the first day, and the 3d Brigade was to pass through and take the front line thereafter. Several successive objectives were indicated, and brigade commanders directed to relieve their front lines by fresh battalions according to their own judgment. The corps commander had said in conference, that he regarded this as an especially important and difficult attack; he had therefore directed that the artillery brigade be reinforced by those of both divisions in corps reserve—the 1st and 42d—besides Corps and army artillery in the area. The necessary reconnaissances were made, and details of relief agreed upon with the 42d Division. The final attack orders⁹ followed the general line of the tentative plan. One important modification, however, was made. In view of the strength of the German positions at Landres-et-St. Georges and in the Bois des Hazois, it was felt that additional force was needed in the attack there. Hence, those positions, which had been in the territory of the 89th Division on the right, were transferred to the 2d Division by a change in boundary line. The 2d Division was directed to put an additional regiment (the 23d Infantry) from the reserve brigade into the front line, for the purpose of clearing those positions and the Bois l'Epasse. On the first objective line, just beyond these woods, the regiment would halt, and revert to its own brigade in division reserve, the 4th Brigade extending its right to cover the entire division front.

The three artillery brigades, under the senior brigadier (General Gatley, of the 42d Division) were to fire two hours for preparation. This preparation was to pass into a standing barrage for ten minutes; the barrage would then advance slowly, so that the infantry might follow it closely. The rate of advance was fixed at a hundred yards in four minutes on favorable ground, and in the more difficult country eight minutes.

It appeared that in previous attacks on the same ground the troops had encountered heavy machine gun fire at the very moment of advance, delaying them to such an extent that the barrage got far ahead of them and ceased to be of value. It was evident that the enemy, during the preparation fire, noted its short limit, and pushed machine guns beyond it. Then, when the barrage opened, those guns, untouched by it, opened fire in the very face of the troops and broke the attack before it could get fairly started. Hence it was arranged that, when preparation fire opened, the front line of infantry should be withdrawn five hundred yards from its short limit. The barrage line was drawn back 200 yards from that limit. This fire caught the German machine gunners who had worked forward. During the ten minutes that the barrage remained stationary, the leading elements of the attacking infantry pushed up as close to it as possible, and were then able to advance "leaning on the barrage.¹⁰

The division's own artillery was to advance by battalion during the progress of the attack, so as to keep in close touch with the infantry. The other two brigades were supplied with the Model 1917 long range shell, so that they could complete the barrage up to the final objective without change of position.¹¹ The three artillery brigades directly supporting the division numbered 36 light and 18 heavy batteries. Adding to this number half the corps and army artillery on the corps area—in round numbers, 30 heavy batteries of various calibers, mostly 155 mm.¹², there were firing on the division front 36 light and 48 heavy batteries, or something over 300 guns. If formed in a single line, the guns would have stood at ten yard intervals across the entire divisional front.

Special troops attached included a company of the 1st Gas Regiment, a company of fifteen light tanks, a squadron and a half of airplanes, and a balloon company. All the troops concerned in the operations of the division were American, except part of the airplanes, which were French. Replacements had been coming in steadily, and the division was nearly at full strength.¹³

The time of the attack was fixed at 5.30 A.M., November 1st. The support and reserve battalions of the 42d Division were relieved on the night of October 30-31. The front line remained unchanged. Division headquarters were established at Exermont.¹⁴

Opposite the American First Army was the German Fifth, with headquarters at Montmedy. This was General von Gallwitz' old army, and he had retained its command even after the formation of his Army Group, until September 27, when he turned it over to General von der Marwitz and moved his army group headquarters to Longwy. It consisted of five corps, of which two occupied the Meuse-Argonne front. On the right, connecting with the Third Army of the German Crown Prince's Army Group, was the LVIII Provisional Corps (General von Kleist) known here as the Argonne Group and later on as the Florenville Group. Corps headquarters were at Beaumont. Next came the XXI Corps (General von Oven) known as Meuse West and later as Montmedy, connecting beyond the river with the V Reserve Corps (General von Soden) called Meuse East or Louppy. As illustrating the feeling of the German commander as to the importance of this part of the line, it is interesting to note that Colonel Bruchmtiller had been sent to General von Gallwitz as artillery adviser. This remarkable artillerist, known throughout the army as Durch-bruchmiiller, or "Break-through Miller," had been chief of artillery in every important operation of 1918. Since October 26th, by order of General von Gallwitz, he had been doing duty as chief of artillery of the Fifth Army.¹⁵

Immediately opposed to the American 42d Division was the German 41st, the boundaries corresponding almost exactly at the front line. This was the left division of the Argonne Group; on its right was the 15th Bavarian, which the 2d Division had met at Blanc Mont; on its left the 88th Division of Meuse West. While the 2d was relieving the 42d, the German 52d was relieving the 41st. On the morning of November 1st all three regiments of the 52d had taken their positions, but the relieved regiments were still in the area; regimental headquarters were in Landreville and Bayonville. Command had passed in the left and center regiments, and was to pass in the right regiment at 7.00 A.M., in the brigade (advance headquarters on "Bellevue Hill," a mile northwest of Bayonville) at 9.00 A.M., and in the division (headquarters Belval Château) at 10.00 A.M. The average strength of the regiments was about 800 men; battalions were organized in three rifle companies and a machine gun company.¹⁶

During the last days of October it had become evident to the Germans that a new attack on a large scale was soon to come. Heavy traffic, both road and railway, was noted in American territory. Long range fire from heavy guns reached Montmedy and Longuyon. The troops were warned to be in readiness and preparations were made to move army headquarters back to Virton if necessary.¹⁵ In an account of the Meuse-Argonne battle written by General von Gallwitz,¹⁷ he discussed the uncertainty as to where the new Allied attack would take place, and says:

"According to statements made by prisoners, the Americans by this time had eighteen of their divisions around Verdun. We continuously detected additional new divisional insignia. As for the west bank of the Meuse, we discovered there more than six divisions, as originally reported. That famous American crack unit, the 2d Division, withdrew from opposite Army Unit C and was now reported to be near Montfaucon."

November 1st was a cold, cloudy day, with fog in the morning and evening. The artillery preparation was fired as prescribed and the advance began on time.

The 4th Brigade (General Neville) making the main attack, had the 5th Marines (Colonel Feland) on the right, 6th (Colonel Lee) on the left. Both regiments were in column of battalions at a thousand yards distance. In the 5th Marines the 1st Battalion (Major Hamilton) led, with two companies in front line and two in support, each company well distributed in depth. The 2d Battalion (Captain Dunbeck) and the 3d Battalion (Captain Larsen) followed in the order named. In the 6th Marines the order of battalions was 1st (Major Barker), 3d (Major Shuler), 2d (Major Williams). Each battalion was accompanied by a machine gun company of its own regiment or of the brigade machine gun battalion (6th, Major Kingman) . These companies had taken part in the barrage fired by all the machine guns of the division, and joined the infantry battalions just in time to advance with them.¹⁸

The special operation of the 23d Infantry on the right flank —the reduction of the positions of Landres-et-St. Georges, the Bois des Hazois and the Bois l'Epasse—required a very broad front but only a shallow penetration. Hence Colonel Stone put two battalions in his front line—the 3d (Captain Shipley) on the right and the 1st (Lieutenant Colonel Zane) on the left, together with the usual machine gun companies.¹⁹

The attack started promptly at 5.30, and kept so well to schedule that there is a noticeable lack of detail in the American reports. The troops followed the barrage closely; pauses were made on the designated lines, and fresh battalions from support passed to the front; "the objective was reached"—this is all commanders can find to say. It was different with the Germans.

Between Landres and St. Georges, the hill south of the road was desperately held, but here the idea of using the 23d Infantry for its special attack on the right proved its value. The 1st Battalion of the 111th Infantry was holding the hill; even before the battalion commander heard from his own front line that the attack had begun, the Americans were seen from his headquarters, pressing through St. Georges, where troops of the 148th Infantry, of the 41st Division, were still in line with the 169th Infantry of the 52d. At the same time, heavy firing was heard from his left rear, where the 2d Battalion of the 111th was fighting. The Americans, forcing their way rapidly through the Bois des Hazois, were coming westward down the hill, and pressing northward through Landres. Two companies of the 2d Battalion maintained their organization, and succeeded in bringing small forces away and joining the 170th on the left. Of the other companies, only scattering men escaped. One rifle company and the machine gun company of the reserve battalion went into line in a vain attempt to check the advance; the other two companies of the battalion tried to establish a new position at Landreville. For a time, there seemed to be a little hope, for the Americans worked but slowly into Landreville, and after taking it they seemed not inclined to advance further. But this was only the pause scheduled to be made on this line, the first objective for the day. The artillery fire, which had slackened for a time, soon grew again in intensity, and the barrage resumed its movement. What little was left of the 111th fell back upon the 170th, which had paused at Bayonville, and all fell back together, the last man leaving that town at ten o'clock.²⁰

It was impossible to move the artillery. The guns continued their fire until actually overcome by the Americans, and were disabled at the last moment by the cannoneers. The division's own field artillery regiment, the 104th; another field artillery regiment, the 55th Reserve, attached to it from the 75th Reserve Division just arriving from the British front; and the 15th Field Artillery Battalion of the 41st; all were taken almost complete.²¹

Soon after the attack started, General von der Marwitz began moving up reserves. The 31st Division was already in the forward area of the Argonne Group, in close support of the divisions in line, and all of its regiments became engaged. The 115th and 236th Divisions, farther back, were ordered forward in the corps area. It was hoped that a counter-attack could be made, and the Freya position through Champigneulle and Bayonville held long enough to effect an orderly swing back to the Meuse, but this proved impossible. Hardly had orders to this effect gone out, when it was learned that, while the American advance had been checked north of Imecourt, the 2d Division had broken through the Freya position and was in the Bois de la Folie. Making a virtue of necessity, the Army ordered the new line Buzancy-Bois de la Folie, and the Freya position thence eastward. At night, the 15th Bavarian Division was north of Sivry, its left bent back and connecting with the 52d on the ridge between Buzancy and the Bois de la Folie. The fragments of this division were in the Bois de la Folie, but could hardly be said to hold a line; by evening of November 3d, when it was withdrawn from the area, it had been able to assemble only 35 officers and 242 men of its infantry. The 115th Division was coming up in its rear.^{21 22}

By reason of the bend in the line near Sivry, the left flank of the 2d Division was exposed, but fortunately the Germans were in no condition to seize their opportunity. Still, the situation was dangerous, and the rear battalions of the 6th Marines had to cross over the division boundary line and clear out the woods between Sivry and the Fontaine des Parades.²³

During the night, orders were received from the V Corps, directing that the 3d Brigade pass through the 4th and continue the advance to the line Nouart-Fosse. There was still, however, some uneasiness in regard to the situation on the left flank, and these orders were changed so as to call for an attack westward by the 3d Brigade to capture Buzancy. Movements preparatory to this attack began, but difficulties arose in arranging the details with the I Corps and the 80th Division. Finally, the Buzancy idea was given up and the 3d Brigade again ordered into the Bois de la Folie. By this time it was almost daylight, and too late to arrange for a further advance. The 4th Brigade was relieved by the 23d Infantry in the southern part of the woods, about on the line of the Buzancy-Nouart road; the 9th remained in the region of Bayonville where it had been placed for the Buzancy attack." ^{23 24}

At about the same time, in the northern part of the wood, the German 115th Division completed relief of the ill-fated 52d. Command passed at 4.00 P.M., headquarters still at Belval Château. On the left was a composite regiment of the 41st Division, attached to the 88th Division; on the right, the 31st Division, with which the 2d Division had had momentary contact at Thiaucourt, in the St. Mihiel operation, was commencing the relief of the 15th Bavarian.

In the course of this relief the line was withdrawn and readjusted; by morning it ran north of Buzancy and the Bois de la Folie, thence between Nouart and Barricourt and on to Villers. Headquarters of the Fifth Army moved to Virton; of the Argonne Group to Carignan.²⁵

The German preparations for withdrawal were noted, and advantage taken of them. The 3d Brigade was ordered to move in line of regiments up to the line Nouart-Fosse. This order was soon followed by another, directing it to extend its left to Buzancy, and then advance to the high ground south of the Bois de Belval and push reconnaissances toward Beaumont.²⁶

The first thing to be done was to secure the Nouart-Fosse line. Up to that line, only rear guard action was to be expected of the Germans, but these rear guards would be everywhere, and would fight desperately. To minimize the effect of their fire, a night movement seemed indicated; but such a movement through the woods in deployed formation would certainly result in utter confusion, and would insure that some part of the line would encounter every one of the little positions frontally, on its own prepared ground. The solution adopted was a simple but bold one—a march on the road, in columns of two's. A regiment thus formed would occupy an enormous road space, and deployment would be very slow—but no complete deployment would have to be made in haste. The column would avoid most of the danger spots, and those on the road could be dealt with by the advance guards. No counter-attack in force would be made in the darkness and without preparation. Risk there was, of course, but the bold course seemed the safer.^26a The 23d Infantry, already in the Bois de la Folie, took the road for Fosse, in advance guard formation. The 9th, in rear, moved by the road north from Bayonville, then northeast on the Buzancy-Nouart highway. The night was cold and rainy. As was anticipated, rear guard positions were encountered but were carried as planned. An illustration of the methods used is found in the reports of Company "A", 9th Infantry, which led the advance guard of that regiment.²⁷

At 10.30 P.M. "head of battalion was fired on point blank from center of road, by enemy machine guns. Company halted, and formed one rank on each side of the road. Lieutenant Hutchings, four auto-rifle teams, was sent forward to reconnoiter. After advancing one hundred yards found one German machine gun covering the road. Three prisoners were captured. Patrol also found enemy to be in position, on both sides of the road, covering road from all directions, strength about three companies of fifty men each, too strong to be attacked by this patrol but patrol stayed in position, covering road to battalion's front. One platoon of Company "A" formed on the north side of the road, in line of skirmishers, facing east. One platoon formed on south side of road, same formation, same direction. All platoons moved forward to clear the way for the advance of the battalion. At about one hundred yards from starting point encountered the enemy, killed or wounded fifteen and captured thirty-five prisoners."

The Fosse-Nouart line was reached without difficulty, and at 6.00 A.M., November 3d the division took attack formation and continued the advance. The 3d Brigade led, battalions retaining their relative position as in the night march the 4th Brigade followed in reserve. By noon, the line was close up to the southern edge of the Bois de Belval, from Les Champys to Vaux-en-Dieulet. The neighboring divisions had found difficulties north of Tailly and Buzancy, and were not yet up to this line, but the reserve brigade was in position to take care of the flanks, and the divisional machine gun battalion (the 4th, Major Bruce) was posted with the 6th Marines to strengthen the left.²⁸

During the day, the artillery was changing position to the front, by battalion. The 15th Field Artillery (Colonel Davis) reached Nouart, the 12th (Lieutenant Colonel Holabird), Fosse. Part of the 17 (Colonel Dunlap) came up to the same line. The artillery brigade of the 42d Division remained in place, and was detached from the 2d Division. The 1st Field Artillery Brigade moved forward, under the control of the 2d, but was not called upon to fire. General Bowley left the division during this movement, to take over the duty of chief of artillery, VI Army Corps, turning over his brigade to Colonel Moore, who had been sent to relieve him.²⁹

The German 115th Division had its left on the hill east of Belval Château, its boundary running back just west of La Forge Farm. Division and artillery headquarters had been moved back to Pouilly, with an advance station at Beaumont; infantry brigade to Petite Foret Farm south of Beaumont; 171st and 173d Infantry north of Vaux-en-Dieulet and at La Forge Farm; 136th Infantry farther east serving with the 88th Division. The 115th, it will be noticed, was passing westward out of the territory of the 2d Division; the 88th, on its left, was opposed to the right of the 2d Division. This division was a heterogeneous mass, mixed detachments, generally known by the names of the commanders. Major Friebe, commanding the 353d Infantry, had the fragments of his own regiment and the 426th, about 150 rifles; Captains Thode and Besser, commanding the 1st and 2d Battalions of the 352d, had each a similar group, consisting of his own battalion and stragglers from all regiments. The 3d Battalion of that regiment had been loaned several days before to the 107th Division, farther east. The entire rifle strength of the divisional infantry on October 31st had been only 2,300; what it was by now, no one knew. The pioneer battalion was in line with the infantry, and its sadly harassed commander had, besides, orders for extensive bridge and road demolition. Attached to the 88th and fighting with it were various other units—the three infantry regiments of the 41st Division—all that was left when the 52d had relieved it in line on October 31st—consolidated into one detachment under Lieutenant Colonel Wilsdorf of the 18th Infantry; the 124th Infantry of the 27th Division from corps reserve; and the 136th Infantry from the 115th Division. This last named regiment was "lost"; it had been ordered into the line of the 52d Division on November 1st in the course of the relief of that division by the 115th, but missed its way and came into line with the 88th, where it still remained.³⁰

For several days, the Germans had realized that they must withdraw to their final position, the Antwerp-Meuse line. This view had found expression in an order of the Fifth Army on November 1st31 and all troop movements since that time had been based upon it. Divisions in rear, and exhausted troops coming out of line, were ordered behind the river, and heavy guns were installed in positions there. But there was no intention of a hasty movement. At 1.00 P.M. on November 3d the Fifth Army received orders from Imperial Headquarters, requiring that its existing line be held for two days. Orders were sent accordingly to the corps, and steps taken to build up a reserve. In view of the continued progress of the 2d Division, the Argonne Group was directed to organize a counter-attack—which, however, proved impossible. But at 8.30 that evening the attempt to hold was recognized as hopeless. Imperial Headquarters telegraphed orders to go back at once behind the Meuse. This movement, named "War March," was to commence at nine o'clock; during its execution, that part of the Fifth Army still west of the river—the Argonne and West Meuse Groups—were placed under the Third Army, the left of the Crown Prince's Army Group. The left boundary of the Argonne Group was moved eastward so as to include the 88th Division.³¹

The 2d Division orders³² called for immediate reconnaissance by the 3d Brigade, through the woods to Beaumont. In view of the situation on the flanks, however, it was out of the question to push into the woods without due preparation. It was decided that the hostile positions in the edge of the woods should be paralyzed by artillery fire, and that then the tactics which had proved so successful the night before should be repeated.³³

Orders were sent to the artillery to place powerful concentrated fire upon the edge of the Bois de Belval until 2.30 P.M.; then to move the fire back gradually through the woods, sweeping a strip 400 yards wide along each of the two roads that seemed to exist. The brigade was to move by these roads, occupy the northern edge of the forest, and consolidate this position before daylight. The infantry regiments were to move at 2.30, in columns of two's, with advance guards as on the preceding night. The orders had to be sent by runners, however, and it was not until 4.30 that the columns actually started. By that time it was growing dark, and a cold rain was falling. It was soon found that only one of the two roads was practicable, and the whole brigade fell into a single column, 9th Infantry (Colonel Van Horn) ahead with the 3d Battalion (Major Janda) as advance guard.³⁴

The Germans had given up the idea of holding the southern edge of the woods, especially as communication with their artillery was poor and the front lines suffered from short fire. Late in the afternoon a withdrawal began, with the idea of holding again on a line through La Forge Farm,—a name which they teutonized as Schmidt Farm. Only a few machine guns remained at the entrance to the woods north of Belval Bois des Dames, and the advance party drove them back and off to the eastward. Without stopping to follow them, the column pushed rapidly on, a point consisting of half a dozen German speaking soldiers ahead. Stragglers on the road were picked up by this patrol and passed to the rear, but little attention was paid to them. Hostile parties, even batteries, in the woods off the roads, were disregarded. At La Forge, Colonel Wilsdorf tried to establish a line with his provisional regiment, at the north edge of the clearing, but what with the American artillery fire along the road and the rapid pursuit of the infantry, the men could not be controlled. Again the resistance was overcome by the leading company, without calling for support. The attempt to hold at the exit of the woods at Tuilerie Farm also failed the pursuit came so close on the heels of the retreating Germans that the farm house was found brilliantly lighted and filled with men, who were made prisoners. Outposts were established north of the farm, extending well across the road.³⁵ Here at last the Germans succeeded in forming a line. The 236th Division, which had suffered very heavily about Romagne and Cunel in the middle of October, had been given some little rest east of the Meuse, and on November 2d its infantry brigade (Lieutenant Colonel Fusslein) had been brought up to Beaumont. It had marched and countermarched, under successive emergency orders, but had had no serious fighting. Its rifle strength was only 120 per battalion, but under the circumstances it was looked upon as fresh troops. This brigade was now placed at the disposal of the 88th Division, with a view to checking the pursuit at Petite Forel Farm.

The division front was nearly two miles. Colonel Fusslein's brigade took over the right, across the Belval-Beaumont Road at Petite Foret Farm. General von Pfeil, of the 176th Brigade, 88th Division, was assigned to command the left under him were two provisional regiments—Colonel Wilsdorf's, including all that was left of the 41st Division, and Major Friebe's, similarly made up of the fragments of the 88th. The 10th Division, fairly fresh, was coming up to Beaumont, but the composite 88th Division had no reserve of its own except one regiment, the 459th, of Fusslein's brigade. The idea was to withdraw all the provisional units, and let the 236th Division relieve the 88th, but this was out of the question at the moment.³⁶

The position of the American 9th Infantry was secure, in so far as danger of a serious counter-attack was concerned, but it was badly exposed. It was receiving cross-fire of artillery from the northwest and north, and from batteries far to the northeast across the river, as well as rifle and machine gun fire from the front. In the course of the day the 2d and 3d Battalions (Majors Day and Janda) pushed forward half a mile and secured better ground. The 23d Infantry came up on the left, and the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, (Captain Dunbeck) came up to the northern edge of the woods in support. Both regiments of light artillery opened headquarters at La Forge Farm, and their batteries moved up to that region. The 4th Brigade was ordered into line on the right of the 3d, to connect with the 89th Division, which came up abreast the 2d on that side. The 80th, on the left, was still in rear to take care of any possible danger on that flank, after the departure of the 4th Brigade, the 1st Division, in corps reserve, was ordered to push a regiment up to the region of La Forge Farm. All these movements, in rear as well as in front, were difficult and costly, by reason of German artillery fire upon the Bois de Belval, and especially upon the main Belval-Beaumont Road.³⁷

Division headquarters, originally at Exermont, had been moved up successively to Landres-et-St. Georges, to Bayon-ville-et-Chennery, and to Fosse. Headquarters of the 3d Brigade were now at La Forge Farm; of the 4th, at Belval Bois des Dames.

The German 88th Division was now backed up close against the Meuse, and anxiety increased as to securing a retreat. Bridge guards were improvised at Pouilly and Létanne out of signallers, trainmen and any others that could be collected behind the lines. For the bridge at Alma Farm a machine gun was found, and manned by clerks from division headquarters. Officers from division headquarters were assigned to these detachments, and Lieutenant Colonel Gerlach of the 426th Infantry, was given command of them all. On the night of November 4-5, the division fell back across the Meuse, turning over Colonel Fusslein's brigade to its proper command, the 236th Division, which now took over the Beaumont line.³⁸

The orders of this division were to cover the withdrawal of the 31st and 115th Divisions across the bridges between Létanne and Mouzon, drawing back its own forces to the heights north of Beaumont and Létanne. It was reinforced by four battalions from the 10th Division, under Major Lorenz of the 56th Field Artillery; one regiment of the 240th Division; Wilsdorff's composite regiment of the 41st Division, now under Major Pfafferot of the 152d Infantry; the 7th Bavarian Field Artillery of the 15th Bavarian Division; and such artillery of the 88th Division as remained on the west bank. The division's own artillery went into position near division headquarters at Moulins, on the east bank. All troops on the west bank were under the immediate command of Lieutenant Colonel Fusslein, with headquarters at Villemontry.³⁹

The retirement was closely followed by the Americans. During the night the 23d Infantry advanced, on the left of and through the 9th. The 2d Battalion (Major Miller) occupied Beaumont; the 3d (Captain Shipley), Létanne. The 5th Marines, with the 6th in second line, cleared the Foret de Jaulnay of the enemy, and reached the Meuse at Pouilly, a battalion of the 89th Division cooperating. During the day of the 5th, the positions were organized, and active reconnaissances made all along the river line, to determine points for crossing. The 80th Division, came up and made connection at Beaumont.⁴⁰

During the night of November 5-6 the Germans gave up the ridge north of Létanne and Beaumont, the 236th Division crossing the Meuse at Villemontry and Mouzon. The 9th Infantry followed, moving up on the left of the 23d and extending the line along the river as far as Villemontry.⁴¹

On the 6th, reconnaissance of the Meuse line continued. The crossing was now not only a tactical but an engineering problem, and Colonel Mitchell, of the 2d Engineers, began to plan bridges and collect material for them.⁴² But the greatest activity for the moment was in the rear areas.

The boundary between the American First and French Fourth Armies followed approximately the valley of the little river Bar, and reached the Meuse at Bazeilles, a southeastern suburb of Sedan. The river cut diagonally across the front, and the American divisions were reaching it successively, from right to left. The III Corps had already gained a foothold on the other side; the right and center of the V Corps had reached the west bank. Only a small area, remained to be cleared out, and the 1st and 42d Divisions, no longer needed in reserve of the V Corps, began to move across the rear areas of the 2d and 80th Divisions to assist the I Corps. The intention was that the 1st should relieve the 80th, and move up to the river at Mouzon. The entire corps, by concerted action, would then force a crossing. The 42d Division would join the I Corps.⁴³

The movement through the rear areas was completed, and the 1st Division entered the Faubourg de Mouzon, on the west bank of the river. It became evident that there was to be no more resistance between the Meuse and the Bar; apparently, the way to clear out the triangle was to march straight for its apex at Sedan. Perhaps, too, the success of the 2d Division's night marches had set a fashion. The 42d Division, now the free lance of the I Corps, passed through the lines of the 78th, the left division of that corps, and started down the left boundary line of the army; but the French Fourth Army was not yet so far north, and the boundary line on the map was not a defensible flank. To hold the Meuse line opposite Bazeilles, the flank would have to be extended to the Bar; to gain a footing on the opposite bank, Sedan would have to be taken. This meant pushing three or four miles across the theoretical boundary, but General Maistre's instructions of November 2d, fixing that boundary, had made it clear that the line was only theoretical, and was "to be modified if the tactical situation required it."

The V Corps also was called upon to press northward. The corps commander went in person to headquarters of his left division, the 1st, and ordered it to march on the night of November 6-7 upon Sedan, there to cooperate with the I Corps in the capture of that place.⁴⁴

The 2d Division was required to push forward on the right of the 1st; the 89th to take over protection of the river line as the 2d moved, and itself prepare to join in the advance. The 4th Brigade was withdrawn from its position opposite Pouilly, passed across the rear of the 3d Brigade—flank movements across rear areas were becoming orthodox—and assembled at La Forge Farm ready to march north. The 3d Brigade and the artillery were to remain in place until relieved by the 89th Division, and then be ready to follow the 4th Brigade.⁴⁵

The retirement of the Germans was a gigantic wheel to the right rear, with its pivot at Metz, and the Antwerp-Meuse line faced nearly west. The advance of the Americans, and of the French Group of Armies of the Center, had been directed north. It had now progressed so far that the German center was backed up against the Ardennes, and their line practically cut in two. The campaign was about to split into two campaigns, one north of the Ardennes and one south, the Group of Armies of the Center serving to connect the two. The southern campaign would be conducted by the American Group of Armies and by the French Group of Armies of the East, which would be reinforced by troops drawn from the Group of Armies of the Center.⁴⁶

But as the units arrived successively on the Meuse following the old boundaries, the direction of the river was such that the front of the Group of Armies of the Center, which was now to play a less active part, was growing shorter; that of the American First Army, which would now attack eastward as the left element of the new Lorraine campaign, was growing longer. It became necessary to change both the position and the direction of the boundary. Marshal Foch therefore ordered on November 6th that the boundary point on the Meuse should be Mouzon instead of Bazeilles, and on the 7th fixed the boundary lines as Tannay-Stonne-Mouzon-Carignan, slightly north of east instead of slightly east of north.⁴⁷

But events had gotten ahead of orders, and by the time these changes reached the Americans their troops were already across the old boundary line and along the river opposite Sedan. It was necessary to draw the 1st Division back, out of French territory and into the new American limits, which took a little time and hampered the movements of the French. To conform to the new plan, the American I Corps was ordered out of line. Upon completion of this movement, which would require several days, the 2d Division would become the left element of the American Army and would connect with the French at Mouzon. As a matter of fact, the relief of the troops of the I Corps was never fully completed, and the American 77th Division was still in line on the left of the 2d at the Armistice, attached to the V Corps.⁴⁸

By reason of these changes, no northward movement was made by the 2d Division under the orders of November 6th. The 4th Brigade assembled at La Forge Farm and on the 7th was placed in bivouac along the Beaumont-Sommauthe Road; the 3d Brigade remained along the river with its right at Létanne and its left at the Faubourg de Mouzon.⁴⁹

No important moves were made on November 7th and 8th. The 3d Brigade made such dispositions as were possible to protect itself against the heavy German artillery fire from across the river. On the 7th, news was received of the departure from Berlin of a German delegation seeking an armistice, and all front line troops were directed to be on the watch for their approach. On the 8th, orders were received for the 2d Division to cross the Meuse at Mouzon and Létanne.⁵⁰

The Germans had had several bridges along this stretch of the river, but these had been completely removed except those at the two places named, which had been wrecked. At both places, the ruined bridges were kept lighted, and under artillery fire, to prevent repair work. At Létanne, the bridge was evidently useless; at Mouzon, there seemed to be some chance, and the 9th Infantry tried to send a patrol across. It was found that the bridge was a trap, with a loose section that gave way under weight and threw the patrol into the water.

Another patrol found a boat tied to the bank. Surprised, but willing to take any good the gods might provide, they crossed in it, and talked to some French inhabitants whom they encountered. No Germans were seen, but the French said they were all about. The patrol returned safely, and tied up the boat. In the morning it was gone. A German patrol had evidently been on our bank, and doubtless had been much concerned over the temporary loss of their transportation.⁵¹

The division plan was for two simultaneous crossings on the night of November 9-10, to be made by the 4th Brigade, under cover of fire from all the artillery, the 3d Brigade remaining in support. The engineer regiment was busily engaged in preparing floating footbridges to be brought down to the river in sections and launched after dark, but these could not be ready in time and the attempt was postponed until the following night.⁵² After a conference held at corps headquarters on the morning of the 9th, new and more detailed orders were issued, but no material changes were made.⁵³ In preparation for this operation, the 5th Marines had been placed in the woods two miles west of Beaumont, and the 6th in the Bois du Fond de Limon between Yoncq and Villemontry. The 5th was now brought up to join the 6th. Brigade headquarters were at Beaumont.

The Mouzon crossing was looked upon as the main attack. It was to be made by the 6th Marines, reinforced by the 3d Battalion (Major Larsen) of the 5th. The Létanne force was regarded as a connecting detachment, to clean up the area between the other group and the 89th Division, which was crossing at Inor. It was consequently to be made up of troops from both divisions—the 5th Marines less its 3d Battalion, and a battalion from the 89th Division. All battalions had the usual assignment of machine guns, and two companies of the 2d Engineers were charged with the bridge work, assisted by two companies of the 9th Infantry. The artillery and the 3d Brigade supported by fire. Two footbridges were to be thrown north of Mouzon, below the point of junction of the canal with the main channel; and two near La Sartelle Farm north of Létanne. Both crossing forces were to push rapidly forward and seize the heights in their fronts; the artillery schedule was planned accordingly, the fire to move back gradually from the river, from point to point.⁵⁴

The Germans were on their last line. It was unfortified, and depended entirely upon the obstacle of the Meuse. They were down, also, about to their last man.

Mouzon was the boundary point of the Third Army, of the Crown Prince's Army Group, and the Fifth Army of Gallwitz' Army Group. From Mouzon to Alma Farm was the 31st Division, 58th Provisional (Kleist's) Corps, formerly called the Argonne Group, with a total infantry strength of 850 officers and men and 25 machine guns. From Alma Farm to Létanne was the right regiment, 353d of the 88th Division —380 officers and men with 11 machine guns. This force served only to provide a fairly thick cordon of small posts along the river bank. On what was designated as the main line of resistance—the high ground across the base of the deep river bend—there was no defensive organization whatever, but here were stationed the sole reserves available, two provisional regiments. One, containing all that could be found of the infantry of the 52d Division, was at Vigneron Farm; the other, similarly constituted from the 236th Division, was between Autreville and Moulins. The strength of these two detachments does not appear, but must have been under a thousand all told. The 29th Machine Gun Battalion was attached to the 88th Division, and had one company on the river bank and one on the reserve line. The artillery and air forces were strong and active.⁵⁵

Resistance on the line of the river, then, was to be stubborn and even desperate. That line once passed, and the heights reached, the work was done. The Americans felt this; the Germans, as their orders at the time and their memoirs since show, well knew it.

The Mouzon crossing failed. All night long the engineers, assisted by details from the infantry, labored to throw the bridges. But the Germans promptly discovered the attempt, located the crossing point, and brought so heavy machine gun and artillery fire to bear that all efforts were fruitless. Shortly before daybreak the troops were withdrawn into the Bois du Fond de Limon.⁵⁶ The artillery support here was furnished by the 12th Field Artillery (light) and four batteries of the 17th (heavy), firing upon Mouzon and river bank to the north, and was intense, but its effect inadequate, for the German fire was not kept down. This is attributable in part to the strength and activity of the German air force, which had prevented thorough reconnaissance by our own planes and accurate location of German batteries, which, as noted above, were very numerous and active.⁵⁷

At Létanne, fortune was better, and the operation intended as a secondary attack became the main one. The idea had been to send the battalion from the 89th Division and the 2d Battalion of the 5th Marines (Captain Dunbeck) across together each using one bridge. the 1st Battalion (Captain Hunt) following in second line. Major Hamilton, of the 1st Battalion, was in command of the entire crossing force. There was to be an hour's artillery preparation, the 15th Field Artillery (light) firing upon the strip of low ground between the river and the wooded slopes, two batteries of the 17th Field Artillery (heavy) upon selected points further back; during this, the actual crossing was to be effected. The fire was then to lift from the river bank, and be concentrated upon successive strong points in advance of the infantry.

The battalion of the 89th Division was late in arriving, but this caused no delay. The 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, in second line, was substituted for the one from the 89th, and that battalion held near Sartelle Farm as the support. More serious was the situation at the bridges. The artillery was working under the same difficulties as at Mouzon, and could not silence the powerful German batteries. One bridge was twice broken, and no troops crossed it. The other held, and in spite of the machine gun fire which swept it, the 1st Battalion worked its way across, from 9.30 to 10.30 P.M. The fire, the darkness and the precarious footing—for the bridge was a mere footway supported on floating logs, "like a railway track turned upside down"—scattered the battalion badly, and a strong machine gun nest encountered as it started forward from the bank completed the work. Only about a hundred men could be assembled before daylight, and these were organized into a single company.⁵⁸

This group advanced to the northwest far enough to clear the bridge. The 2d Battalion got across, in better shape, by 11.30, came up on the left, and pushed patrols toward Bellefontaine Farm, where they expected to connect with the Mouzon force. The battalion from the 89th followed, during the early morning, and at daybreak advanced with 300 men on the right of the 1st Battalion. The 89th Division itself had effected a crossing, established its left at Pouilly, and was working northward astride the Inor-Moulins Road.⁵⁹

The entire Létanne crossing force was in first line with no support. This condition had been foreseen by the commanding general of the 4th Brigade, and at 2.30 in the morning he had requested another battalion. The 3d Battalion of the 5th Marines was unavailable, being attached to the Mouzon force; the 1st Battalion, 9th Infantry (Captain Howes) was sent across in its place, and remained in support until afternoon, when the marine battalion arrived to relieve it.⁶⁰

At 8.35 news reached headquarters of the 4th Brigade that an armistice had been signed, and that hostilities would cease at 11.00 o'clock (noon, German time) . The news and orders were at once sent forward, and had reached all parts of the line before 11.00. The same news was being transmitted along the German lines. On both sides, it was at once evident that a defensible line must be marked out and occupied before 11.00; for, as was later emphasized in orders, an armistice was not peace, and hostilities might be resumed.

The Americans selected the Senegal Farm Ridge. This was occupied by the 1st Battalion, the 2d extending the line along the main highway to Bellefontaine Farm. Patrols which had reached the outskirts of Moulins were recalled. Through the battalion of the 89th, connection was made with that division near Autreville. Opposite the 2d Battalion the Germans had a good position, on the ridge running up toward La Folie Farm and Vaux; opposite Senegal Farm they were not so fortunate, being in the valley and completely defenseless. Here the 88th Division selected the line marked by the main highway for a last stand. The left of the 31st Division was now at Moulins. The 88th, with one of its own regiment3 and the fragments of the 236th Division, took positions along the road; the other two regiments of the 88th, under Major Friebe, had stood for a time against the advance of the American 89th from the south, then made a desperate counter-attack in which Major Friebe lost his life fighting hand to hand, and finally drew back across the road, facing south. Telephone connections had long ceased to exist, and the division commander was in the front lines. The division's report says "it was absolutely necessary to hold the enemy on this line, if a catastrophe was to be avoided. In the wood east of the highway, with its steep slopes and bottomless roads, the division with all its artillery would have fallen an easy prey. The artillery was forbidden to change position until the infantry should actually pass through the batteries; it continued in action until the last moment. The enemy was unable to break this new line. At 11.00 o'clock the fierce fighting of November 11th ended. The hostile artillery, active until this moment, ceased firing suddenly. The great success, which the enemy had undoubtedly promised himself for this last day, was denied him".⁶¹ And so, even in this extremity, the Germans were able to find a little crumb of comfort. "Tout etait perdu fors l'honneur."

This appreciation of the situation was accurate. Elsewhere along the line, all the way up through Belgium, there was the same condition, of mere outpost cordons with no real line of resistance behind them. But farther to the north and west there were other positions in rear, and, with good luck, several successive withdrawals might be made. Here, the Germans were backed up literally against the Ardennes; there was absolutely no hope behind them.

The last German order issued, along this front, was at 10.50 A.M. (11.50, German time) when the 174th Infantry was directed by the brigade commander to send its reserve battalion to the 166th Infantry on the left, to meet the American advance from the direction of Autreville. This was doubtless a surprise, for news of the armistice had been received two hours before; still, it was not yet noon, and the movements were legal. But, the regimental war diary goes on to say, "the movement was not made, because an American prisoner said that they had all been informed that the armistice was effective at 11.00 o'clock".⁶² And so, a failure to consider difference in time and the unsupported word of the last American to be captured, held up the last German troop movement.