0n this new front the enemy was holding strong positions with his line running East and West about four hundred yards South of Landres-St. George. Previous attempts to take this position had been unsuccessful. The Ninth Infantry, in column of battalions, with leading battalion five hundred yards in rear of the jump-off, moved into place near Sommerance, behind the Fifth and Sixth Marines, after dark the night of 30 October — 1 November. The Regiment jumped off in support of the Marine Brigade at 8 hours, 1 November, 1918, with one thousand yards distance. The Third Battalion led, with two companies in front and two companies in support. The First and Second Battalions followed in that order, each with five hundred yards distance, at the rate of one-hundred meters in five minutes on level and one-hundred meters in six minutes on rough and rising ground.
The Regiment, following in support of the Sixth Marines on the left of the Division Sector, dug in for the night in the same relative position when the attacking line reached the day's objective. Considerable artillery fire was received during the advance, and some casualties, were sustained due to direct observation and systematic shelling of the anticipated route. A few enemy machine-guns offered trouble during the night on our left flank, but they were cleared out by continuous patrolling throughout the night. Outposts were established by the two forward battalions to protect the left flank of the Division.
On 2 November the Brigade commander, Col. J. C. Rhea, returned, and Col. R. O. Van Horn resumed command. Orders were received to relieve the Fifth Marines on the right of the Division Front, but after the battalions were marching to their new positions orders were changed. These new orders were to jump off at 5:30 A. M. from the Division exploitation line. It was found that this line was two or three kilometers in
front of the outpost line then held by the Marines. It was impossible to jump off in line of battle from the Marine position and avance that distance over rough and wooded ground and arrive at position ordered at the proper time and in shape to jump off in a daylight attack. An advance of the right in column of squads on main road and with advance guard was then ordered by the Regimental commander. In conformity with these orders the Regiment was formed in column (First Battalion, Second Battalion, Third Battalion) on the Bayonville-Nouart Road, the advance guard clearing the forward elements of the Marines front line (third objective line), at 18:30 hours, under cover of darkness. Opposition from enemy troops was met along road, artillery fire registered upon the column, but losses were slight and, after some delay while flank patrols cleaned out the surprised enemy positions, the battalions arrived in position, along the exploitation line, about daybreak, and under cover of a heavy fog, promptly jumped off in attack, (Map: Remonville 304.3 — 96.8 on Buzancy-Nouart Road).
The objectives for this attack — the heights south of Bois de Belval — reached at 9 hours, 3 November without any stiff resistance, Company "I" of the reserve battalion, acting as liaison unit with the Eighty-Ninth Division on the right, and Company "L" cleaning up Nouart. As the objectives were reached and Company "B" started to clear Le Champ Haut, heavy machine gun fire developed from this village and from the Champ Bas, as well as from Belval. These were all cleaned up in turn. Minenwerfers, 88's and machine guns in the southern edge of Bois de Belval increased in volume and accuracy of fire. The support (Second Battalion) moved up on the right and left flanks of the front line battalion, and took position. There were many casualties and the Regiment dug in on reserve slope off hill. Regimental P. C. at this point established at Le Fontaine au Cronco Ferme. Liaison was established with the Eighty-Ninth Division but the Twenty-Third Infantry on left did not come up until later. The Fifth Marines were in rear in their support position. The Fifteenth Field Artillery coming into position north of Nouart shot up the southern edge of the woods with good effect. This fire stopped in great part the enemy fire from our front and flanks.
The day's attack had been a complete success, but the enemy resistance demonstrated that he intended to hold the Bois de Belval, a naturally strong defensive position with heavy woods which it would have taken days to fight through if any resistance were offered. There was only one available road north, and it was seven and one half kilometers to the northern edge of the woods.
The following message was sent to the Commanding General, Third Brigade: |
Confirmatory orders were received and in compliance the Regiment formed again in column of twos at dusk, abandoning its line, moved out through Belval to carry out a surprise move of eight kilometers into enemy territory. The Third Battalion, acting as advance guard, led out at 16 hours, 3 November, followed by the Second Battalion and First Battalion. Several machine gun outposts were taken unawares and either dispersed or captured. German details passing up
and down the road through the forest were quietly taken in hand by a point composed of German speaking soldiers and marched to the rear under proper escort. Some of these parties were captured and recaptured several times during their progress as no attempt was made to mop up woods on either side of the road. In fact enemy batteries in these woods were firing toward the rear several hours after we passed. The necessity of reaching the northern edge of the forest by daybreak allowed no delay in the march.
Near La Forge Ferme at the first opening in the woods enemy resistance was encountered, also upon entering Bois de Vaux Dieul, where an enemy infantry battalion was surprised fortifying the southern edge of the woods. The enemy was dispersed or captured and the advance continued to
La Tuilerie Ferme. The farmhouse, brilliantly lighted, was surrounded, and numerous terror-stricken prisoners were routed out. At 23:30 hours, 3 November, a line of defense was established two hundred meters north of the Ferme, extending eastward for five-hundred meters from the Belval-Beaumont Road. Outposts established to the front and flanks.
At 9:30 hours 4 November the Second and Third battalions attacked, advancing to position on ridge south and east of Beaumont, against stiff resistance from machine guns thickly planted along this ridge. The enemy gunners were either driven off, killed or captured. Enemy artillery from three sides registered heavily on the advancing troops and new lines, assisted by great numbers of enemy planes, who directed the fire of their artillery accurately. Throughout the day these enemy planes, unmolested by our aeroplanes, swept the troops with machine gun fire and dropped bombs on all three battalions with some effect. The casualties during the advance were heavy, the Third Battalion officer personnel being reduced to two officers with the four companies.
The Twenty Third Infantry which had followed the Ninth Infantry on the same road came up on the morning of November 4th. and advanced into position with one battalion on the western side of the road, extending our left flank. The remaining Battalions of the Twenty Third Infantry and the Second Battalion of the Fifth Marines, wich [sic] also came up remained in support in the northern edge of the woods, and stayed there under constant and heavy
artillery fire. The one road south to Belval was shelled heavily throughout the day. Many casualties resulted and passage on the road rendered most precarious on account of the accuracy of the German artillery. A German observation balloon commanded a view of its entire length. Heavy flanking fire was received throughout the day from both machine guns and artillery. Regimental P. C. established at La Tuilerie Ferme.
During the night 4—5 November, the Twenty Third Infantry passed through our lines and took up a position some Fifteen hundred meters to our front, relieving the fire on our lines.
The night of 5—6 November, the Regiment, in order First, Second and Third Battalions, with advanced guard, marched through the Twendy [sic] Third Infantry lines and continued its forward movement on main highway, northward through Beaumont and reached a position without loss, on the west bank of the Meuse shortly after midnight. (Map Buzancy Spepial [sic Special]) at 306.5—310.5 La Sartelle Ferme, which was consolidated. This movement preceded a daybreak attack of the Twenty six Infantry, First Division, and protected their right flank from any attack which they might expect to encounter from the enemy, who had withdrawn across the river.
The Second Battalion in the front line held about Three Thousand meters of west bank of Meuse, receiving some artillery fire from across the river.
At 16:30 hours, 8 November, 1918, "K" and "M" companies occupied Villemontry and La Faubourg (Mouzon) respectively. The occupation was carried out with but slight losses. Regimental P. C. established in Beaumont, which was shelled more heavily than the lines, although the town was still occupied by civilians.
At La Faubourg the Third Battalion in aniicipation of crossing the Meuse at this point reconnoitered the passage of the river. The enemy had taken a strong defensive position with machine guns crossfiring at short range upon the destroyed bridge. Investigation during daylight was impracticable as the one street was under sharp fire from enemy snipers in dominating positions, and the western bank of the stream afforded no cover from the heavy machine gun fire which every movement brought forth. Fires started by the enemy were
augmented at night by oil and the whole vicinity made as bright as daylight. Despite these difficulties patrols reconnoitered the destroyed bridge, which had been reported passable, only to find two impassable gaps, wire, and traps located in the stream with a steep twenty foot bank to scale on the Mouzon side. Patrols attempting to cross fell in the water and were subjected to heavy fire both from machine guns and a line of Infantry. The enemy was extremely nervous at this point, throwing up flares at every sound and firing machine guns at every shadow.
At 7 hours, 10 November, companies "G" and "H" assisted the Second Engineers in placing two bridges across the Meuse near La Sartelle Ferme, while the other two companies of that Battalion with "B" and "C" companies, in conjunction with attached machine gun companies, assisted the crossing of two battalions of the Fifth Marines by fire of position upon the east bank of the river. At 4:15 hours, 11 November, the First Battalion moved out, crossing the Meuse, and took up position in support of the Fifth Marines on the eastern bank. Heavy enemy artillery registration on roads and western bank caused casualties. The Armistice took effect at 11 o'clock, 11 November. That night at dusk the Regiment was relieved by the Twenty-Third Infantry and assembled in billets at Beaumont.
All prisoners and indications throughout the operation testified to the fact that orders were to hold at any cost. After the first night attack and march of the Ninth Infantry through his lines, the enemy was in constant fear of being cut off and endeavored to withdraw. His troops were in front of, in rear of, and on all sides of the Ninth Infantry but the surprise of such a daring advance confused him, and broke down his liaison with his own supporting troops.
The enemy was decisively beaten wherever met, surprised and routed and forced to fall back across the river in disorder, a distance of thirty kilometers, twenty of which the Ninth Infantry was in advance. By its three night marches into enemy territory, the second and longest of which was unsupported by any troops on either flank, it made possible the progress of all other units of the American Army west of the Meuse.
The morale of the officers and men of the Regiment would have been an inspiration to any commander. Weakened by diorrhea [sic] and fever; fighting all day and marching through enemy territory all night, with little food and no protection against steady chilling rains; lying in muddy foxholes in their brief moments of respite; constantly subjected to hostile fire of every description; the men made no complaint and would not fall out or be evacuated. Their only thought was to push the success to the utmost. Volunteers were ready for every dangerous mission, and battalion vied with battalion to lead throughout the pursuit.
The regiment entered the operation with an effective strength of 2600 men for combat, less than that of any other regiment, of the Division. It suffered more casualties, had less sick, and more men present for duty at the and of the operation, than any similar unit in the Division. The losses in this engagement were: |