WHAT is generally known as the Château-Thierry operation was now over and the 2d Division had established a reputation extending beyond the circle of the American Army. Officers and men had distinguished themselves by their fortitude and their courage; the officers had shown their ability. The valor exhibited by the troops had not been needless as it had been demonstrated in a crisis when the Allied cause hung in a balance. The Germans had smashed through the Allied defenses at the very gates of Paris on one of the great national routes to that city. The weary French veterans were in full retreat, while thousands of refugees, abandoning their homes in unhappy flight, choked the roads to the south. At this critical juncture the 2d Division had hurried to the scene where their presence gave fresh hope to France. They immediately formed a defensive line, but dug no trenches; they came to carry out a war of maneuver—to assume the offensive—they would meet the enemy upon his own ground.

In the month of June the division had undertaken two offensives—the operations in Belleau Wood and the attack on Vaux. The capture of the wood by the 4th Brigade commanded by General Harbord illustrated the valor and bulldog tenacity of the Marines; the successful assault on Vaux by the 3d Brigade under General Lewis demonstrated the courage and discipline of these troops. The series of combats in Belleau Wood were carried on in a wilderness of trees, brush, and limestone caves, amid great jutting rocks, on a terrain more fitting for encounters between savage tribes armed with bolos and spears, a terrain where every advantage was with the defense. The assault on Vaux is today a remarkable example of a carefully planned advance upon a fortified village. Foreign officers of high rank and distinguished service have recognized the striking record of the 2d Division at Château-Thierry. General Joseph Hellé, at one time chief of staff to General Mangin, gives this division the highest praise for their June operations. He says they were called upon suddenly to face the German horde; upon arrival, they "Directed themselves in remarkably orderly formations to the enemy lines; it was a true war of movement . . . . they attacked with fire and bayonet; they gained the upper hand over the Germans, forcing him to retreat; they took Bouresches. General Bundy intensified his attacks and on the morning of the 10th the brigade of General Harbord on the left attacked Belleau Wood with its full-grown forest, copses and glades, including natural caves. These made shell-proof shelter to say nothing of the rocks which, fortified with machine guns, formed veritable strongholds. The artillery of General Chamberlaine . . . . supported the Marines".¹

Lt.-Col. de Chambrun and Captain de Marenches in their book "L'Armée Américaine Dans Le Con flit Europeén" Paris, 1919, say of the 4th Brigade:

"During those combats at the Bois de Belleau the brigade of General Harbord took a large number of prisoners and gave the Germans a high idea of the combat value of the Americans," (page 150) . These two French officers also speak of the citation of the 3d Brigade by the French Sixth Army for their conduct at Vaux and add that, "the staff of General Lewis, guided by Colonel Brown, Division Chief of Staff, drew up a plan of attack on the village of Vaux which is a model of its kind," (Page 151) .

General Pershing says in his Final Report: "The third German offensive on May 27th against the French on the Aisne soon developed a desperate situation for the Allies. The 2d Division, then in reserve northwest of Paris and preparing to relieve the 1st Division, was hastily diverted to the vicinity of Meaux on May 31st and early on the morning of June 1st was deployed across the Chateau-Thierry—Paris Road near Montreuil-aux-Lions in a gap in the French lines, where it stopped the German advance on Paris. . . . The enemy having been halted, the 2d Division commenced a series of vigorous attacks on June 4th which resulted in the capture of Belleau Wood, after very severe fighting. The village of Bouresches was taken soon after and on July 1st Vaux was captured. In these operations the 2d Division met with most desperate resistance by Germany's best troops".²

The impression made by the division upon the enemy appears in an intelligence report of the German Seventh Army, June 17, 1918. In this report the 2d Division was rated as a "shock unit," the highest classification for a body of troops. It says that "the attacks on the Bois de Belleau were made with courage and dash, and even the heavy German fire did not stop the Americans." The personnel of the 2d Division was considered remarkable: "healthy, well-built men from eighteen to twenty-eight years of age; their esprit de corps is excellent; they make a good impression and exhibit a wide-awake air. A number were born of foreign parents; yet these 'half-Americans' who after all were born in America, have without hesitation the sentiments of pure Americans. The men are in fine spirits and filled with naïve assurance; the words of a prisoner are characteristic: 'We kill or we get killed'."

A copy of this report had been captured in the Marne region on July 7th, 1918; but as some doubt was expressed after the war as to its authenticity, the Chief of the Historical Section, Army War College, called upon that section's representative in Berlin to make a search to establish the document's value. With the assistance of the German authorities, the German original was actually found. It was translated and sent to the Historical Section.

The following letter from General Tasker H. Bliss, American Representative on the Supreme War Council, to General Pershing, the report made by Colonel B. H. Wells (since Major-General), and General Bliss' indorsement of the report to General Pershing are of particular interest:

From the time when your men began to do such fine work in the vicinity of Château-Thierry, I heard in all quarters the most enthusiastic expressions of admiration for them, accompanied in many cases by statements that the speaker believed that they had saved Paris. Colonel Wells, the SWC officer at General Foch's Headquarters, several times told me of what he had heard said by members of the staff there. It occurred to me that it would be a good thing to quietly put on record such statements, contemporaneously with the events themselves, so that when the history of the war comes to be written up these things will not be forgotten. There may be a tendency a year or so from now to minimize the credit which at the moment they gave to our troops.
I, therefore, asked Col. Wells to give me a memorandum of what he had heard and knew, in order that I might indorse it and send it to you. I enclose it herewith. and if you think it of any value to have it, you can put it in your records for future use.

"On the 16th instant, Captain Millet, French Army (who, as you know, has charge of matters connected with the American Army at these Headquarters) and myself left Headquarters, in compliance with orders of General Foch, for a visit to the areas occupied by the 4th, 28th, 2d and 3d American Divisions. We performed the mission upon which we were sent, and returned to Headquarters the night of June 17th.

"During our visit with the 2d American Division I had conversations with General Bundy (Commanding Division); General Lewis (Commanding 3d Brigade); General Chamberlaine (Commanding 2d Field Artillery Brigade); Major W. C. Potter (Adj. of the Artillery Brigade); Col. Paul B. Malone (Commanding 23d Infantry); Colonel Preston Brown (Chief of Staff of the Division), and several other American officers. We also visited several French Headquarters, among them the Headquarters of the 21st French Corps in which our 2d Division is now serving, and had conversation with the Staff officers on duty there.

"From the officers I obtained some of the details of the service recently performed by the 2d Division and of the circumstances under which the service was performed, which I think, perhaps, might interest you and the officers of the American Section.

"As nearly as I can recall them, the incidents were as follows:

"For some time previous to May 30th, the Second Division was in sector north of Sommedieu [sic]. Its left rested just south of Verdun and its right about 20 kilometers farther south. During this period the Division, brigade and regimental commanders did not exercise tactical command of their units. The entire question of 'Trench Training' was under the direction of the French military officials. This status continued to within a few days of the withdrawal of the division from the sector, when the brigade commanders were given tactical command of their brigades. It was the intention of the French Corps commander to turn over the command of the sector to the Division Commander just about the date orders were received for the Division to withdraw and proceed to the Bar-le-Duc area.

"The Division was gradually withdrawn from sector, and concentrated west of Bar-le-Duc, where it had an opportunity to get clean, straighten out equipment, and institute drills, intended to restore smartness and precision. After a few days at Bar-le-Duc, the Division proceeded by rail to the Chaumont-en-Vexin area. This movement was accomplished in a most satisfactory manner. The system, order, and despatch with which this movement was made was the subject of favorable comment among the French Staff officers at these headquarters before we left Sarous. The training of the Division at Chaumont-en-Vexin was planned with the idea, that the Division would soon go into line at some point near the 1st American Division in the vicinity of Cantigny.

"On May 29th, the Commanding General of the French G.A.R., directed the Division to proceed by marching to the Beauvais area, about one day's march to the North. Orders for this movement were given. The march was scheduled to commence at 6.00 A.M., May 31st. It was believed that the concentration of the Division in the Beauvais area would put the Division in a better position with respect to the Montdidier salient, and facilitate its employment wherever needed in that sector. Billeting parties were sent forward to the Beauvais area, arrangements made to change the railhead, and nothing remained to be done but begin the march.

"At about 5.30 P.M., May 30th, a French officer came to Division Headquarters with an order for the Infantry of this Division to move by trucks at 5.00 A.M., May 31st and to proceed, as an emergency measure, to the vicinity of Meaux. Camions were to be in position ready to transport the Infantry at the hour named.

"It should be borne in mind that this change of orders had to be communicated to numerous units, separated by considerable distances from each other and from Headquarters, and that preparations had to be made for locating the camions, allotment of units, stationing of guides, alignment of columns to permit the embussing to take place without confusion or delay, and finally the embussing.

"It is sufficient to state that the necessary preliminary work was accomplished with commendable celerity and that the Infantry did embuss promptly at the hour scheduled. The average time per battalion was given me as a little over six minutes. The camions went to appointed places, took the prescribed intervals, found the necessary guides who preceded organizations, and the organizations, divided into small columns, were enabled to get on the trucks without delay.

"At midnight, May 30th, a French staff officer arrived with the information that the remainder of the Division would be transported by rail, the first train to move at 5.30 A.M., May 31st. This order, of course, required the promptest possible action and intensive labor on the part of the divisional staff to get out the necessary instructions and schedules for the rail movement and distribute them to the commanders concerned.

"It should be noted that some of the units had to march about six miles in order to reach designated entraining points, and that previous arrangements, made for a road march, required readjustment of transportation.

"This change of orders also required readjustment of messing arrangements, for the movement by train made it certain that troops would be separated from their kitchens and utensils for a period of at least two days, and that they would have to rely, for that period at least, on reserve rations carried in haversacks.

"All scheduled movements went off on time. Necessary staff officers were sent in advance by automobiles to Meaux, a rear echelon being left at Chaumont-en-Vexin to superintend the embarkation of the Division. It appears that no one in the Division was informed where the Division was going. The only instructions received were to the effect that an officer would be at the City Hall at Meaux to give necessary instructions.

"The Division Commander and his Chief of Staff proceeded to Meaux by automobile.

"Late in the afternoon of the 31st, the leading elements of the Infantry began to arrive at Meaux in camions.

"It seems that there was considerable difficulty in getting advice from the French authorities as to where the troops should debuss and detrain.

"Colonel Brown, having reached Meaux, found it necessary to go to Trilport Headquarters of the Sixth French Army, where after some delay he succeeded in getting an area allotted for debussing the command. There appears to have been considerable confusion and consequent indecision on the part of the French authorities at this time. I heard no complaint of it from our officers, but drew this conclusion from what I did hear. In fact, I believe that perhaps the Division Commander was compelled by the circumstances to make his own decisions at this time and to decide quickly where his troops should be placed.

"Colonel Brown met the leading elements of the Infantry as they arrived and assigned them to stations in the area of May-en-Multien, northeast of Meaux. It was the intention of the Division Commander to concentrate the Infantry there and to await the arrival of the remaining elements of the Division.

"Hardly had the first regiment arrived, when the French authorities sent an order which was received by the Chief of Staff, requesting that the Division take up a position between Gandelu and Montigny, northeast of Meaux.

"It was reported that the Germans were to attack that night.

"The Division Commander promptly conformed to this change of orders. After strenuous efforts, the remaining Infantry regiments were gathered and the men, with 100 rounds in their belts, were marched to their designated position.

"At 11.00 P.M., the last element of Infantry, except those delayed by broken camions, arrived.

"At midnight, a French officer met Colonel Brown, who was on the field, directing troops to their locations as they arrived, and delivered an Army order requiring the concentration of the Division as an emergency measure in the area near Montreuil-aux-Lions.

"The necessary orders were immediately given and the Infantry made a forced march to Montreuil-aux-Lions, arriving there a little after day-break, June 1st.

"I have heard at General Foch's, and at other staffs where the work of 2d Division has been enthusiastically discussed, that nothing but praise of the manner in which this Division cheerfully conformed to the rapidly changing orders of the French Staff, affecting the Division, and expressions of astonishment and admiration that they were able to meet the situation.

"Upon arriving at Montreuil-aux-Lions, the Division Commander found conditions somewhat chaotic. The situation was tense, as the Germans were pushing along the Château-Thierry-Paris road.

"All roads were blocked with troops and refugees streaming to the rear.

"It was, in my opinion, from all I could learn, a rout, accompanied by a considerable degree of disorder and even drunkenness.

"As the American troops approached Montreuil-aux-Lions, General Degoutte, commanding the 21st Army Corps, called on General Bundy, explained the emergency of the situation, and asked for aid. It appears that at this time the Division Commander had already issued orders for the 9th Infantry to take up a position on the Château-Thierry-Paris road.

"General Bundy immediately took command of his elements and ordered the 4th Brigade to march with all haste to a point near Le Thiolet on the Paris road, east of Meaux. This brigade was followed by the 3d Brigade. Supply trucks, which had arrived, were quickly unloaded and used to hasten the transport of the troops. A great many men were actually carried to their positions on the line by trucks. The remainder went by marching.

"At 9.00 A.M. the Division had placed approximately 13,000 infantrymen across the road in front of the enemy, and had begun to dig.

"The empty supply trucks were loaded with ammunition, the ammunition trains filled, and one-half a million rounds of small arm ammunition quickly dumped behind each brigade.

"The 3d Brigade was south of the Paris road and the 4th Brigade north of it. By noon, two days' reserve rations were placed behind the troops.

"Attention was then turned to gathering in the remaining units of the Division.

"A staff officer, arriving from Chaumont-en-Vexin, brought word that orders for eighteen of the trains, scheduled for the purpose of bringing up the remaining troops, had been cancelled, and said that the mounted elements, transportation, etc., which had been prepared for rail transport had been directed to proceed overland by marching. Despatch riders were sent out at once to order these units to proceed at once to Montreuil-aux-Lions by forced march. An ammunition dump was established at Lizy-sur-Ourcq, and 1,500,000 rounds of ammunition placed there within 14 hours after the arrival of the troops. Railhead was established at Meaux, Headquarters of the Division at Montreuil-aux-Lions. By the evening of June 1st, practically all the Infantry was up. The need of machine guns was apparent. Despatch riders had ascertained their lines of approach. The supply train was emptied and sent after them at full speed, with orders to bring personnel, guns and ammunition to the front.

"The marches of the mounted elements, field transportation and artillery were rendered difficult by the congestion of the roads. The Engineer Train was advanced, tools issued, and entrenching begun.

"The artillery began to arrive.

"On the night of June 1st the Corps Commander, General Degoutte, called on General Bundy and informed him that a gap of over four kilometers existed in the line between Gandelu and Montigny, and that a German attack might be expected at any moment.

"The 23d Infantry, reinforced by a battalion of Marines, the 5th Machine Gun Battalion, and a Company of Engineers, were aroused from their sleep and made a forced march to the designated spot. A wire was laid from Headquarters 164th Division, following Colonel Malone's command. An ambulance company was sent to Wendest, and the ammunition train delivered five hundred thousand rounds at Coulombs. Rations were promptly delivered.

"On the afternoon of June 2d, the Artillery began to run short of 155 ammunition. The French had none. Thirty-two trucks, loaded with .30 calibre ammunition, which had arrived from GHQ, AEF, were commandeered and sent forty-five kilometers to the rear to load with ammunition. This train made the round trip and delivered 32 truck loads of 155's ammunition to the guns in 13 hours.

"The evening of June 2d, Colonel Malone's command was relieved and rejoined the Division.

"On June 4th, two vicious attacks made to the left of the Marine Brigade, which had been under fire constantly, were repulsed.

"The night of June 4-5 the entire division was concentrated, the trains and transportation having arrived, and having been assigned and placed in the divisional sector.

"Various local attacks, made by the Germans, had been repulsed. Another attack made the night of June 5-6 was without result.

"On the morning of the 6th, at 5.00 A.M., the Marine Brigade delivered a counter attack, driving the Germans toward Bussiares. On the same afternoon an attack was made, driving the Germans toward Bouresches-Torcy, capturing Bouresches and the Bois de Belleau, taking approximately 500 prisoners, killing approximately 600 Germans, leaving wounded unknown. Seven 7-inch trench mortars and upwards of 65 machine guns were captured.

"Various attacks were made against the 3d Brigade, all of which were repulsed.

"In brief, it will be seen that this Division of approximately 28,000 men and 7,000 horses started on less than twelve hours' notice, for an unknown destination, debussed, took up two successive positions during the night, marched until daylight, went into position across the Château-Thierry-Paris road, and in less than six days repulsed repeated attacks against them, counter-attacked with great success, driving the enemy before them; that during this time no man was ever without ammunition and rations immediately behind and immediately supplied him; that the operations were performed in the face of numerous discouragements and surrounded by, what appeared to be, disorder and retreat of other forces. The whole performance deserves the highest commendation which the French authorities, wherever I have been, are freely expressing.

"The Division has brought great credit upon the American Army.

"I understand that General Degoutte has stated that the arrival and prompt action of the Division and its subsequent service had saved Meaux from capture by the Germans. This being granted, it is hardly an exaggeration to say that it saved Paris.

"The officers at Headquarters of the XXI Corps told me that the effect upon the retreating, tired-out French soldiers was electric in its effect, and that it was as though all America had arrived at the critical moment at the proper place.

"I believe the matter of finding the proper place into which to throw the troops was a matter which was left very much to our Division Commander and his staff, and which was solved most successfully by them.

"I mention this in praise of them, and without any idea of criticism of the French authorities who were undoubtedly overwhelmed with troubles of their own.

"On the day of my visit at General Bundy's Headquarters, June 17th, I learned from him, from General Lewis, and Colonel Malone, and from Colonel Brown, that there were hundreds of men in the Division who had not removed their shoes or clothing since the night of May 30th, and that the entire command since June 1st had been under constant bombardment by German artillery; that German aviation was active and that our facilities, in that respect, were practically nothing. The Adjutant of the Artillery Brigade said they had the greatest difficulty in obtaining information that was necessary to make effective concentration fire upon the enemy's artillery.

"In one heavy bombardment, with Yperite, the Germans inflicted about 900 casualties on our men.

"It is always natural in such cases to assume that such a casualty list has been, in large part, due to lack of gas discipline. An idea seemed to prevail at some of the French Headquarters that our men had been too reckless and too indifferent to the instructions concerning the wearing and proper adjustment of gas masks. I could find no facts to confirm this idea. The fact that most of the wounds were body burns and not lung or interior wounds, seems sufficient proof of the fact that the wounds should be regarded as unavoidable.
"The total casualties, evacuated through the dressing station to June 17th, were approximately 4,500. General Bundy said the figures were subject to revision and could not be taken as final.

"This seems a rather high percentage, but when we consider the magnificent service rendered by the Division, in stopping the Germans in what was becoming nothing short of a direct march on Paris, and the fact that since entering the fight the Division has not yielded one inch of ground to the enemy, but on the contrary has driven him in a desperate struggle from the Bois de Belleau, one cannot feel but that the losses, heavy and regrettable as they are, have been justified by the splendid results.

"I found the officers going about their work in the most businesslike and matter-of-fact manner. They and the men are, of course, awfully tired and will welcome relief for a short period of rest. They will undoubtedly hold without difficulty until relief comes. They have already seen two German divisions withdrawn from the line in front of them and give place to two new divisions. I am informed that steps have been taken for early relief of the 2d by another American division, probably the 26th. The 2d will probably be withdrawn a short distance for rest, refitting and replacements, and after a brief period sent back to or near its original sector, or used elsewhere in the battle area as circumstances may then dictate.

General Degoutte, commanding the Sixth Army, on June 30th, 1918 issued the following order:

"In view of the brilliant conduct of the 4th Brigade of the 2d Division which in a spirited fight took Bouresches and the important strongpoint of Belleau Wood, stubbornly defended by a large enemy force, the General commanding the Sixth Army orders that henceforth in all official papers the Bois de Belleau shall be named 'Bois de la Brigade de Marine'."³

After this order was issued, official maps were immediately modified conforming to the order. The plan directeur used in later operations have the new name of Belleau Wood, that of Bois de la Brigade de Marine. In all following French orders the new name appeared.

Lt.-Col. Otto, of the Historical Section of the German Army, in a monograph on Belleau Wood written in 1928, says:

"The immense moral impression created by the appearance of the Americans we have already mentioned. During my discourse I have already pointed out their great courage. Their fiery advance and great tenacity were well recognized by their opponents.

". . . . General Ludendorff already had recognized from official reports how great a danger the American divisions would continually be. Therefore, on June 8th, he issued the following order: 'Should the enemy use American units, especial effort must be made to stop their development.'

". . . . So it is that the 2d Division, by writing a glorious chapter in the history of the World War, furnished the answer to our question: 'How will the Americans act in a real battle?' It might be suggested to place a tablet on the edge of the blood stained woods displaying the French, German and American colors with the following inscription:

" 'This is the Wood of Belleau. In June, 1918, taken from the French after a brave defense in two days by bravely advancing Germans; then gloriously defended for nine days; then in unexampled bravery captured by the Americans in two days, who remained victoriously in possession of the Wood. Honor to the gallant heroes of three nations who, true to their country, here fought and died'."

Frequently remarks have been made to me by French officers of all ranks, by French civilians, and by my British colleagues, plainly expressing their belief that the American troops in the vicinity of Château-Thierry stopped the German drive, and very possibly saved Paris.

In March, 1923, there was a public controversy on the subject of the Allied occupation of the Ruhr district between Herr Gessler, German Minister of Defense and General Degoutte, French commander in the Ruhr. It was reported in the Associated Press. In a rejoinder made by Herr Gessler reported in the New York Times of March 2, 1923, the following sentence appears: "In the summer of 1918 France was saved only by the fact that an American division revived the fighting, and at the last moment prevented the taking of Paris."

French inhabitants of the region where the 2d Division operated expressed their gratitude. On July 10th the Mayor of the Meaux District (Arrondissement) sent to the Division a resolution passed by all the mayors of the District. It reads:

"Voted in a Congress of the Mayors of the Meaux District who were eye-witnesses on the 25th of June, 1918.

"The Mayors of the Meaux District who were eye-witnesses of the generous and efficacious deeds of the American Army in the stopping of the enemy advance send to this Army the heartfelt expression of their admiration and gratefulness.