THE typical journal of operations of the division for the next few days reads: "Work on the Army lines continued. All units of the command spent the day in resting and cleaning their equipment."

There were no alarms. Nothing was heard of the Germans except a little shelling each day from heavy guns, which did no serious damage. Higher commanders visited the division to congratulate it—General Liggett of the American I Corps, General Degoutte of the French Sixth Army, General Pershing, our own Commander-in-Chief. Thirty-four distinguished service crosses were distributed.

General Bundy left the Division, assigned to command the newly formed VI Corps. General Harbord, promoted Major-General, succeeded him in command of the division, and was succeeded in the 4th Brigade by Col. Neville, and later by General Lejeune. General Lewis was promoted to Major-General and given the 30th Division, turning over the 3d Brigade to General Ely. Colonel Bowley, temporarily commanding the artillery brigade, received his brigadier's star and permanent assignment to that command.

The general military situation, while no longer desperate, as it had been on June 1st, was still threatening. Since that time, the Germans had attempted another large scale attack, the Gneisenau Operation, as their code called it—the Mont-didier-Noyon Operation, as we now know it. The German Eighteenth Army attacked here on June 9th, and in two days drove the French Third Army back to its second position, penetrating seven miles in the center, in front of Roye.¹

On June 10th when the attack seemed to be slowing up, General Fayolle, who commanded the French Group of Armies of the Reserve, with headquarters at Noailles, decided to stop it, not by strengthening the line but by a counter-attack. This counter-attack is noteworthy for the speed and energy with which it was prepared and delivered.²

At ten o'clock that morning he had in hand three reserve divisions and asked General Pétain for two more. By noon he had the promise by telephone of this reinforcement. At the same time he had sent for General Mangin, who was commanding the IX Corps on the First Army front, thirty miles north of Noailles; he soon reached headquarters, received his instructions and started for Pronleroy, twenty miles away at the very point of the German advance.³ Here he found headquarters of the XXXV Army Corps, which had all three of its divisions in line, and which was assigned to him as the nucleus of his "Groupement Mangin."

General Fayolle meanwhile started the movement of the reinforcing troops. Division commanders coming ahead reported at Pronleroy at 6.00 P. M. At 7.00 General Mangin dictated his orders for the attack to be made at 11.00 the next morning. The order closed: "the whole command must understand this: it will be explained to every man before the attack." This order was a model of its kind and is well worthy of study.

The attack was made precisely as ordered, although there had been no detailed reconnaissance, although the ground was open, although the last infantry battalion deployed for action as it left the trucks, and although the last of the artillery went into action without a halt after the long march. It penetrated a thousand yards on the left, when it was exposed to intense artillery fire from beyond its flanks. It could go no farther for there were no more reserves. Marshal Foch telegraphed to General Fayolle as the attack was starting: "I have nothing more to give you."⁴

The "Gneisenau Advance" was effectively stopped. It continued for a day or two in front of Noyon but without energy. The "Hammerstroke Operation," an auxiliary attack just north of the Forest of Villers-Cotterets, started early in the morning of June 12th, but accomplished little. The "Tree-Felling Operations," which was to have connected Gneisenau" and "Hammerstroke" had been given up for lack of troops.⁵

But if the Germans were to retain the initiative, something must be done and done quickly. The Marne Pocket seemed a suitable place for another attack. Since it had proved impossible to broaden the protective zone at Soissons, the logical thing to do next was to try for another railway center at Rheims.⁶ But this was a very difficult undertaking. As early as May 28th the First Army had recommended that frontal attacks there be abandoned and that the city be cut off by movement from the west.⁷

On June 1st it was evident that the First Army was being stopped and Ludendorff suggested starting it again by calling upon the Seventh Army to cross the Marne and advance east on the south bank toward Epernay.⁸ Consideration had been given meanwhile to an attack east of Rheims; this was given up as impracticable at this time.⁹ The First Army worked out a program for a step-by-step advance between Rheims and the Marne, each corps moving up in turn with the assistance of its neighbor; the city was then to be subjected to an intense bombardment by artillery and trench mortars, and the infantry would enter by the southern suburbs.¹⁰ The first of these partial operations was successful. After some discussion of details with the Crown Prince and with Ludendorff it was arranged that another partial attack would be made on June 9th. But this attack was a failure and the rest of the program was postponed.¹¹

On June 8th the Crown Prince had called upon the Seventh Army to submit plans for the Epernay Operation on the south bank of the Marne. This received the code name "Marne Defense." A preliminary outline was submitted on June 11th and forwarded with the Crown Prince's approval on June 12th, on the 14th General Ludendorff ordered that complete plans be made by the Seventh Army for this movement, and by the First Army for the operation east of the city, which was now named "Rheims."¹²

Both operations were difficult, "Marne Defense" especially so. To reduce these difficulties Army boundaries were modified and the plan completely revised. This combined and enlarged operation was given the name "Road Construction;" orders were finally issued for it on June 21st.¹³ July 15th was finally fixed as the date. In studying the operation it was foreseen from the position of the French reserves that a counter-attack in the direction of Soissons was probable, and preparations were accordingly made to meet it by the Ninth Army and the right flank of the Seventh.¹⁴

All orders and communications dealing with this great operation emphasized the necessity of secrecy, but this was impossible to maintain. On July 1st, from a study of the movement and location of reserves, the French commanders were convinced that an attack was soon to come in the Champagne. By July 10th they were in possession of fairly complete information as to its time, plan and strength.¹⁵

The French, too, had been planning attacks, but so far had been in no position to execute them. It had been evident since early spring that this was to be a year of active field campaigning, and the methods of training had been altered accordingly.

Plans were made for an offensive by the Fifth Army at Rheims, to be commenced late in June; but this was postponed when the German attack of June 9th drew all French reserves to the front of the Third Army and to the Groupement Mangin.

After the Mangin counter-attack of June 11th, it began to seem that something might be done with the troops that had been drawn to the region of Soissons. On June 14th and again on June 16th General Foch suggested a "methodical and intense" bombardment of Soissons by aircraft and long range artillery and a move to seize the Domiers Plateau, overlooking the city from the southwest. This advance, it seemed to him, might be made by a powerful concentration of artillery and tanks without great demand upon the infantry.¹⁶ On the basis of this requirement a definite plan was prepared by General Mangin, who, as soon as his Montdidier attack ended, had been placed in command of the Tenth Army. The plan called for certain preliminary operations to secure suitable lines of departure before undertaking a general advance.¹⁷ Some apprehension was expressed that these operations might attract the attention of the enemy and jeopardize the success of the attack. Nevertheless, they were necessary, and were at once undertaken.¹⁸ The Tenth Army outlined plan was approved and elaboration cf the details were taken up.¹⁹

On July 5th, in instructions to Army Groups concerning their attitude in the expected German offensive, General Pétain emphasized the importance of being prepared for counterattack, even on the fronts of entire Armies, as soon as the German advance began to slow down.²⁰ General Degoutte came forward on July 8th with plans for an offensive by the Sixth Army in prolongation of the offensive front of the Tenth Army.²¹ On July 9th General Foch proposed an attack by the Fifth Army (General Berthelot) between Rheims and the Marne.²² All this indicated a gradual expansion of ideas as to what might be accomplished.

Examining the situation on both sides at once, we see a gradual development from consideration of local operations to combined plans covering fronts of a hundred miles. In each case the principal effort was to be made on the left, Rheims for the Germans, Soissons for the French; a typical "revolving battle" often seen on a smaller scale, as for example in our own battle of Murfreesboro. Also in each case provisions had been made for extension of the line by the insertion of an additional Army — the German Ninth Army (General von Eben) between the Seventh and Eighteenth, the French Ninth Army (General De Mitry) between the Fifth and Sixth.²³ The forces were nearly identical, about seventy divisions on each side, in line and in reserve between Soissons and the Argonne; the advantage in numbers was slightly on the side of the French.²⁴ Both sides were planning for the offensive; the great difference was, that the Germans were proceeding confidently to their attack while the French were only hoping that they could undertake it after stopping the Germans.

General Pétain's orders on July 12th set out this scheme in its complete form. A German attack could be expected within a few days; it would involve the Fourth and Fifth Armies and the right of the Sixth. Dispositions already made were considered adequate to stop it. A counter-offensive was to follow all along the line from Rheims to Soissons, to reduce the Château-Thierry sailent. General Foch, on the 14th, emphasized the point that the attack of the Tenth Army was essential to both phases. As a defensive measure it would relieve pressure on both the Fifth and the Fourth Armies; as an offensive measure, it was the entering wedge for all the rest. Hence troops designated for this attack must not be diverted elsewhere for defensive purposes.²⁵ and ²⁶

The German artillery preparation opened at midnight, July 14-15. Fully informed by this time, the French had already opened their counter-preparation fire. At 4.00 A.M., the rolling barrage started and the infantry advanced.

East of Rheims, General Gouraud's Fourth Army employed brilliantly General Pétain's new method of defense, so much discussed that Spring. Withdrawing from his outpost line, his troops escaped the bombardment and initial attack and made their defense on the intermediate line where the enemy was stopped completely.²⁷ The American 2d Division took part in this fighting. General Berthelot's Fifth Army lost ground between Rheims and the Marne but kept its line intact.

The Germans forced a crossing of the Marne on a broad front in the territory of General Degoutte's Sixth Army and pushed up the river; but the failure of the attack east of Rheims left this attack isolated, and stubborn resistance in the bend of the Marne above Mezy prevented it from gaining the necessary elbow room. Two American divisions were engaged here—the 3d holding a sector of its own in the river bend, and the 28th reinforcing two French divisions.²⁸

The attack at this point was given up on the evening of the 15th, and a defensive attitude assumed. The next day all offensive operations south of the river were discontinued and consideration given to withdrawal to the north bank. The French began to attempt counter-attacks.²⁹

The temptation had been strong during the period of German success to draw upon the troops marked for the attack between Soissons and Château-Thierry, and to use them farther east. General Pétain went so far as to order a suspension of the concentrations on the west flank of the salient, and to start one corps headquarters and one division eastward. Orders to this effect went out at 10.00 A.M., July 15th, but General Foch countermanded the order at 1.00 P.M. and the concentration was resumed.³⁰

On the 16th, the French Ninth Army took over the part of the front of the Sixth east of Château-Thierry. The Sixth and Tenth Armies now stood side by side, from the Marne to the Oise, engaged solely in preparation for attack. The general scheme was for the Tenth to make the principal attack. The Sixth was to support its right, extending the active front to the vicinity of Chateau-Thierry. The Armies farther east were to take advantage of success here, increasing their pressure northward.³¹

American troops were found in both the attacking Armies. As shown in the preceding chapter, the American I Corps was in line on the Sixth Army front, having under its command the American 26th Division, which had relieved the 2d, and one French Division. To the Tenth Army had been assigned the American 1st and 2d Divisions. Our interest for the present, then, is chiefly in the Tenth Army. It will be well to turn back and study the development of the plans and preparations there.

The preliminary stages have been indicated above, General Mangin had been called upon for an outline plan on June 18th and had submitted it on the 20th. On July 13th the intentions of the enemy had become clear, and the attack had been ordered for the 18th. The Tenth Army was to move at 4.35 A. M., without artillery preparations; the Sixth would open artillery fire at the same moment and commence its advance an hour and a half later.³² General Mangin's attack order was issued on July 14th. It was slightly modified by General Fayolle and supplemented by several additional orders from General Mangin.³³

The right of the Tenth Army was at Noroy-sur-Ourcq, connecting with the Sixth across the river. Between the Ourcq and Fontenoy on the Aisne, a front of fifteen miles, it had two Army corps, the XI and the XX, each with two divisions in line facing east. From the Aisne to the Oise, where it connected with the Third Army, it had the I Corps with three divisions in line and the XVIII with two.

For the attack, the XXX Corps was to come in between the XI and XX, and corps boundaries were to be readjusted. The main attack was to be made by the XX and the XXX Corps. The XI Corps would cover the right and insure connections with the Sixth Army; the I Corps on the left would advance astride the Aisne, bringing artillery fire to bear upon the approaches of Soissons, and forming a pivot to connect with the XVIII, which would stand fast. The II Cavalry Corps was held in readiness to exploit a break-through. In all, the Army possessed two hundred and forty light and two hundred and thirty heavy batteries, four hundred airplanes, one hundred and thirty-five light and two hundred and forty heavy tanks.³⁴

It is the XX Corps (General Berdoulat) that directly interests us, since it contained all the Americans in the Tenth Army—our 1st and 2d Divisions. General Pershing, who was particularly interested in this attack, and had been urging ii; since June 23d, had hoped that these two divisions might take part under the direction of an American corps commander, and headquarters of the American III Corps had been ordered there for that purpose. Preparations had gone too far to permit of this change, but General Bullard remained at headquarters of the XX Corps and exercised administrative control over the American divisions.³⁵

This Corps formed for action on a front of about four miles. Of its five divisions, one, the Moroccans, had been for some time in line here, and knew the ground well; the other four were in rear and had had more or less rest. The attack orders put the Moroccans in the center of the first line, with the American 2d on their right and the American 1st on their left. These three divisions, it should be noted, had twelve battalions of infantry each. This was a standard for all American divisions, but the French, British and German divisions had a standard of nine battalions. The only French divisions maintaining the old standard were the Moroccan division, the 38th, which was now placed in the front line of the XXX Corps to connect with our 2d, and the 37th which was at Amiens.³⁶ The two last named divisions were from the old XIX, the French Algerian Corps. The Moroccan Division had a regiment of the Foreign Legion; the rest of the infantry, in all three divisions, was made up chiefly of battalions from all over Africa, Algeria, Morocco, Senegal, Madagascar, and Somali Coast—grouped into provisional regiments (regiments de marche) of Zouaves and Tirailleurs.

Two divisions were in the second line—the French 58th and 69th. The divisional artillery of the Corps had sixty light and twenty-four heavy batteries; to the Corps had been assigned a light regiment portee, and sixteen heavy batteries, making sixty-nine light and forty heavy batteries in all, beside sixteen batteries of Army heavy artillery employed in the northern section of the Army area. Each front line division had tanks—forty-five light and a hundred heavy in all.