ON JULY 14TH the 2d Division lay in the Army Line, the 3d Brigade north of the Paris-Metz Highway from Montreuil-aux-Lions, and the 4th Brigade between Montreuil-aux-Lions and the Marne. The 2d Field Artillery Brigade was distributed behind the infantry, and all auxiliary services were present. It was Bastille Day, and decorative tri-colors appeared in all the villages. About 7.00 P.M. an officer of the Sixth Army staff arrived at division headquarters in Chamigny, with orders placing the division at the disposal of the Tenth Army and directing the artillery brigade to march at once to Betz, fifteen miles north, where further orders would be received. The three artillery regiments—12th, 15th and 17th—were immediately notified and at 9.00 P.M. moved out.

Having put his troops in motion, General Bowley, commanding the artillery brigade, motored ahead of his columns in order to learn their ultimate destination. He arrived shortly after midnight (July 14-15) at headquarters of the Tenth Army at Chantilly where the Army Chief of Staff requested him to return the next morning. This he did and General Mangin gave General Bowley an outline of the plan.

The artillery arrived at Betz about noon the next day. Here at 1.00 P.M. orders reached General Bowley for the brigade to return to its division; this, it will be remembered, was in accordance with one of General Pétain's dispositions ordered at 10.00 A.M., when the situation on the Marne here looked most serious. Preparations were accordingly made for this counter-march, but at 2.00 P.M., before it had begun, the order was cancelled and the brigade was ordered to march to the wood north of Villers-Cotterets, twelve miles to the northeast. Traffic congestion was already beginning to appear on the roads, by reason of the heavy concentration of French troops, but by noon on the 16th the brigade was assembled as ordered. Artillery observers had taken their front line posts, reconnaissance parties were seeking gun positions. Headquarters were established at the Carrefour de Nemours, a road junction in the woods two miles north of Villers-Cot-terets which had been designated by the XX Corps as Division Headquarters.¹

Since the relief of the Marines by the 26th Division, Colonel Harry Lee had acted as brigade commander, as Colonel Neville, senior Marine officer in the 4th Brigade, had been sick. Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Holcomb, senior battalion commander under Colonel Lee, had the 6th Marines and Colonel Logan Feland, the 5th. In the 2d Engineers the command had changed at the time of the relief by the 26th Division when Colonel Mclndoe had gone to be Corps Engineer Officer of the new IV Corps and was succeeded by Colonel William A. Mitchell. In the Division Staff Colonel A. L. Conger was relieved by Lieutenant Colonel George A. Herbst.

The 2d Division had been disturbed on the night of July 14-15 by shelling of long range guns. The troops heard the sound of distant artillery fire coming from the east, and before dawn they could distinguish the ominous flashes of heavy ordnance illuminating the sky. From Château-Thierry, up the Marne to Rheims, and across the Champagne to the Argonne, the Armies of the German Crown Prince were attacking.

When General Harbord took command of the Division he found his artillery brigade gone to parts unknown and his transportation ordered away to the vicinity of Lizy-sur-Ourcq, a six-hours' journey, to be completed in one march; but in spite of all the obstacles this had been successfully executed.

On the evening of the 15th at 8.30 P.M. a French staff officer arrived at Chamigny and stated vaguely that the infantry would move somewhere. At 6.55 P.M. General Fayolle had issued an order through the Sixth Army placing the remaining elements of the 2d Division at the disposal of General Mangin; the Army would find transportation for the infantry and dismounted units; animal-drawn and motorized elements would move overland.

The order from Degoutte's headquarters reached the 2d Division the night of July 15-16 while German long range fire continued to fall in the area. The infantry and dismounted elements were to move by truck "to another area," mounted and motor units would march overland; all trains to assemble at Ussy-sur-Marne by 9.00 P.M., moving by convoy to Betz. Etrepilly was designated regulating station; division headquarters would close at Chamigny at 10.00 A.M., July 17th and open on the same date and hour at Carrefour de Nemours.² A division staff officer was at once sent ahead to Marcilly where further orders were to be found, but when he arrived no one seemed to know the destination of the division. However, some one suggested that St. Soupplets, three miles west, was a regulating station. Finally all truck trains reached the region of Retheuil where headquarters of the XX Corps had been established. These truck trains reached their terminal points early in the morning.

General Harbord and Colonel Brown left the old headquarters on the afternoon of the 16th and reported at Headquarters of the Tenth Army. General Mangin had gone to an advanced command post, and no information as to the mission of the 2d Division could be obtained, except that it was to be in the French XX Corps. General Bowley met them and escorted them to Retheuil, where they found General Berdoulat, commanding the XX Corps, and General Bullard of the American III Corps. At about dark the Corps attack order was issued and the party proceeded to the American III Corps Headquarters at Taillefontaine.³ Here they were fortunate in finding clerical facilities including a mimeograph machine, and here also was Major Berthier, a distinguished French General Staff officer, who had fought over this same ground during the first years of the war, and who dictated a short description of the terrain assigned for the division advance.

This memorandum was the sole intelligence material furnished or obtainable. Interrupted by air raids, General Har-bord and Colonel Brown spent the night poring over maps and preparing the attack order for a division whose location was unknown, whose presence at the time appointed for the attack was by no means certain and which, furthermore, was to attack over terrain that could not be reconnoitered. By morning the order had been mimeographed with attached maps showing the salient ground features. These were distributed on the road to brigade and regimental headquarters as soon as they could be found. A concentration of all units was directed upon their arrival at Carrefour de Nemours.⁴

General Harbord, in his book "Leaves from a War Diary," sums up as follows the situation of his division at this time:

"A division of twenty-eight thousand men, the size of a European army corps, had been completely removed from the control of its responsible commander and deflected by marching and by truck through France to a destination unknown to any of the authorities responsible either for its supply, its safety, or its efficiency in the coming attack. The French Corps commander and his staff were unable to state the points at which the division would be debussed or where orders could reach it which would move it promptly to its attack position. This within thirty hours of a decisive attack. The only assistance the French Corps Headquarters was able to give was a liberal supply of maps and copies of the Corps attack order, though their Operations Officer offered to write my attack order for me; an offer which I declined with thanks and perhaps a little ice in my voice. They said the division would undoubtedly be in place in the forest by Wednesday morning. I doubted it and said so, and was reassured by many shrugs of French shoulders. I complained of the utter confused and unregulated condition of traffic on the one forest highway as tending to make the arrival uncertain. The answer to that was more shrugs and the statement that it was the affair of the Army to arrange that, not the Corps, which observation was true but did not promise to hurry the arrival of my men." (Pages 318-319.)

From the Corps order General Harbord found that his division would approach its assigned position through the Forest of Villers-Cotterets, also known as the Forest of Retz, taking position on the eastern border of the woods.

This forest stands between the Aisne and the Ourcq Rivers, southeast of the great Forest of Compiegne. It is about twelve miles square, where giant hardwoods of beech an oak, tree of genuine antiquity, intertwine their long branches. These huge trees were in full leaf, forming an impenetrable canopy overhead. Roads pierced the forest like tunnels. The forest was cut by a great highway running diagonally to Soissons with a network of narrow avenues, paved and ditched, running in every direction. There were numerous circles and carrefours (crossroads) at intersections. Except Villers-Cotterets, there were no large towns.

The battle front assigned the 2d Division was an open plateau, five or six miles wide, cut by ravines and dotted with strongly built villages and farms and with stone quarries allstrong defensive positions. On the eastern edge at Berzy-le-Sec, Villemontoire, and Tigny, it fell off sharply to the Soissons—Château-Thierry Road which lay concealed in low ground. There were many wheat fields where the grain stood waist-high.

From the point of view of the 2d Division the situation proved to be complicated. The general axis of attack was a little south of east. The front lines ran nearly north and south along the eastern border of the Forest de Retz; but at the boundary line of the 2d and Moroccan Divisions two or three square miles of the northeastern tip of the forest was still held by the Germans, causing a reentrant bend in the line of the XX Corps, and the part of it that fell to the 2d Division faced nearly north. This bit of wood was a strong position, and it was proposed that it be flanked out by the advance, rather than attacked frontally; but it was necessary for both the 2d and Moroccan Divisions to send troops through it to clean up and to maintain connections.

This called for an awkward maneuver. The 2d Division had to execute a great right wheel on a front of two miles. This would bring the left out of the woods, the whole line facing northeast, the front reduced to a mile and a half. Following this direction for about a mile, the front still narrowing, it would reach the first intermediate objective, the line of Beaurepaire Farm. Here it must wheel again to the right, and advance south of east on a front of slightly over a mile. Another mile's advance would bring it to the next objective, a transverse ravine, where its right would strike the village of Vauxcastille; still another mile, and its right would come to the village of Vierzy, the final objective of the first advance. The solution of this problem was embodied in orders issued on the morning of July 17th.⁵

Apparently the principal resistance was to be on the right. Here the entire 3d Brigade (General Ely) was placed and given a front which changed but little during the advance, and averaged some twelve hundred yards. Its regiments were to attack abreast, each in column of battalions. The rest of the front was assigned to the Fifth Marines, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Feland—for General Lejeune had not yet joined and Colonel Neville commanded the 4th Brigade. This regiment would have to start on a broad front and execute the maneuvers necessary to maintain contact with the Moroccans; when the first objective was reached and the final formation assumed, the front would have narrowed to four hundred yards. The right of the regiment would keep in touch with the 3d Brigade, the left, follow marked roads. The first objective, where the final change of formation must be made, was marked by le Translon Farm.

The 6th Marines was in Corps reserve, its battalions placed at convenient junctions of wood roads a mile behind the line.

For the initial barrage, the 2d Field Artillery Brigade (General Bowley) was reinforced by the French 268th Field Artillery, nine light batteries, from the 69th Division which was in second line. This barrage would reach the nearest point of the first objective in twenty minutes, the farthest point in an hour, and rest just beyond it for twenty minutes; thereafter the 12th Field Artillery was placed at the disposal of the 5th Marines, the 15th Field Artillery at the disposal of the 3d Brigade, and the batteries would be moved forward as required. The ammunition up to this point was calculated at 19,000 rounds light and 2,500 heavy. Intervention of heavy guns of the Corps artillery to assist during this period was arranged for. The original plan gave the division six battalions of tanks, but the final assignment was four battalions, forty-eight tanks in all. Airplanes were made available.

The solution of this tactical problem on paper had been hard enough; solution on the ground looked almost impossible.

The troops of the division were arriving at various points in the region of Retheuil, some of them at points fifteen miles from the front, throughout the morning of the 17th. No one had had any sleep or hot food. Some units made an effort to prepare a meal upon leaving the trucks, but were prevented by lack of time, equipment, fuel, or water. The kitchens of course were on the march overland and not available. The weather was hot, but the troops struggled as best they might, directing their march anywhere eastward in the general direction of Germany.

General Ely, commanding the 3d Brigade, found the division commander at about ten o'clock in the morning and received his orders. He then located his regiments. The 23d was as far forward as Haramont, but the 9th was back in the neighborhood of Pierrefonds. The regimental commanders were brought forward to Division Headquarters,⁶ the situation was explained, and brigade orders were issued placing the 23d on the right and the 9th on the left. The 23d was now close at hand; Colonel Malone was able to assemble his battalion commanders and issue orders at once.⁷ Little maneuvering was required of this regiment. It was to relieve the French troops in line and advance directly upon Beaure-paire Farm. The main point emphasized was maintenance of connection throughout by details following behind the flank of each unit.

Colonel Upton had much farther to go to rejoin his regiment. He met it, halted in the woods, late in the afternoon, found a trumpeter, had him sound "Officers' Call; double time" and gave verbally a brief and energetic summary of what had to be known at once, explaining particularly the changes of direction that would be necessary. Little more was said.

Leaving the men to make their way forward, the regimental commanders undertook the next task—to find the French troops that they were to relieve and to make the necessary reconnaissance. Both established temporary headquarters at the Carrefour de Montgobert, in the eastern part of the forest, from which roads or "laies" (forest trails) led to all parts of the front line. The regiments were directed through the forest towards this point by the Route du Faite, or ridge road, passing division headquarters at the Carrefour de Nemours, brigade headquarters at the Carrefour des Fonds Douchards and joining the Paris-Maubeuge National Road at the Carrefour du Saut du Cerf, within a thousand yards of regimental headquarters. At this point ammunition had been placed, each man receiving two bandoleers as he passed.

The regimental commanders with a few of their officers went to the front, and after much searching located their places and the troops to be relieved. But the roads and trails were getting more and more jammed every moment, so it was late at night before they could connect with their regiments again. More and more troops of every arm, nationality and color, were crowding to the front; truck trains forcing their way through the mass; French troops just relieved were working their way to the rear. Sometimes as many as six columns were trying to use one narrow road. After the hot day, a violent thunderstorm came on leaving the roads deep in mud. It was intensely dark; no one had slept or eaten hot food for thirty-six hours; reserve rations were exhausted or lost. There was little water; the weather had been dry so the supply was short, and gas had made some of it unfit for use. 'The infantry, crowded off the road, marched in single file in the ditches, each man holding the belt of the man ahead. Overturned trucks blocked their way and broke the columns. Occasionally someone would try to move through the woods, but the way was blocked by thick underbrush and wire.

The 9th and 23d Infantry began passing division headquarters at 7.00 P.M. They had five miles to go, but seemed to have a good chance of making it. The 6th Marines followed, moving to their reserve position. Their regimental machine gun companies were with them, but not their 37 mm. guns nor their Stokes mortars; and the brigade machine gun battalions, the 5th and 6th, had not yet arrived. Colonel Feland of the 5th Marines had reported late in the afternoon and received his orders, but nothing had been seen of the regiment. At ten o'clock it was found, about two miles west of division headquarters. The brigade commander had been there, given such information as he could and gone back to his own headquarters at Vivieres, and the regiment was starting forward. Its machine guns were somewhere behind, so as it passed division headquarters part of the division machine gun battalion was attached to it. At the last minute, twenty minutes before the barrage fell, the machine gun company of the 6th Marines was added.⁸

Impossible as it seemed, most of the troops were in place, and advanced at 4.35, the hour fixed. Some had to take the last ten minutes at double time. The brigade machine gun battalions were still in the tangle of traffic somewhere in rear; staff officers had been trying to get them forward all night. Colonel Brown called the XX Corps by telephone to see if more guns could be obtained. The answer came back that traffic by this time was completely blocked so the division could not count upon their arrival. To this there was only one adequate "comeback"—"Very well, we'll take the Boche machine guns"; and they left it at that.⁹

The 23d Infantry had its 2d Battalion (Major Fechet) in front line, 1st Battalion (Major Waddill) in support, and 3d Battalion (Major Elliott) in reserve. Each battalion commander regulated his own formation, but all were deep. Only the regimental machine gun company was available, a platoon to each battalion. The 9th Infantry formed similarly, on a two-company front;—1st Battalion (Captain Speer) ahead, then the 3d Battalion (Captain Worthington) and the 2d Battalion (Major Bouton) . Headquarters of the 23d were Chavigny Farm, of the 9th about a mile to the north.¹⁰

The broad initial front assigned to the 5th Marines made it necessary to put two battalions in line. Accordingly, Colonel Feland assigned the leading battalion (Major Turrill) to the left; its duty was to keep contact with the Moroccans along the division boundary line and to advance upon le Translon Farm. The 2d Battalion (Major Keyser), next in column, was to advance upon Verte Feuille Farm, astride the Paris-Maubeuge Road, connecting with the 1st Battalion and with the 9th Infantry; the 3d Battalion (Major Shearer) was to occupy the old trenches as soon as the attack was under way, and thereafter to act in support as required. A forest road junction had been designated on the map as regimental headquarters, but this place proved to be densely overgrown. The headquarters company had not come up, and the regimental commander had with him only his adjutant and two orderlies; nevertheless he established himself here and maintained intermittent communication to the front through the battalion runners, and to the rear over a telephone line.¹¹

From the Carrefour du Saut du Cerf, where ammunition was obtained, the column followed the Paris-Maubeuge Road. As it passed the Carrefour de Montgobert, guides were obtained from the French troops just coming out; these did not know precisely where the battalions were to go, but at least knew a little about the country, and so were of some use. The barrage opened while the column was still on the march, the guns being in position in the woods on both sides of the road only a few hundred yards away. The sound of friendly guns so close at hand acted as a powerful stimulant upon the wet, hungry, tired men. Deployment began at the point where the main road cuts the hold trench line the advance began only twenty minutes later.¹²

The front from the Aisne to the Savieres was held by the German XIII Corps (General Baron v. Watter), the left Corps of General V. Eben's Ninth Army. General Mangin's preliminary operations kept the Germans nervous, and on July 11th, the Crown Prince warned both the Seventh and Ninth Armies that an attack was probably coming soon. In reporting his disposition to General Headquarters, the Crown Prince pointed out that the divisions were at very low strength, and were suffering severely from grippe that the Ninth Army needed four fresh divisions. The answer was that these could not be furnished.¹³

On July 9th information had been received at German Headquarters from reliable agents that the French planned an attack. Ninth Army headquarters were advised of a French attack between the Aisne and the Marne. On July 11th a French engineer soldier taken prisoner near the Forest of Retz said the French X Army was preparing to attack and he described these preparations in some detail. In the meanwhile the French 48th and the Moroccan divisions were identified and known to be assault troops. This information was furnished to Army Group Headquarters.^13a

In some cases where divisions or smaller units were not strong enough to hold a line alone, they were temporarily consolidated into one command.14 It was the consolidated 14th and 47th Reserve Divisions that stood opposite the 2d Division. Its right was near le Translon Farm; its left extended over into the territory of the French 38th Division to the south. The six infantry regiments had an average effective strength of thirty officers and a thousand men, a little over six thousand in all, with a hundred and forty light and two hundred heavy machine guns. The artillery was much split up. The 14th Reserve Division had its own batteries; but the 47th had only one light battalion of its own, and one light battalion borrowed from the 211th Division, in reserve of the Army Group. Its own batteries began to come back to it on July 18th, but too late to get into action. All men were tired, rations were short, and the spirit was none too good.¹⁵

One point should be noted here and borne in mind in tracing the course of the action. The attack of the Tenth Army was directed a little south of east, to cut through south of Soissons. Its axis was Dommiers-Chaudun-Villemontoire. When the 2d Division reached its objective at Vierzy, its flanks were to be on two trench systems of the old fortified positions of the Montagne de Paris, called by the Germans the Paris Position. These lines ran generally northwest and southeast, one west of Vierzy, the other through Chaudun. The German axis was not the same. Their artillery protective line was the Vauxcastille Ravine, designated to the 2d Division as its second intermediate objective; their main line of defense, the Chaudun-Vierzy-Bois de Mauloy Position, was the American final objective for the attack. But they had come into this region from the northeast; their railways and their highways ran to Soissons; their divisional and regimental boundary lines ran south of west; their outpost line lay chiefly in the old Paris Positions, so that the troops felt their front to be southwest. In this particular region, the axis was Charantigny-Vierzy-Longpont. Hence, retiring troops tended to drift diagonally across the line of advance—from the territory of the 38th Division into that of the 2d, thence into that of the Moroccans. This accounts for the large number of German regiments identified by the Americans.

The attack of the 2d Division found a battalion of the German 218th and one of the 219th Reserve Infantry in the outpost line. Taken completely by surprise, they offered little resistance. Their positions were partly wired, but consisted of little more than organized shell holes. All their communications to the rear were instantly lost; only one message from them got back, brought by a dog to headquarters of the 219th.

The American 23d Infantry, on the right, which had but a short distance to go, began to arrive on the first objective at 4.50, close behind the barrage. The German defensive barrage, called for by rockets, came down promptly, but was thin and weak. Here along the La Grange-Beaurepaire Road, lay a German battalion, formed by consolidation of the 2d and 3d Battalions, 220th Reserve Infantry, across the boundary of the 2d and 38th Divisions. All communications being cut, nothing was known here of the situation in front. The battalion commander and adjutant had gone forward to reconnoiter; they never returned. The first real news was brought by the Americans and the Africans, following close upon the heels of the German fugitives. The battalion was swept away before it could offer a serious defense.

Later in the day, the Adjutant reported at regimental headquarters, then at Villemontoire, and told of his adventures. He had encountered the French 38th Division in the Bois du Mausolee, and continued to meet them at every turn. Wading across the Savieres Brook, he came upon the outposts of the 159th Infantry of the German 14th Reserve Division, but the French swept this away in a few moments, and he resumed his wanderings, urged on by the "crazy" French barrage behind him. Losing his way in the ravine, he came out north of Villers-Helon, and had more encounters with "Black French" patrols. Somewhere about St. Remy he got away from the active front, and reached Villemontoire by way of Hartennes. His day's march, as nearly as it can be traced on the map, had been at least ten miles.¹⁶

The 9th Infantry had a longer distance to go, and a change of direction to make. Its left flank was in the air, as the Marines were late in reaching their position. After advancing half a mile, the leading battalion (Captain Speer) came under rifle and machine gun fire from Verte Feuille Farm, and so turned north against it. Some of the Marines began to come up and resistance there was quickly crushed; but the battalion had taken a false direction and continued to diverge to the north. Thus, a gap was opened, and the second line battalion (Captain Worthington) moved into it. West of Beaurepaire Farm the second line battalion of the German 219th made a short stand, but was overrun, and with the assistance of the tanks the farm was taken. The German artillery was active, but the advance had been so rapid that it3 fire was mostly over the front lines. The supports, however, suffered from it, and had to pass through it several times, as the barrage line was gradually drawn back.¹⁷

The 5th Marines had a very broad front, a long distance to go, and an awkward change of direction to make. The right battalion (Major Keyser) met some little resistance in the woods, but passed through Verte Feuille Farm with the 9th Infantry and reached the first objective. Its right company, last to reach the starting line and delayed by its efforts to make contact with the 9th, was still somewhere in rear, and its left company had diverged to the north, trying to keep connection with the left battalion.¹⁸

That battalion was still farther north. As it advanced beyond le Translon Farm, it should have made a sharp turn to the right; but the Moroccans, having the Bois du Quesnoy to take, had decided to flank it, and their time table was slower accordingly. The German second line troops, not yet engaged with the Moroccans, were thus in position to fire into the flanks and even into the rear of the Americans as they made the change of direction. The battalion therefore continued on to the northeast, broke down this resistance, and came into the first objective line in Moroccan territory.¹⁹

The American barrage stood on a line just east of the first objective until about six o'clock; then the advance was resumed and the artillery moved forward by battalions, the guns remaining in position moving their fire up to the second objective. The light regiments were placed at the disposal of the attacking infantry—the 12th for the Marines, the 15th for the 3d Brigade. The first batteries to come forward were those of the 2d Battalion, 15th Field Artillery. Major Lang, the battalion commander, reported at Beaurepaire Farm before eight o'clock, and his batteries were firing from a new position at Verte Feuille Farm at ten o'clock.

The 2d Battalion, 12th Field Artillery (Major Cole) came to Verte Feuille Farm about the same time, other battalions followed in turn. Both regiments continued to advance their batteries successively as the attack advanced.²⁰

Moving out from the first objective line, the 23d Infantry came immediately upon resistance by a provisional group consisting of the consolidated 1st and 2d Battalions of the German 218th, which lay in reserve in the Vauxcastille Ravine. Major Fechet's battalion was checked here for a time, but Major Waddill's continued its advance and came up on both flanks. Part of Major Elliott's reserve battalion also came into line here. The German detachment was surrounded, very few men escaping, but held out under command of Lieutenant Nohlen until late in the afternoon. The situation was reported at German division headquarters by fugitives and by patrols, and airplanes were sent to reconnoiter, but relief was hopeless. Lieutenant Nohlen was so informed by a note dropped to him, and he was directed to cut his way through to Vierzy. This proved impossible so he finally surrendered with between two hundred and three hundred men.²¹

Except at this point, the advance continued unchecked across the second objective line, and by seven o'clock the Americans were arriving on the heights overlooking Vierzy. A small group even penetrated Vierzy, but was driven out by gas and machine gun fire. By midday the line was close up to and partly surrounding Vierzy. Nearly the whole regiment had become engaged; one company was in support at Beaure-paire and two companies in reserve at the original position.²²

Some marines fighting at the head of Vierzy ravine captured a group of Germans who were sent to the rear under guard of a few walking wounded. They encountered a wandering detachment of Senegalese who threatened to take over the prisoners. The marines prepared to resist and the German prisoners looked around for weapons, and lined up with the Americans against the French Colonials; thereupon the Senegalese moved on.

The leading battalion of the 9th (Captain Speer) finding its left still in the air, continued on to the northeast and came up against Maison-Neuve Farm. Parts of the other two battalions joined it, and the place was soon taken. When the Moroccans came up later, these troops turned into their own sector, and came up to the final objective line north of Vierzy, where the right half of Captain Worthington's battalion had preceded them.

This latter group met resistance from artillery and machine guns on the east bank of the Vauxcastille-Maison-Neuve Ravine. Against this fire the ravine itself was the only cover, and they took it at a run. Coming up the other side in the same rush, they captured the guns, whose crews disappeared in the wheat fields beyond. More interesting to the men, so long without food or water, was a barrel of sauerkraut. This was broken open, and the men went on, each "with his rifle in one hand and eating sauerkraut from the other."

About nine o'clock this group was stopped by machine gun fire from the old stone tower north of Vierzy. Partly protected as long as they lay still, they were exposed as soon as they moved; every expedient was tried, but further progress was impossible. Once a group of German airplanes passed over them, flying low and using machine guns and grenades, but fortunately the effect was slight and the planes did not return. At last a single French tank appeared, and by frantic signals the attention of its crew was drawn to the tower. Three shots from its gun at fifty yard range put an end to the tower and its garrison; the tank went on about its business, in the direction of Maison-Neuve, and the remnant of the 9th Infantry battalion moved on to its objective.^22a

The Marines had become even more scattered than the 9th Infantry. Three companies of Major Keyser's battalion changed direction properly at Verte Feuille Farm, passed in rear of Captain Speer's battalion of the 9th Infantry, and went on to the final objective, where they mingled with both the 9th and 23d. The left company, trying to maintain connection with Major Turrill's battalion, became extended to a thousand yard front. At Maison-Neuve it split, part of it taking a hand in that fight and then moving to the southeast; the other part went on northeast, guiding on Major Turrill. One company of Major Shearer's reserve battalion went in to assist this company and shared in its fortunes; two more of Major Shearer's companies were sent to reinforce Major Turrill, leaving only one company on reserve. Major Turrill's battalion, with parts of both the others, went on eastward in Morroccan territory, and along the Paris-Maubeuge Highway met a company of the 18th Infantry from the American 1st Division which had diverged into this territory from the north just as the marines had from the south, seeking connection to the flank. The 18th turned back toward their own division, passing north of Chaudun. The Marines, assisted by tanks, took Chaudun and then occupied the old trenches east of town.^22b

At midday, then, the division was on the final objective, except in the village of Vierzy, which was still strongly held by the Germans. Nearly all reserves had been absorbed, units were much mixed, and the men exhausted. The light artillery had come forward, and was between Verte Feuille and Beau-repaire Farms. The Moroccans had come up abreast the division at Chaudun, and the 38th Division on the other flank at Montremboeuf Farm.

The XX Corps now issued orders for a further advance to the Soissons-Château-Thierry Road. The 2d Division directed an attack by the 3d Brigade, supported by the 5th Marines and the 6th Machine Gun Battalion. The Engineers and the 4th Machine Gun Battalion, in division reserve, were posted in the Vauxcastille Ravine; the 6th Marines in corps reserve at Beaurepaire. The 3d Brigade attached the 2d Battalion of the 5th Marines and a machine gun company to the 23d Infantry, the 1st Battalion of Marines and another machine gun company to the 9th, and kept the rest of the Marines in brigade reserve at Beaurepaire. The 23d was to take Vierzy, the 9th pass north of it.²³ Corps headquarters were moved up to Montgobert, those of the 2d Division to Verte Feuille Farm.

During the afternoon, both sides were reorganizing. The German troops were thoroughly mixed. In and about Vierzy were fragments of all six regiments of the 14th and 47th Reserve Divisions, with various miscellaneous units—machine guns, pioneer and labor companies. Patrols had been out all morning, collecting stragglers and reorganizing them; but many of these were from units not armed with the rifle, and many of the infantrymen had thrown away their arms. Rifles were being collected to rearm them. The trains had been sent to the rear, but all spare men with them had been left for use in the line. The 28th Division, which had recently opposed the 2d at Belleau Wood, was now in reserve here, and its three regiments were moving up to the line, parts of them in this sector.

Early in the afternoon this mass of troops was formed into two provisional brigades, the boundary line being the Char-antigny-Vierzy Road. In the northern sector were the fragments of the 219th Reserve Infantry, and the 40th Fusiliers of the 28th Division, all under the command of the 27th Reserve Brigade, 14th Reserve Division. The 94th Reserve Brigade, 47th Reserve Division, held the southern sector; here were fragments of the 218th and 220th Reserve Infantry, 47th Reserve Division; of the 16th and 53d Reserve and 159th Infantry, 14th Reserve Division; and miscellaneous groups. Later in the afternoon, the 110th Grenadiers, 28th Division, came in to fill a gap on the southern division boundary. The 94th Brigade formed two subsectors under Lieutenant-Colonel v. Jagnow and Colonel Plehn, of the 16th and 218th respectively. All headquarters were scattered; the 94th Brigade operated with the staff of the 220th Reserve Infantry; Colonel von Jagow with that of the 159th and Colonel Plehn with that of the 53d.²⁴

The 2d Division orders issued at 1:30 called for an immediate attack; but transmission of orders was no easy matter. General Ely had established headquarters of the 3d Brigade at Beaurepaire Farm at 12.30 P.M. Both his regimental commanders were already there, and he was soon familiar with the situation in so far as it could be learned. There were no telephone connections with the division, no mounted messengers, and only one motor car—the one in which the brigade commander had come up. He therefore started back in his car to make a personal report to the division commander, and found him just leaving his old headquarters at Carrefour de Nemours to go forward. The aftack order was received from him in person.

The roads were still crowded, and it was four o'clock when General Ely again reached Beaurepaire. Regimental commanders were sent for and orders given them at 4.30. Both said six o'clock was the earliest possible moment at which they could move; the commander of the tanks said seven o'clock. The attack was finally ordered "as soon as possible, but not later than six P.M." Tanks were ordered to follow if they could not accompany.²⁵

The advance did not actually start until seven o'clock. Meanwhile, the location of the troops having been determined more accurately, the assignment of the Marine battalions were reversed, Major Turrill's going to the 23d Infantry and Major Keyser's to the 9th. As for Major Shearer's battalion, which was to constitute a brigade reserve, it no longer existed, all but a small provost guard having already been sent into line with other battalions.

The 23d came out of the ravine west of Vierzy with the 1st Battalion (Major Fechet) on the right and 2d (Major Waddill) on the left. Half of the 3d Battalion (Major Elliott) had been absorbed in these, and the other half lay in reserve. Most of the line was north of Vierzy, but the right extended south of it; all converged upon the town and fought their way through, driving before them all organized opposition.

In the ravine, on the southern division boundary, a battalion of Moroccans of the 38th Division was found; here also fifteen tanks joined and rendered excellent service.²⁶ Major Turrill's 1st battalion, 5th Marines came up in support at the west end of the village. He had received his orders at 5.15 at Verte Feuille Farm, where he had gone to report the situation to his own regimental commander. He moved at once, with parts of the 3d Battalion which was then in support under his orders, made a circuit to the north to avoid the batteries in action there, and came down by way of Beaurepaire and Vaux-castille, picking up men of his battalion on the way. The regimental machine gun company, whose guns had only just arrived, attached itself to his column. He arrived at Vierzy with a hundred and fifty men besides the machine gunners, and met General Ely, who ordered him forward. With the machine guns on the left of the road and the infantry companies on the right, he went through the town and assisted the 23d in cleaning it up.²⁷

The Germans in Vierzy exhibited much tenacity after the 23d Infantry had forced its way through and after the Marines and some men of the 23d Infantry had mopped up the stronghold. Individual German snipers in and around Vierzy were active for several days.^27a

The 9th Infantry had been reorganized in the ravine northwest of Vierzy. Here also were three companies of Major Keyser's battalion of Marines. Colonel Upton received his orders from General Ely at Beaurepaire shortly after 4.30; Major Keyser from the brigade adjutant in Verte Feuille at 4.50. One company of the Marines was up at Chaudun and rejoined after the attack had started.

The 2d Battalion of the 9th was placed on the right, the Marines on the left. The front being something over a thousand yards, each battalion formed a thin line, and the remaining men followed in small groups. In support were the other two battalions of the 9th, the 3d on the right and the 1st on the left. All battalions were very weak. Two machine gun companies were to accompany the regiment, but they did not arrive in time.

Resistance was met from the start, but after advancing about a mile the left was enfiladed by machine guns in the Lechelle Woods and ravine. This was the territory of the Moroccans, who had attacked during the afternoon but failed to pass the old trench line between Chaudun and Lechelle. The Marines turned northeast against this fire, and advanced slowly. Here the tanks which had preceded them came to the rear through their lines, followed by a fierce artillery fire. Four tanks were destroyed, and casualties in the battalion were heavy. The missing company from Chaudun joined during the check, and with this reinforcement the advance continued to the old trench system.

These trenches, cut up and overgrown, were a formidable obstacle in the gathering dusk, and fire began to be received from the rear, from machine guns overlooked in the advance, so a halt was made here for the night. The gap between the two front line battalions was filled by the left battalion of the second line.²⁸

The American line for the night ran nearly north and south, a mile east of Vierzy, the left bent back along the old trench system and in some places across it, facing Lechelle. The Moroccan Division connected in the trenches; the French 38th Division had a post near the crossroads on the divisional boundary a mile behind the right of the 23d.

The Germans tried to organize several counter-attacks upon this line, but failed to gather the strength. One was attempted against the 9th Infantry early in the morning of the 19th, but was readily repulsed. The American troops in line, however, were utterly unfit for any further effort. Losses had been heavy. Every battalion commander in the 9th Infantry had been killed or wounded; many of the companies were commanded by sergeants; what men were left were badly scattered, and battalions could assemble hardly the strength of a company; rations had not yet come up in anything like sufficient quantity; the men were dead for sleep.

Army orders for the 19th provided for a continuation of the attack at 4.00 A.M., with the same objectives as designated for the afternoon of the 18th. For the 2d Division, this objective was the Soissons-Château-Thierry Road.

Corps orders based upon this did not reach the division until 2.00 A.M., and the physical condition of the men made it imperative that the front line be relieved, which could not be accomplished by the time fixed. Division orders were therefore issued meeting the requirements as nearly as was possible.²⁹

This order called for artillery preparation commencing at 6.00 A.M. At 7.00 A.M. the 6th Marines, from reserve, was to pass through the front lines and advance to the Château-Thierry Highway on a front of about twenty-five hundred yards. The only other fresh troops armed with the rifle were the 1st Battalion, 2d Engineers; with the 4th Machine Gun Battalion they were to constitute a reserve.

The 6th Marines moved out from Beaurepaire Farm at 6.30, the 2d Battalion (Major Holcomb) ahead, then the 1st Battalion (Major Hughes) and the 3d (Major Sibley). Following the ravine, it came into Vierzy without loss. At the railway station Lieutenant Colonel Lee issued orders placing the 1st Battalion on the right, the 2d on the left, the 3d in support. The first line battalions moved on, deployed in the open, and passed through the old lines at 8.25.

The ground was absolutely flat, some planted in wheat, with here and there bare fields. Artillery and machine gun fire caused heavy losses. After advancing about a mile the right was stopped in front of Tigny and the left at La Raperie, the head of the Villemontoire Ravine. The center continued on a little farther to the Bois de Tigny. A gap opened between the 1st and 2d Battalions, which was filled by the 3d. This line was held the rest of the day.³⁰ Further advance was impossible without fresh troops, and there were no more to send in.

The artillery on both sides was very active all day. All the batteries of the 2d Field Artillery Brigade were well to the front, within range of the Château-Thierry Highway—the light regiments between Beaurepaire and Vauxcastille, the heavy regiment close behind them.

Communication was now good, for all headquarters were close together, division and artillery brigade at Beaurepaire, the others in and about Vierzy. The artillery had observations upon Tigny, Hartennes, Taux, and the Châte*au-Thierry Highway. from stations in front of Beaurepaire and from the old tower north of Vierzy, communicating with the batteries by telephone and light signals. The 2d Battalion, 15th Field Artillery, reports an ammunition expenditure of 4,500 rounds for the day, or three hundred and seventy-five rounds per gun; no reports are found from the other battalions.31

The German reports show a steady drift of troops from southwest to northeast across the front of the division. Fragments of the 14th and 47th Reserve Divisions driven out of Vierzy had taken position on the ridge between Villemontoire and Charantigny. Here they were protected by the Lechelle Ravine, against the attack of the Moroccans, and were able to fire into the flank of the Marines and help to stop them at la Raperie. But the position was too hot for them; when, to the pressure of tanks from the south and the leading elements of the Moroccans from the west, there was added short fire from their own artillery, they fell back through Villemontoire upon a new line established by the 46th Reserve Division along the Château-Thierry Road. In the evening they assembled near Nampteuil and were withdrawn. A few days later the 47th was broken up and permanently consolidated with the 14th.³²

Across the southern boundary of the 2d Division lay othei. remnants of the same two German divisions. The 110th Grenadiers of the 28th Division had been sent in to reinforce them, a battalion at a time; part of it was with the Villemontoire group, and part northwest of Parcy-Tigny. There had been less pressure from the south and west; this group had held on, keeping connection to the left, and a gap had opened during the night opposite the 2d Division. For over a mile here there was no organized body of troops except a weak battalion of the 16th Reserve Infantry.³³

Next on the left, however, was the 3d Reserve Division, with part of the 115th Division. West of Tigny was the 49th Reserve Infantry in a position which apparently was regarded as the second line against attacks from the southwest. When the Americans advanced from the west this now became a first line. Major Hughes' battalion reconnoitered it and called for reinforcements. Half of Major Sibley's battalion went in on the left, but this was not enough; his estimate was that it would require a whole regiment to take Tigny.³⁴

The situation at Villemontoire was most alarming to the Germans. Late in the morning men were streaming through the town so thickly that from the rear it seemed that the town was lost and that a counter-attack to gain it was urgently needed.

As noted above, the 46th Reserve Division was in second line here. This division had reached Soissons early in the morning of the 18th, in reserve for the Army group, but so serious was the situation that both the XIII and XXXIX Reserve Corps had attempted to assume jurisdiction over it and issue orders. The division commander had shown willingness to assist, and commenced deployment of his troops. The situation had been adjusted during the day, and the division was placed at the disposal of General von Watter of the XIII Corps; it now held a second line, on a front of three miles from Rozieres, to Taux. Nothing else being immediately available, it was ordered at 10.30 A.M. to retake Villemontoire.

The division commander accordingly telephoned to his infantry brigade commander at Ambrief; but such an operation was a delicate matter. The situation in front was far from clear, and an attack in the wrong direction might not only fail of its effect but jeopardize the whole second line. He therefore sent his operations officer forward to consult with the infantry commander, to secure more definite information. From Am-brief he telephoned to corps headquarters and was told that the attack would not be necessary—that the 20th Division was near at hand and would make it.³⁵ This division had been in Army reserve east of Reims; on July 15th, it had been engaged at Somme-Py. On the 18th its infantry regiments had moved by motor trucks to Ambrief, Chacrise and Nampteuil, in reserve of the XIII Corps. The assembly was not complete and the artillery was not yet up, but the division seemed in better position to attack than the 46th Reserve, and orders were sent accordingly at about eleven o'clock. A regiment of light artillery and two heavy batteries were attached to it, and all batteries in the territory of the 14th Reserve Division placed under its orders. It was to relieve that division and attack from the front Buzancy-Taux, with Charantigny-Parcy-Tigny as an objective.³⁶

The attack developed slowly. At 3.30 P.M. the 79th Infantry was at Villeblain, only a mile from its assembly point and still two miles behind the Château-Thierry Road. But between 6.00 and 7.00 this regiment on the left and the 77th on the right, each with an accompanying battery, passed Villemon-toire, and in the evening held the eastern slope of the ridge to the west; the 92d was in reserve. The left of this line, however, was bent back and extended only a short distance into American territory. The attack did not endanger Major Hughes' position. About seven o'clock the Moroccans made a counter-attack, in the course of which firm connection was established between them and the Americans.³⁷

It was evident that no further offensive action could be expected from the weakened and exhausted troops of the 2d Division, and Corps orders of that afternoon provided for their relief by the French 5th Division, in second line behind them. One infantry brigade was to be placed in the woods at le Translon Farm where it would be available if needed as a support, and the rest of the division was to go back to Vivieres, four miles north of Villers-Cotterets. This order was received at 5.00 P.M., and the relief began that night. The troops relieved withdrew into the woods along the Paris-Maubeuge Road.³⁸

The dispositions ordered were never completed; two important modifications were made the next day.

First, the orders for the relief of the 2d Field Artillery Brigade were revoked. The relief order of the 19th had provided for leaving in line the French 268th Field Artillery, which had been attached to the 2d Division, but it now became necessary for it to rejoin its own division, the 69th, which was entering the front line of the I Corps on the left of the XX, and the American brigade could not be spared. The 15th Field Artillery and part of the 17th had already moved out of position, but returned at once. The Brigade supported the attack of the French 58th Division on July 21st, which pushed well across the Château-Thierry Road; but the divisions on the flanks had not penetrated so far, and it was pushed back to Tigny. Two of the American battalions, one of the 12th and one of the 15th, which had pushed forward with the advance, suffered severely in the retirement.³⁹

On the 22d several German counter-attacks were repulsed and preparations made for a new attack. In the afternoon a telephone message again directed the relief of the 2d Field Artillery Brigade; but a new impediment to the movement was discovered. General Bowley, the brigade commander, pointed out that the honor of the brigade was involved. It had certain property not its own, to wit, 6,000 German shells. These, General Bowley said, he had arranged to return the next morning. This delicate situation was readily appreciated by the punctilious French General, and the relief of the American artillery was again suspended.⁴⁰ The brigade supported the attack of July 23d, which brought the line to the Château-Thierry Road along most of the division front, but failed to take Villemontoire. The French 12th Division now relieved the 58th and renewed the attack on July 25th. This time Villemontoire was taken. The 2d Field Artillery Brigade was relieved after this attack and rejoined the division. During this period each regiment had manned at least one German battery in addition to its own and had labored faithfully to return the borrowed German shells.⁴¹

The second modification to the dispositions for the withdrawal, referred to above, involved the entire division. To facilitate its reorganization, it was withdrawn farther from the front and assembled in the region of Pierrefonds on the border of the great Forest of Compiegne. This completed, it marched on further south and was quartered in the area about Nanteuil-le-Haudouin, thirty miles northeast of Paris. Here the 2d Field Artillery Brigade rejoined on July 26th.⁴²

It is difficult to conceive of a division entering action under more unfavorable and trying conditions than those experienced by the 2d Division at Soissons. They had been moved from their second line position without warning; transported by French trucks to a region unknown to the division commander or his staff, some units making the journey by a weary forced march. They arrived at the outskirts of a great forest, a day's march from their objective, tired and hungry, finding that the expected French guides were not there.

In the meantime the division commander was called upon to prepare his attack order solely as a map problem, without the least opportunity of reconnoitering his front. In preparing this order he had no knowledge of the location of his command, when and where they would arrive, and the order of their arrival. There was a grave doubt that they could arrive within the given time.

The 2d Division, after an exhausting ride, without rations or water, was compelled to march by night across an unknown forest, plodding their way through mud in a fearful traffic jam, much of the time forced into the ditch, the men in single file, holding to each other to assure not being lost. In spite of these difficulties, it arrived just as the barrage fell. Many units were then compelled to double time, and immediately take up the attack.

Brilliant as was their accomplishment in the resulting action, it may be said that the obstacles in their path to reach the line of departure were as formidable as those they combatted in the ensuing battle itself. An organization with a less forceful and able commander and a less resourceful staff, or troops with less stamina, discipline and courage, would never have reached the battlefield; reaching it, they would never have achieved the victory.

The division loss was 29 officers and 452 men killed wounded, 121 officers and 2,572 men missing, 4 officers and 764 men total, 154 officers and 3,788 men.⁴³ The division had taken prisoners 66 officers and 2,810 men, not including wounded prisoners sent to the rear through the hospitals. The trophies in guns and war material were beyond counting.⁴⁴ The corps commander, the American Commander-in-Chief, General Pershing, the French Army Commander, General Degoutte, the Commander of the Army Group, General Pétain —all hastened to send to the 2d Division a testimony of its accomplishments. In General Pershing's Final Report he says:

"General Pétain's plan for the counter-attack involved the entire western face of the Marne Salient. The 1st and 2d American Divisions, with the 1st French Moroccan Division between them, were employed as the spearhead of the main attack, driving directly eastward, through the most sensitive portion of the German lines, to the heights south of Soissons. The advance began on July 18th without the usual brief warning of a preliminary bombardment, and these three division at a single bound broke through the enemy's infantry defenses and overran his artillery, cutting or interrupting the German communications leading into the salient. A general withdrawal from the Marne was immediately begun by the enemy, who still fought stubbornly to prevent disaster. . . . The 2d Division advanced eight kilometers in the first 26 hours and by the end of the second day was facing Tigny, having captured 3,000 prisoners and 66 field guns. . . . Due to the magnificent dash and power displayed in the field of Soissons by our 1st and 2d Divisions, the tide of war was definitely turned in favor of the Allies." ⁴⁵