CHAPTER XII
ST. MIHIEL

THE previous fighting in the St. Mihiel region has been briefly outlined in Chapter III. In the same chapter some description has been given of the north and west faces of the salient.

This face, it will be remembered, lay along the Côtes de Meuse, the range of rough wooded hills along the east bank of the Meuse. St. Mihiel itself and the crest of the hills were held by the Germans north of Les Éparges the French held the entire ridge, and the Germans were out in the plain of the Woëvre.

South of St. Mihiel the line turned abruptly east, straight across the ridge, and dropped off into the plain at Apremont. From here on the country was entirely different. The Woëvre is flat, with many wooded areas and with many ponds, swamps and small streams. The principle stream is the Rupt de Mad, which collects the waters of a large part of the Côtes de Meuse and flows northeast through Thiaucourt to the Moselle.

The banks of the Moselle are high wooded bluffs cut by numerous ravines. The whole country was under observation by the Germans from the eastern crest of the Cotes de Meuse and from the detached heights of Mont Sec and Loupmont. Observation from the French side was poor. The plain has very distinct wet and dry seasons during the summer water supply is precarious. About the middle of September the rains begin and from then on the country is deep in mud and often flooded. From Apremont, the front line ran slightly north of east across this plain, by Seicheprey, Flirey, Limey and Regniéville to the Forêt du Bois le Prêtre, where it reached the Moselle in the Marbache Sector.

The German outpost zone, called by them the Wilhelm zone, was from three to six miles deep. The interior was called the Schroeter zone, named for the Chief Engineer of the German Crown Prince's Army Group, who had laid out the defense position in 1917. The Schulenberg switch trenches connected this position with the Wilhelm front line, forming a new continuous front in case of loss of the tip of the salient.

The salient was held by the German "Army Detachment C" commanded by General von Fuchs, which was the left element of General von Gallwitz' Group of Armies.

On its left was General von Bothmer's Nineteenth Army, belonging to the army group of Duke Albrecht of Württemberg. Detachment "C" usually disposed of about twelve divisions organized in three corps; the Combres Group on the right, from Moranville to Vaux-les-Palameix; the Michel Group around the point of the salient from Vaux to Mont Sec; the Gorz Group on the left, from Mont Sec to the junction with the Metz Group of the Nineteenth Army at Forêt du Bois-le-Prêtre.

The American First Army was to be introduced into the line opposite the salient, between the French Second and Eighth Armies. When its headquarters opened at Neufchateâu, in the middle of August, the plan was to place its right at Port-sur-Seille, east of Pont-à-Mousson, in the Marbache sector and its left at Watronville, near Sommedieue, in the 2d Division's old Toulon Sector. To it were to be assigned three American and one French corps with fifteen American and four French divisions. Two American corps were to make the attack upon the south face, and one on the west face; their attacks were to be connected by the French corps at the point. This would give an active front of about fifty miles; the left could be extended to Bezonvaux, ten miles more, by two corps, six divisions, of the French Second Army (General Hirschauer) which were temporarily placed under General Pershing's orders for this purpose. The total force was thus twenty-five divisions. The objectives were to be the general line Gorze—Mars-La-Tour—Étain; this involved not only the reduction of the salient but a clear break through the Hindenburg line and a direct and immediate approach to the Briey region.¹

The movement of so many divisions and of the great mass of artillery assigned to their support, besides the elaborate preparations necessary in the rear areas for supply, could not fail to attract the attention of the Germans. Efforts were therefore made to mislead them as to the purpose of the movements by activity further south, in the Vosges.

Headquarters of the American VI Corps (General Bundy) were ordered to Belfort where preparations were made to install headquarters of an army. Reconnaissances were made and plans drafted for offensive operations in the direction of Mülhausen. Papers concerning this operation were discreetly "lost" in a Belfort hotel where they would do the most good. General Main sent to that region a formidable amount of railway and other heavy artillery and directed General Castelnau, commanding the Armies of the East, to place it in position and do a little fire for adjustment. All of this was done so realistically that only Generals Pétain, Castelnau and Pershing with a few of their confidential staff officers knew that it was only a diversion; even General de Boissoudy, commanding the Seventh Army in the Vosges was not in the secret.²

An advance station of the First Army headquarters was opened August 28th at Ligny-en-Barrois which had been selected as their location during the battle; but for the sake of secrecy the main station remained at Neufchateâu and General Pershing himself made frequent visits to general headquarters at Chaumont (Haute Marne) and to the Vosges.³

On August 28th headquarters of the American First Army moved to Ligny-en-Barrois and on the 30th transfer of command was made as planned. Preparations and troop movements had gone on continuously, but no change was made at the time of transfer in the occupation of the front line. At Saizerais was the American I Corps (General Liggett) with the 82d and 90th Divisions in line. Next, at Toul, was the American IV Corps (General Dickman), 89th Division in line; at Ernecourt, the French II Colonial Corps (General Blondlat), 26th and 39th French divisions; and, finally, at Benoitevaux, the American V Corps (General Cameron), French 2d Dismounted Cavalry Division.⁴

But meanwhile the general situation had been developing, and Marshal Foch came to Ligny to discuss an enlarged program of operations.

The first two items on the July 24th program, he pointed out, had been fully accomplished. The Châlons and Amiens railways were fully disengaged; moreover, the German line was being pushed back on a front of 125 miles, from Rheims to Arras. The time seemed ripe for a general convergent advance of all the Allied armies against the great salient formed by the whole German line. To make such an advance decisive, it would be necessary to strike a powerful blow in the direction of Mézières, the key point of all the enemy's lateral communications.

This, in his view, made it undesirable to consider further any divergent operation toward Briey. The St. Mihiel operation, then, might be limited to the reduction of the salient.

It was finally decided that the attack should be limited to the Les Éparges-Vigneulles-Thiaucourt-Regnieville line; that it should be made about September 10th; that at the same time preparations should be made for an American attack between the Meuse and the Argonne about September 25th. It would be directed upon Mézières, as the American part in the combined advance of all the Allied armies.5

The final dispositions were announced in Army orders on September 7th. Troops were moved to their attack positions between August 28th and September 11th, but the outpost line was not relieved until the night of September 11-12, to prevent identification of newly arrived units.⁶

The I Corps on the right had one division east of the Moselle —the 82d, which had taken the place of the 2d in the Marbache Sector. This division was merely to advance its left along the river, keeping contact with the 90th on the opposite bank. That division closed in to the right making room for the 5th and 2d to come in on its left. The 78th was in Corps reserve near Saizerais, and the 35th in Army reserve at Liverdun.

In the IV Corps, the 89th Division closed in, letting the 42d and the 1st take their places on its left. The corps reserve was the 3d Division near Sanzey; Army reserve in this region, the 91st at Lagney. The II Colonial Corps was to make no serious attack but merely connect the two flanks and delay the German withdrawal, so made no changes in its dispositions except to resume control of its 2d Dismounted Cavalry Division which had formed the screen for the concentration of the V Corps. That Corps placed in line the American 26th and the French 15th Colonial; half of the 4th served to connect with the French Second Army, the other half was in Corps reserve.

Ever since April, at the urgent request of the French and English, American infantry had been sent to France at the expense of shipments of artillery and auxiliary troops. This threw the American army in France badly out of balance. In recognition of this condition, the French had agreed to provide French troops and services as required. In fulfillment, great numbers of French guns were placed in position bringing the total up to 3,000 light and heavy. Both French and British air squadrons were brought in, making, with the American squadrons, a concentration of 1,500 planes. The American troops numbered 555,000 and the French 110,000.⁷

Transportation and supply constituted a complicated problem; not only were our services of supply shorthanded, for reasons just given above, but our permanent installations, in so far as completed, were calculated for an American front more to the south and east. Our principal railway center was Is-sur-Tille, far to the south. New installations had to be provided during the concentration itself, and a new system of supply was built up working through St. Dizier. The railways were French operated and most of the truck trains used in the troop movements were French. The two fronts were treated as separate groups for supply and each had its own system of hospitals and depots.⁸

The 2d Division began its march to the front on September 1st, under orders from the I Corps which assigned it the area about Domèvre-en-Haye. All moves were of course by night. Headquarters moved on September 3d to Francheville in the new area; the marches were all completed on the night of the 4th and 5th and all troops were busily engaged in training for woods fighting. General Pershing made them a visit on the morning of the 7th.⁹

The front assigned to the 2d Division included Remenauville on the east and Limey on the west, about a mile and a half at the start, but gradually widening to over two miles. The ground was rolling and partly wooded with no remarkable features until the Rupt-de-Mad was reached. This stream entered the division's territory from the west at Thiaucourt, four miles ahead, followed a tortuous course to the northeast, through Jaulny, and out across the front line of the Michel Position at Rembercourt, just inside the division's east boundary.

On the German side, the line from Flirey to Fey-en-Haye, something over five miles, had been held since the middle of July by the 77th Reserve Division (General Adams) of the "Gorz Group" or 57th Provisional Corps (General von Hartz). It was weak in infantry; its battalions averaging under 500 effective men. The regiments, from west to east, were the 257th Reserve, the 419th and the 232d. On the front line the 419th covered almost exactly the ground assigned to the 2d Division; but the American boundaries ran a little west of north, while the German boundaries, guided somewhat by the course of the Rupt de Mad, swung east of north. Thus the east boundary of the 2d Division barely touched the German 232 Infantry even at the start, cut into the territory of the 419th soon after the start, and entered that of the 257th Reserve beyond Thiaucourt. Similarly the west boundary cut across the rear areas of the 257th Reserve and entered the territory of the German 10th Division at Thiaucourt. The main line of resistance of the 419th was along a ridge known as the Promenade des Moines, with a shallow outpost zone extending to the Robert Menil Farm-Ansoncourt Farm-Remenauville Road. Two battalions were on this front—2d on the right, 3d on the left—each with two rifle companies in front line and one company in support in the forward edges of the Bois la Haie l'Evêque and the Bois du Four. The artillery protective line was at the rear edge of these woods, a mile and a half behind the outpost; it was occupied by a Landsturm battalion and a company of the division's own pioneers, engaged in work on it. The 1st Battalion, with an accompanying battery, was in division reserve south of Thiaucourt. There was a second line along the southern edge of the Bois d'Heiche, a mile south of Thiaucourt which was to be occupied in an emergency by the division recruit detachment—two companies of 120 men each, with eight machine guns—and the provisional "assault company" of the division. The division had its own nine light batteries and eight heavy batteries (two of them not horsed) attached, besides the Corps and Army artillery in the region.¹⁰

The 2d Division had received replacements almost daily and had 1,030 officers and 28,600 men, about 60 officers and 1,400 men overstrength. It began to move into line September 8th, relieving elements of the 89th and 90th Divisions. Division headquarters were established in the Bois de Montjoie, southeast of Lironville, and command passed at 9.00 A.M., September 10th. The final fringe of outposts was left unaltered as long as possible this line was taken over on the night of September 11-12. The 2d Battalion, 5th Marines (Major Messer-smith) forming the outpost for the entire division.¹¹

A tentative plan of attack had been worked out and detailed reconnaissance based upon it was made by all units. The plan was submitted to the corps commander on the 8th and his approval having been received, final orders were issued on the 10th. The time of attack was fixed by the Army at 5.00 A.M., September 12th.¹²

Army orders had divided the operation into several phases. In the 2d Division area, the first phase line was at the Bois de Heiche, about at the German divisional reserve line. The second phase for the first day was to end on a line crossing the Rupt-de-Mad between Thiaucourt and Jaulny. The second day's operations involved pushing the left of this line up to Xammes, and exploitation clear to the Hindenburg Line from Rembercourt to Charey.^12a

The order called for attack in column of brigades, the 3d Brigade leading; regiments abreast, in column of battalions, each battalion on a two-company front with two companies in support and accompanied by a machine gun company.

The 9th Infantry, on the right, had its 3d Battalion (Major Denig) ahead, 1st Battalion (Captain Foley) in support and 2d Battalion (Major Bowen) in reserve. The battalions of the 23d were in the order, 2d (Captain Hall), 1st (Lieutenant Colonel Waddill) and 3d (Major Peyton). The brigade machine gun battalion (5th, Major Lewis) furnished four machine gun companies, the regiments themselves the other two. The Stokes mortars and 37mm guns were with the leading battalions.¹³ The brigade commander formed a reserve for himself, under Lieutenant Colonel Zane, by taking a company from each rear battalion. Distinctive marks had been adopted for each battalion and were worn on the left shoulder. These proved very useful in maintaining organization.

The 5th Marines followed the 9th, in the order: 3d Battalion (Major Shearer), 1st Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel Turrill), 2d Battalion (Major Messersmith); this last mentioned battalion had been holding the outpost line of the division and took its attack formation only after the rest had passed through. The 6th Marines had its 3d Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel Sibley) in front with the 2d Battalion (Major Williams) in support. The 1st Battalion (Major Barker) had been attached to the 23d Infantry for use in maintaining connections across the corps boundary, for the 2d Division formed the left flank of the I Corps and had the 89th Division of the IV Corps on its left.¹⁴ Similar dispositions were made for maintaining connection all along the line by detachments following along boundaries.

A machine gun barrage was prepared to be fired under the direction of the division machine gun officer (Major Drollinger) by the 4th (Major Bruce) and the 6th (Major Waller) Machine Gun Battalions. Upon completion of the barrage the 4th Battalion passed to division reserve; the companies of the 6th joined battalions of the 4th Brigade.¹⁵ Engineer detachments were placed with the leading infantry battalions and with the artillery. The remainder of the engineers were with the 4th Brigade. The 3d Brigade had a gas and flame company, a company of medium tanks and two companies of light tanks; the 4th Brigade had one company of light tanks. Eighteen airplanes and two balloons were under the orders of the division commander.^15a

The artillery brigade was strongly reinforced for this operation. Attached to it, in addition to its own batteries, were two French light regiments (the 49th and 247th, the latter a portée regiment); one regiment (the 317th) of 155 mm. howitzers; and three battalions of long range rifles from the 182d, 416th and 451st. The total was 30 batteries of 75 mm. guns, 15 of 155 mm. howitzers, three of 105 mm., four of 120 mm. and three of 155 mm. long range guns. A four-hour preparation was planned for the heavy batteries. At five o'clock, when the infantry advanced, a rolling barrage was to be fired by 15 light batteries—one battalion of the 12th, one of the 15th and all of the 247th—moving continuously at the rate of 100 meters in four minutes to the first phase line, which it would reach in a little more than three hours. The 49th, meanwhile, was to place standing barrages and smoke screens on designated lines, and howitzers to fire upon selected areas, and the heavy rifles to take care of counter-battery and targets beyond the range of the other guns. Beyond the first phase line a standing barrage would be placed until eleven o'clock. One battalion of the 12th Field Artillery was attached to the 23d Infantry, one battalion of the 15th to the 9th Infantry. These battalions were provided with extra caissons of ammunition and with wooden ramps and bridges to facilitate crossing trenches and shell-torn ground. They were to be ready to move and fire as called upon by the infantry. By eleven o'clock they were to be in advanced positions and to fire a rolling barrage from the first phase line to the final objective for the day; for the batteries in the original positions would have reached the limit of their range. The rear batteries would then be brought up as required.¹⁶

On the German side, too, troop movements were in progress on the night of September 11-12. The essential weakness of the salient had been recognized by the Germans from the very beginning, but its great value as a protection for Briey had made them anxious to hold it. By the middle of 1917, under the direction of Colonel Schroeter, the general plan of the defenses had taken essentially its final form.¹⁷

Plans for the retirement, spoken of as the "Michel" or "Loki" movement, were worked out and took definite form in October, 1917. These outlined certain preliminary work, then gradual withdrawal or destruction of installations over a period of eight days, and finally a withdrawal of the troops, step by step, in four successive nights.¹⁸

On August 22d, 1918, a conference was held by General Ludendorff at Imperial Headquarters at Avesnes as to details of defense in the salient, attended by the acting chief of staff of the army group (Major Bramsch) and the Chief of Staff of Army Detachment "C" (Colonel Baron von Ledebur). In the course of the discussion Colonel von Ledebur suggested that it might soon be necessary to commence the Loki movement. Although no troop concentration had begun, activity in the French rear areas led to the suspicion that supply installations were being organized for an attack in force.

On August 30th reports were received from secret agents, sent through Switzerland, to the effect that the French would attack on September 1st. The troops of the Army Detachment occupied their advanced positions, but nothing happened. However, from this time on troop movements began to be noticed leading to the expectation of an early attack by the Americans on the south front at least.

Preliminary work was commenced, with a view to possible withdrawal. Additional mobile army artillery was ordered to the Gorz Group; and orders given for the withdrawal of the unhorsed heavy batteries to the Michel Position.

On September 7th General von Fuchs considered the possibilities of a limited attack on the south front, to break up the American concentrations. On the 8th it was decided that the proposed attack was out of the question; moreover that the Loki movement should be commenced at once. Orders were issued to this effect and approval requested by telegram to Imperial Headquarters. Approval was received with the reservation that the outpost zone should be occupied as long as possible.¹⁹

September 11th was announced as the first day of the eight-day schedule of transportation.²⁰ No actual withdrawal of troops was made, but the Gorz Group was ordered to deepen its outpost zone, withdrawing its main line of resistance to the artillery protective line; the new disposition was to be completed by 3.00 A.M. on the 12th.²¹

The new line of resistance in front of the 2d Division lay, it will be remembered, at the rear edge of the woods. Major Nauman, commanding the 419th Infantry, issued his orders verbally to his battalion at 6.30 P.M. The outposts were to remain in place with machine guns; but the front line companies—two in each of the two front line battalions—were to draw most of their men to the forward edge of the woods which had been heavily wired. The reserve battalion was to send two of its companies forward to join them. The machine gun company of that battalion was to occupy prepared positions in support; its remaining rifle company was regimental reserve.²²

Everything was in motion, then, when the American artillery preparation began at 1.00 A.M. Rain and intense darkness made the movement of artillery extremely difficult, even without the hostile fire, and some of the guns never reached their new positions. Those that did could maintain but little communication and fired largely upon rocket signals. Of the 2d and 3d Battalions of the 419th, nothing was ever heard except from stragglers who made their way to the rear. The regimental commander and his staff were never seen after seven o'clock when his adjutant left headquarters to carry a message. The 1st Battalion was already split into companies when the firing began and could make no stand. The small units in rear—labor companies, assault company, recruit depot—made some efforts to establish a new line, but were swept away. Only about 300 men of the regiment could be collected the next day.²³

The infantry of the 2d Division had been formed up well close to the front to avoid the German barrage. The 3d Brigade was all north of the Limey—Pont-à-Mousson road; the 4th Brigade, close south of it, all in old trenches. Each company moved out in four waves at about fifty yards distance; two hundred yards distance between companies and five hundred yards between battalions. The first two waves were in thin skirmish lines—five to ten yards interval—the others in line of small columns followed by machine guns, mortars and one-pounders.

Little resistance was met. The German lines were weakly held at best, and they were far from their best that night. Some rifle and machine gun fire was met in the woods, but machine gun nests were flanked out and captured. Delays were due more to the wire, which was there in great quantities, and to the torn-up ground, than to the fire. The mud and the trenches held the tanks back, but they were not needed. The German artillery, a part of it just arrived in new positions and part of it actually in motion, fired fitfully and ineffectively. The division attack orders provided for passing second-line battalions through the first on the intermediate objective—the old German artillery protective line, now their main line of resistance—but this proved unnecessary. This line was passed without a check and the leading troops reached the first phase line at about ten o'clock.

Beyond this line the American standing barrage lay until eleven o'clock, and during the wait the lines were reorganized. The sector of the 9th Infantry had widened considerably, so both rear battalions passed through and took the lead, the 2d on the right, 1st on the left. The commander of the 23d also planned to pass his support battalion to the front line, but the orders, sent by runner, were slow in reaching it and the 2d Battalion, having suffered but a few casualties, continued in the lead, reinforced by part of the 1st.²⁴

From the old artillery protective line onward, the division was entering the territory of the 257th Reserve Infantry (Lieutenant Colonel Hann). The break of the 419th exposed its flank, and under the combined pressure of the 2d and 89th Divisions this regiment was swept away. It attempted to make a stand on the ridge south of Thiaucourt, but could not collect enough men to make an impression, so went on through Xammes to the Michel Position where it arrived with 250 men.²⁵

The 23d Infantry passed through Thiaucourt shortly before noon, encountering no resistance except weak artillery fire. The first day line was reached by the whole division front about 1.00 P.M. In the territory of the 9th Infantry this practically coincided with the final Army objective. On the left, the 23d Infantry pushed patrols forward to Jaulny and Xammes and by two o'clock this regiment also held the army objective. This whole line was at once organized for defense. From Thiaucourt on, the left of the 23d Infantry was in the territory of the German 10th Division, but there had been no serious contact between the troops. On the right General Malone with the 10th Brigade of the 5th Division was in touch with his old regiment throughout the day. On the left, contact with the 89th Division had been kept through Major Barker's battalion of the 6th Marines which had been placed behind the 23d Infantry for that purpose. After arrival on the Army objective, this battalion passed to reserve near Thiaucourt.^25-26

The German reserves available in the Gorz Group were the 31st Division at Gorze and the 123d Saxon at Ancy. The infantry battalions of these divisions had an average strength of about 600 and were organized with their rifle companies and one machine gun company each. When the artillery preparation began, these divisions had been assembled and started for their emergency positions, the 31st at Dommartin, the 123d at Onville. Between five and six o'clock they were ordered farther forward, the 31st to the Bois du Rupt northeast of Xammes, the 123d to la Grange en Haye Farm, east of the Bois de Grand Fontaine. Progress was slow on the muddy roads crowded with the retiring transportation of the divisions in front, but the leading battalions were in place toward ten o'clock and both divisions were ordered to make counter-attacks.²⁷

The attack of the Saxons came upon the front of the 5th Division and was not felt by the 2d. That of the 31st Division was directed on both sides of Jaulny, on the 2d Division front, but it developed slowly and disconnectedly and is given only passing mention in most of the American reports.²⁸

By 11.00 A.M. General von Fuchs knew not only that the Gorz Group had been pushed clear to the Michel Position, but also that St. Remy, on the western front, had been lost and that the whole Combres Group was losing ground. This brought the Mihiel Group, in the center, into great danger of being cut off altogether. Orders were therefore given to start the "Loki" movement without further delay—orders which merely confirmed the existing state of affairs, for the troops were already retiring.²⁹

The front line battalions of the Mihiel Group (XII Reserve Corps) remained in position as rear guards until after dark. The retirement of the right division offered no serious difficulty, for the attack on the north and west was still at a considerable distance, and urgent orders were sent to the Combres Group to delay it. But the route of the left division was exposed; when the retirement order was issued the American IV Corps had already crossed the Madine Brook and during the afternoon a squadron of cavalry reached the Heudicourt-Vigneulles Road. But although gaps temporarily opened, contact between the Mihiel and Gorz Groups was never entirely lost. A battalion was sent towards Nonsard and another to Sebastopol Farm south of St. Benoit, and later two more battalions were sent to make a counter-attack between them. These measures sufficed, and before morning the whole Army Detachment was back in the Michel line. The escape had been narrow, for the leading elements of the southern attack reached the Vigneulles-St. Benoit Road at 10.00 P.M.; troops from the western front occupied Hatton-chatel in the early morning; and contact between the two was established at Vigneulles at 9.00 A.M. on the 13th.³⁰

During the night the remnants of the 10th and 77th Reserve Divisions were withdrawn through the lines of the 31st and 123d which had established themselves in the Michel Position. The 31st was opposite the 2d Division in what the Germans still called the Flirey Sector, although Flirey was now seven miles behind the American lines.³¹

Machine gun fire from Jaulny was annoying and during the afternoon the line of the 2d Division was advanced slightly so as to include that place.³²

The artillery advanced as planned. The 2d Battalions of the 12th and 15th, which had been placed at the disposal of the 3d Brigade, were not called upon by the infantry. They moved forward, therefore, about 6.00 A.M., crossed the trench lines by means of prepared bridges carried on their caissons, and took position at the Bois du Four. From this position, they were able to take up the barrage at the first phase line, where the other battalions of the same regiments reached their limit of range. The French 247th Field Artillery, being supplied with the 1917 "D" shell, was able to continue the barrage from its original positions. The rear battalions of the 12th and 15th, when their work was taken over by the others, advanced in their turn at eleven o'clock and took new positions from which they could support the infantry line. One battalion (two batteries) of the 17th and one (three batteries) of the French 317th also started forward at the same time. Getting their heavy howitzers forward across the trenches and shell-torn ground was extremely laborious, but late at night they reached their new positions five miles ahead of their old ones. No other artillery was ordered forward. There was only one practicable road, that from Regnieville to Thiaucourt and this was used by both the 2d and 5th Divisions. Under the circumstances, it was possible to bring only a limited amount of ammunition forward. The guns already moved could fire this amount and more guns would merely have added to the congestion. The rear batteries all reconnoitered forward positions, but were never called upon to occupy them. The French batteries were detached from the 2d Division on the afternoon of the 13th.

The 2d Trench Mortar Battery, whose mortars were useless for this kind of attack, formed its men in gun detachments and sent them forward with the support battalion 3 of the attacking infantry regiments, to take over captured German guns. Their orders were, where observation was possible, to adjust upon any targets visible, taking care to have their first shots well "over." Where observation was not possible, they simply fired at maximum elevation in the general direction of Germany—for the brigade commander was still solicitous to return Germany property when it could possibly be done.^32a

The night was generally quiet, but with occasional alarms from various parts of the line. One such alarm, about ten o'clock, seemed a little serious and led to calls for artillery assistance from the corps. The reports evidently became exaggerated in transmission, for the corps commander not only gave the artillery assistance, but ordered up a brigade of infantry from corps reserve. This was not needed, nor even desired, by the 3d Brigade which had not even called upon the division reserve, and the brigade was stopped north of Limey.³³

No material change occurred during the 13th. That evening the 4th Brigade relieved the 3d in line, the 5th Marines taking the place of the 9th Infantry and the 6th Marines that of the 23d. The relief was accomplished battalion by battalion, the men moving in small groups through ravines and woods as arranged by personal consultation of local commanders. Command passed at midnight, with the brigade headquarters at Thiaucourt. Relief was completed at 4.00 A.M. Headquarters of the division and of the artillery were at the Loge Mangin, a group of dugouts in the old German artillery protective line north of the Bois la Haie l'Eveque.^{34, 34a}

During the 14th and 15th, the 4th Brigade was active with strong patrols, and worked the line forward into close contact with the Germans in the Michel position. Reaction by the enemy was weak and his occasional counter-attacks were easily repulsed. The Germans evidently expected attacks in force with a view to breaking through their main position. The general tone of their reports is satisfaction at having accomplished their "Loki" movement planmässig. The withdrawal of the Mihiel Group from the point of the salient had indeed been skilfully [sic] conducted, but not so much could be said of some other troops. The 77th Reserve Division especially came in for sharp criticism. The German loss had been severe, 16,000 prisoners and 443 guns remained in American hands. Of the prisoners, the 2d Division had taken 3,300; of the guns, 118, in calibers varying from three to ten inches. The total American loss, including sickness and light gas cases, was 13,700. That of the 2d Division was 9 officers and 186 men killed, 34 officers and 1,007 men wounded, 23 men gassed and 292 missing; total 1,552.³⁵

It would doubtless have been possible to continue the advance to an actual break-through, and possibly to the capture of Metz, although this would have been a much more serious matter than the operations just completed. But the general situation, outlined earlier in this chapter, forbade any such thought. It was necessary to stop here and pass to the other operation planned.

The 2d Division had been notified on the 14th that it was to be relieved, and had been making preparations by entrenching its positions and policing its rear areas. The relief began on the night of September 15-16 when the 155th Brigade of the 78th Division took over the front line from the 4th Brigade. Command passed to the 78th Division at 10.00 A.M. on the 16th and the troops marched to the Ansauville area, near Domèvre-en-Haye, fifteen miles to the rear. The artillery was last to leave the line and rejoined the division on the 17th.³⁶

General Brown now relinquished duty as Chief of Staff of the division to assume the corresponding post at headquarters of the IV Corps (General Dickman). Colonel J. C. Rhea, who had been Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations, became Chief of Staff, and Colonel H. B. Myers took Colonel Rhea's former place.

As soon as the division was assembled, it marched farther to the rear, to Toul, where headquarters opened at 10.00 A.M., September 21st. A few replacements were received and as the division had been over-strength on September 10th, these sufficed to fill all gaps. For a few days the troops were allowed to rest and refit.

The St. Mihiel offensive is remarkable in our World War history in that it was the first assembly of an American army for an independent operation under American command. Its result was an achievement of great significance. It proved—if any proof was called for—that a great American force of over half a million men could be concentrated and successfully led by our own officers. It stands, perhaps, as the greatest achievement in our annals of American staff work. The enemy had occupied the salient for four years and had strengthened its natural features with field fortifications. They were familiar with every yard of the terrain. Earlier heavy French attacks had been repulsed. The American army was practically organized on the battlefield. Of the three American army corps headquarters and nine American divisions in the first line, two corps headquarters and four divisions had never before been engaged in offensive combat. Furthermore, it was necessary to issue orders in advance of the attack for the early withdrawal and movements to other theaters of operations of two corps headquarters, four first-line divisions, practically all the army and corps artillery, and the army and corps reserve. Between September 1st and 11th 600,000 men were brought into their combat positions, the first movement starting August 28th and the last ending September 11th. All movements, except by rail, were carried out under the cover of darkness, the troops concealed in billets or woods during daylight hours.³⁷

The part played in this attack by the 2d Division was distinguished. General Pershing in his description of the St. Mihiel Operation says that in making the battle dispositions, he selected three of his older divisions for position in the southern face of the salient, opposite the open spaces "to enable them to flank the wooded areas quickly, thus aiding the advance of the less experienced units assigned to these areas." The 2d Division was one of the three.

John J. Pershing in "My Experiences in the World War," II, 268, says:

"One brigade of the 2d Division—the 9th and 23d Infantry, made a capture in the fight possibly never outdone by a single brigade. In the taking of Thiaucourt, 3000 prisoners, 92 pieces of artillery already loaded in railway cars and about to be removed to the rear, a complete hospital train, a trainload of ammunition, a train of 52 empty goods cars, lumber yards, depots, and other supplies, fell to these two regiments."
    (AEF, Major-General Hunter Liggett, N.Y., 1929, 235.)

After the St. Mihiel attack the Germans were expecting a continued offensive along the same front. General Max von Gallwitz, writing of the uncertainty of the Germans as to the Allied intentions, says: "Was the attack really postponed? It seemed so from the fact that the 2d Division, A.E.F. (known to us as a crack unit and stationed opposite the Michel Position) had meanwhile been replaced".³⁸