BRIEF mention was made in Chapter XII of Marshal Foch's visit to General Pershing on August 30th. It will be well at this point to discuss this visit a little more in detail.

The final blow, it will be remembered, was to be an attack in the direction of Mézières, the key point to the German lateral communications. The St. Mihiel operation was to be strictly limited in its scope and treated as a preliminary to the main offensive. This main offensive was described by the Marshal as follows: " (1) An offensive covered on the East by the Meuse, in the general direction of Mézières, on both banks of the Aisne, including: (a) an attack between the Meuse and the Argonne by the French Second Army, reinforced by American troops (four to six divisions); to be prepared at once and delivered as soon as possible after that in the Woëvre. (b) A French and American attack from the Argonne to the Souain Road, to be prepared without delay and delivered a few days after the one outlined above. This attack will be delivered by an American army on the right, astride the Aisne, and by the French Fourth Army on the left extending to the Souain Road."

In the strategic scheme, General Pershing fully concurred, but he suggested certain changes in the method of execution.¹

The most important point that he raised was that the arrangement scattered the American troops. He proposed that the offensive front between the Meuse and Argonne be assigned to the Americans; that front west of the Argonne to the French. The Marshal objected to the formation of so large an American army because its artillery, air force and services of all kinds were deficient and would have to be supplied by the French. The conclusive answer to this was that this condition resulted from the urgent requests of the British and French themselves, that priority be given to transportation of American infantry at the expense of everything else; that this unbalanced shipment had been made with the distinct understanding that the necessary auxiliaries would be provided.

A secondary point was, that American supply and transport plans, and all work in the rear areas, had been based upon the idea that the American front would ultimately extend from the Meuse to the Swiss border. The First Army was to find some difficulty in making its original entry into line at St. Mihiel on the extreme left of its contemplated front. This difficulty would be greatly intensified if it were now to extend its left instead of its right. This point, however, was regarded as a matter of detail, not of principle, and was not pressed.

The main contention was evidently just and Marshal Foch concurred. Generals Pétain and Pershing came to his headquarters on September 2d and the following decisions were made:²

"The attack west of the Meuse will be made by the American Army, covered on its right by the river and supported on its left by an attack of the French Fourth Army. It will be prepared without delay, to be delivered between the 20th and 25th of September.

"The American army will engage in this attack all the forces which it can assemble (twelve to fourteen divisions), and will make use of all troops concentrated for the St. Mihiel attack which may be or may be made available. The front of attack will be from the Meuse westward at least to the Argonne.

"The organization of communications in the region of the Meuse makes it necessary that the forces on both flanks shall be under the same command. Therefore General Pershing, who already holds the command on the St. Mihiel front, will take command also, for the attack west of the Meuse, of the present front of the French Second Army, extending at least to the Argonne. The French Divisions holding the quiet front east of the Meuse will for the time being remain there under American command.

"The operations will be under the general direction of the General Commanding the Armies of the North and Northeast (General Pétain)."

In the preliminary discussions, the St. Mihiel attack was designated as "Operation A". The Meuse-Argonne operations was referred to as "B," and the attack of the French Fourth Army as "C". On the left of the Fourth Army, the Fifth was charged with an "Operation D," having as its object the capture of the northern defenses of Reims and the advance of the line here to the Aisne in order to avoid the formation of a salient.³

Mézières has been referred to above as the key point of the German lateral communications. It will be well at this point to consider why this was so.

The whole German line, from Champagne to Flanders, was gradually falling back. The last stand, in front of the border, was the Antwerp-Meuse line. On the extreme right, the withdrawal zone was sixty miles deep, and the successive defense lines were well separated. On the left, at Verdun, it was scarcely fifteen, and the lines were close together. If this could not be held as a pivot, the armies farther north could not be withdrawn.

Two railway systems served the front—one in the north, through Liege, the other in the south, through Luxemburg and Metz. Between the two lay the hill country of the Ardennes. An Allied advance in the north would push the Germans directly back along their line of communication; an advance in the south threatened the lateral railway through Longuyon, Sedan and Mézières. If this road should be broken before the withdrawal in the north was complete, the armies would be cut in two.

The operations of the American First and the French Fourth Armies were therefore parts of the same offensive, and were covered by a single set of directives from General Pétain.⁴ The two armies were to attack simultaneously, about September 25th, and work in the closest cooperation.

The American concentration for this operation was extremely complicated. In the first place, it involved extending the left of the First Army from Watronville, southeast of Verdun, to the western edge of the Argonne—a distance of fifty-five miles, in territory through which we had not originally planned to operate, and where we had no supply installations. Six French and Italian divisions had to be relieved from the front line and seven from reserve positions without attracting attention to their withdrawal, to the arrival of the Americans, or to the withdrawal of those Americans from their previous positions. The importance of surprise had been most strongly emphasized by General Pétain. He had directed that the old outpost should remain in position as a screen for the reliefs, until two days before the attack; that the movement of artillery and supplies should be delayed until the last possible moment; that fire for adjustment should be kept to the irreducible minimum; that the telephone should not be used below regimental headquarters; and that even the troops concerned should be kept in ignorance of the precise purpose of their movements. Measures were taken to spread the impression that the Americans were to extend their St. Mihiel operations, and attack in the Vosges; also that the French were expecting a German attack at Rheims, and actively preparing to meet it.^{4, 5}

To facilitate the troop movements and the transfer of installations in the rear areas, General Hirschauer maintained. his Second Army headquarters at Laheycourt, with full control of all troops concerned except as to their tactical employment, and acting under General Pershing's supervision. For the administration of the rear areas, a special French organization was set up, reporting direct to General Pétain.⁶

Of the twenty-nine American divisions ready for service in France, fifteen were engaged in the St. Mihiel operation. Five were holding quiet sectors; two were with the British forces; three were just coming out of the line after active operations on the Vesle; and four were in training areas.

Plans for the new operation called for three corps headquarters, nine divisions in front line and six in reserve. One corps headquarters, the III (General Bullard) was on the Vesle, not in line and immediately available; the other two (I, General Liggett, and V, General Cameron) were at St. Mihiel, and could not move until the lines there began to stabilize. For the front line, the most immediately available divisions were designated—two from quiet sectors, two from the Vesle, one from a rear area and four from the St. Mihiel where they were wholly or partly in reserve. For the second line, two divisions were to come from quiet sectors, one from the Vesle, and three from the St. Mihiel front line.

Seven divisions would have to be left on the St. Mihiel front. Three had recently arrived in France, and were not equipped adequately for active campaign; they could be used to relieve others in quiet sectors. General Pétain, anxious to avoid attracting attention to changes, directed that they relieve American, not French troops.

Concentration was in progress at the same time in the Fourth Army area on the left, and the St. Mihiel front was active on the right, greatly restricting the use of railways and roads. All movements were made under cover of darkness. Only one division was started for its place before the St. Mihiel attack. One moved on the day of that attack, September 12th, the others between the 14th and 24th. The concentration of corps and army troops, and provisions for supply, was even more complicated than the movement of divisions.^6a,7

The attack was actually made on September 26th. In the two weeks before it, 220,000 men were moved out of the area, and 600,000 into it, besides all equipment and supplies. The number of guns employed was 2,700, nearly 100 of which were heavy long range pieces. There were no heavy tanks, but 189 light ones were assembled, 142 of them manned by Americans. There were 821 airplanes, 604 of them with American pilots.⁸

If the reader now turns to the statistics which he skipped, a few pages back, as to the selection and movement of American divisions, he will find that they do not balance. Twenty-nine divisions are set down as available; only twenty-seven have been accounted for—fifteen for the Meuse-Argonne front, seven left at St. Mihiel, two with the British and three in quiet sectors. Where were the other two? The question is one of importance to us, for one of them was the 2d.

The attack of the French Fourth Army was planned in several phases—an initial break-through followed immediately by other advances.⁹

On September 16th General Pétain had asked General Pershing to lend him three divisions for use in the second phase of the Fourth Army attack. On the 18th, General Pershing had replied that he could provide at once two of the newly arrived divisions without artillery and might be able to send a third division later.¹⁰

As the concentration plans assumed definite form, he found that he could do better; instead of one of the incomplete divisions, he could send the 2d Division complete which was then at Toul. The other division, without artillery, would be the 36th, then in its training area at Bar-sur-Aube. These divisions were ordered to the Fourth Army area by rail, the first, elements of the 2d to reach Chalons on the evening of September 25th, those of the 36th to reach Epernay on the evening of the 26th.¹¹ News of the movement reached the 2d Division by telephone on the morning of the 24th; division orders were issued at 12.30 P.M. and entrainment began at 3.00 A.M. on the 25th. Motor transport moved by road. Division headquarters opened at Mairy-sur-Marne (Marne) at noon on the 26th. The movement was completed on the 28th; the division was approximately at full strength in men, slightly over strength in officers.¹² The movement was continued by road, dismounted troops in trucks to Suippes (Marne) where headquarters were opened at 10.00 A.M., September 30th. The division was now in the territory of the French Fourth Army (General Gouraud) but formed a part of the reserve of the Group of Armies of the Center (General Maistre).¹³

General Lejeune, meanwhile, had called daily upon General Gouraud at Chalons, assuming that his division would probably be used in that army, and so kept fully informed as to the progress of operations.¹⁴ On September 28th he heard from French officers the report that the division would be divided and sent into the line by brigades to reinforce French divisions. Much concerned at this, he at once went to Chalons to make inquiries. General Gouraud showed him on the map the whole situation. The First American Army had broken the Hagen and Volker positions, and was in contact with the Kriemhilde position, from Vilosnes-sur-Meuse, through Nantillois to the Argonne at Apremont, and connected with the French Fourth Army at Binarville. The French had pushed a wedge forward towards Monthois and were in contact with the westward extension of the Kriemhilde position at Marvaux but on the left they were still held by the prolongation of the Volker position north of Somme-Py. Here the Germans were holding vigorously.

General Gouraud then pointed out the high hills east of Rheims, and explained that from previous sad experience the French had come to look upon the defense there as impregnable. The idea was therefore to flank them out. The Fifth Army was to cooperate from the west the Fourth would have to take the Blanc Mont ridge, north of Somme-Py. If this could be accomplished, little more difficulty was expected south of the Aisne.

General Lejeune after studying the situation said: "General, if the 2d Division is kept together as a unit and is allowed to attack on a narrow front, I am confident that it can take Blanc Mont Ridge by a single assault." The division not being yet a part of the Fourth Army, General Gouraud could not give a definite reply, but promised to refer the matter to General Pétain. The next morning he sent for General Lejeune and told him that the 2d Division had been placed at his disposal and would be moved forward as soon as it was concentrated.¹⁵

Orders were issued accordingly. As it chanced, this particular part of the line was held by the XXI Corps (General Naulin) in which the division had served at Chateau-Thierry, so it was here at home. It moved directly into the front line, relieving the French 61st Division and a part of the 21st. The latter division belonged to the XI Corps on the left and the corps boundary was therefore moved one battalion front to the west.¹⁶

Opposed to the XXI Corps was the German XII Corps (General Krug von Nidda) known locally as the "Py Group." It was the right corps of the Third Army (General von Einem). On its left was the XVI Corps or "Perthes Group"; on its right, the XXIV Corps or "Langer Group" of the First Army (General von Mudra). Both of these armies belonged to the Army Group of the German Crown Prince.¹⁷

The front taken over by the 2d Division measured two miles, and lay in an old German trench system. This system was about five hundred yards deep, and consisted of four main lines. The old front line, known as the Krefeld trench, was on the northern edge of Somme-Py. North of it were successively, Prussian, Elbe and Essen trenches. East of Somme-Py, Krefeld bent back and connected with Prussian; west of the village, Prussian bent back in a switch line known as Pasha trench, and connected with Elbe.

When the Americans took over, the right of their front line was placed in Essen trench. West of Somme-Py the Germans still held this trench; five hundred yards west of the division left, it bent around and included an elevation called by the Germans Helenen Hill and by the Americans, Essen Hook, which commanded and enfiladed the trench line. This hill was strongly fortified and had several large concrete machine gun emplacements, giving all-around fire.

The country is rolling, with fairly steep slopes, and covered with patches of scrub pine; these, along the front lines, had been devastated by shell fire. The ground is a chalky limestone, showing clear and white wherever the surface is torn up. This limestone gives its name to Blanc Mont, three miles northwest of Somme-Py, the principal hill of the region, rising two hundred feet above the level of the valley of the little stream called the Py.¹⁸

The division moved in on the night of October 1-2. The 4th Brigade occupied the front line in the trench system, the 5th Marines on the right, the 6th on the left. The 3d Brigade was in support in another old German position south of the Navarin Farm ridge, four miles in rear. The artillery brigade went into position south and southwest of Somme-Py. Division headquarters were established in a group of dugouts known as Wagram, beside the main road a mile north of Souain, in rear of the 3d Brigade. In this devastated country landmarks were few and the troops had great difficulty in finding their positions in the dark.¹⁹

A general attack by the whole army was ordered for October 2d, but for the XXI Corps this was postponed until the 3d and the day devoted to an attempt to clean up Essen Trench. The 170th Division, on the right of the 2d, was already well advanced, its line running northeast from Somme-Py. The 21st Division, on the left, was unable to take Essen Hook; its front line was 150 yards south of Elbe trench. It expected to renew the attack early on the morning of the 3d; but meanwhile Essen trench in the 2d Division territory was subject to enfilade. It was, however, occupied with but little difficulty.²⁰

The general attack was made on October 3d at 5.50 A.M. The corps orders were not received until late in the evening of the 2d, so the division order based upon it was not issued until 11.00 P.M. This order reached the 4th Brigade at 4.40 A.M.; the commanding officer of the leading battalion received his copy just as the advance began and read it after reaching his objective. Fortunately, the written order was necessary only as a memorandum; a conference had been held on the 2d at which the details had been explained.²¹

The attack prescribed for the 2d Division was a complicated one. The objective was the Medeah Farm—Blanc Mont Road, a line two and a half miles long, two miles distant. The brigades were to attack side by side, but with an interval of a mile between them, converging and connecting on the objective. Each brigade was to be in column of battalions deployed on the entire brigade front.

In the 4th Brigade, the 6th Marines was to advance on the front actually held. The 5th was to stand fast until the 6th had cleared, then move by the left flank and follow in support. The 3d Brigade was to move into the territory of the division on the right, and pass through the front lines of that division, which, it will be remembered, ran northeast. Each brigade was assisted by a battalion of French tanks. By this converging maneuver, it was -expected that the 3d Brigade would be able to enfilade the Blanc Mont lines and assist the 4th Brigade to take them. The triangle between the brigades would be cleared up later. It was anticipated that the 21st Division, on the left, might be unable to progress. The 4th Brigade was therefore cautioned that it must take care of its own flank, designating a battalion to push in through the Bois du Fourmilier toward Essen Hook.

The 2d Field Artillery Brigade was strongly reinforced for this operation. To it was attached the artillery of the French 28th and 61st Divisions, already in position—the 29th and 35th Field Artillery, 75 mm. guns; a battalion of the 111th and one of the 315th Heavy Artillery, 155 mm. howitzers; also a battalion of the 452d Heavy artillery, 120 mm. rifles of the corps. This gave thirty light and eighteen heavy batteries. The artillery preparation for the attack was made extremely brief, only five minutes, but also extremely intense, all guns firing at maximum rate. During the attack the American light regiments fired a rolling barrage, the 12th Field Artillery for the 4th Brigade and the 15th for the 3d Brigade, progressing 100 meters every four minutes. The French light regiments fired upon successive points in advance of the barrage, and laid smoke screens in selected places. Four batteries of heavy howitzers fired continuously upon Blanc Mont ridge, the other eight upon successive points in advance of the barrage. The long range rifles fired upon points in the German rear areas.²²

The 4th Brigade took up its attack formation without difficulty, and advanced at the time ordered. In the 6th Marines (Colonel Lee), the 2d Battalion (Major Williams) led, followed in turn by the 1st Battalion (Major Barker) and the 3d Battalion (Major Shuler). Then came the 5th Marines (Colonel Feland) with the 2d Battalion (Major Messersmith), 3d Battalion (Captain Larsen) and 1st Battalion (Major Hamilton). The two regimental machine gun companies and the four companies of the 6th Machine Gun Battalion (Major Waller) furnished a company to each battalion. The two leading battalions each had a company of twelve light tanks.²³

The 4th Machine Gun Battalion (Major Bruce), division reserve, followed this brigade as protection for its left and rear.

The 3d Brigade had more difficulty. To reach its starting line, it had to make a night march of five miles through the rear areas of the French 170th Division. A hasty reconnaissance on the afternoon of October 2d showed that the designated line was in the hands of the Germans, the 170th Division having been forced back half a mile by a counter-attack. The new line was located, and the French agreed to furnish guides to lead the troops to it.

About 5.00 P.M. the brigade started, but as much of the ground to be covered was under German observation the movement had to be made in small groups, and was slow. After dark the march was by compass bearing, no landmarks existing. The French guides were never found the 170th Division was itself being relieved that night by the 167th, and apparently neither division sent them.

The 9th Infantry (Colonel Stuart) had been designated to lead; the order of its battalions was to be 1st (Captain Platner), 2d (Lieutenant Colonel Arnold), 3d (Major Denig). The 1st Battalion reached the line, and formed up with two companies in front and two in support; but it had gotten 500 yards to left of its intended position, and the regimental commander, not having any report from it at 5.00 A.M., feared that it was lost. He therefore directed the 2d Battalion to take its place as a result, after the attack had started, the two battalions were found to be side by side. The 3d Battalion found its proper position in support, and the 23d Infantry arrived just in time to follow as ordered. Tanks and machine gun companies were disposed as in the 4th Brigade; the machine gun companies, other than those of the regiments, were furnished by the 5th Machine Gun Battalion (Captain Moulton).²⁴

The German regiment immediately opposed to the 3d Brigade was the 410th Infantry, 203d Division, with a pioneer detachment. These were the troops that had made the counterattack on the preceding day; their position was not yet well organized, and had no connection with the adjoining units. The division commander had ordered an attack for 9.00 A.M. on the 3d to establish a defensible divisional line. The American advance swept this regiment away almost unresisting; that night, only 150 men could be collected, and about 75 stragglers came in the next day. The losses of the regiment on the 3d were 2 officers (including Major Neuhaus, the regimental commander) and 6 men killed, 6 officers and 46 men wounded, 19 officers and 731 men missing.²⁵

Coming in obliquely from the southeast, the advance of the brigade now brought it into the territory of the 51st Reserve Division. The French 167th Division was keeping abreast on the right, so that flank was secure; no serious trouble is reported with the few Germans in the triangular pocket on the left—a part of the 235th Reserve Infantry, 51st Reserve Division. This regiment had suffered severely in the last few days, and now had only two battalions available, the rifle companies of the 1st Battalion having been lent to the division on the right and not yet returned. Provisionally organized in six weak rifle and three machine gun companies, and with a few pioneers attached, it was spread over a front of 3000 yards, practically without supports.²⁶ The 234th Reserve Infantry of the same division, was on the left of the 235th, facing the 3d Brigade; the 236th was reorganizing in rear. The brigade commander (who, by the way, was Colonel von Ledebur, whom we have already met as Chief of Staff of Army Detachment "C," at St. Mihiel) ²⁷ intended to send the 236th into line on the night of October 3-4, and to withdraw the 234th to reserve for reorganization. Both regiments were weak and in poor condition after the previous few days' fighting, and neither offered any serious resistance.²⁸ Colonel von Ledebur called upon a battalion of the 74th Reserve Infantry, 213th Division, which was in corps reserve in his area, for a counter-attack; but that battalion had already been sent to another division.²⁹

The 3d Brigade took Medeah Farm and the entire objective at 8.40 A.M., without serious loss, and connection was established right and left.³⁰

As for the German brigade, Colonel von Ledebur reported at 9.00 A.M. and again at 1.00 P.M. that he had no news whatever of his regiments. Stragglers from them began to assemble, a little later, about Semide, near brigade headquarters, but at 3.00 P.M. he was compelled to report that their fighting value was zero. The total strength of the three regiments the next day was 650.^{29, 31}

The 4th Brigade met little opposition from the front. It encountered the right battalion of the 235th, but swept it away without difficulty. As it approached Blanc Mont, its left entered the rear area of the German 200th Division, but encountered none of its important troop units, they being hotly engaged with the French 21st Division on the front line.

On Blanc Mont, in dugouts, were the headquarters of both the infantry and artillery commands of the 200th Division; also a division observation station. The observer, Lieutenant Richert, kept the division commander informed of the progress of events, which was very favorable in the front lines but most unsatisfactory on Blanc Mont. At 8.15 he reported that the Americans were on the hill—from the dugout he could hear their voices; the Jäger regiments in the front lines were holding their own. The division commander, in reply, ordered use of all available reserves to check the American advance.

Headquarters of the 2d Jäger Brigade now abandoned Blanc Mont and went to the rear; Lieutenant Richert and the artillery headquarters remained. The Americans, at 8.30 were coming closer; they found and captured some of the headquarters detachment. So far, their force seemed to be only about a battalion. The division commander ordered that an attempt be made to find the 149th Infantry, of the 213th Division, which had been placed in his area, and to organize a counter-attack with it—or with anything else. At the same time he called upon the corps for help, and it was at this time that the battalion of the 74th, which Colonel von Ledebur had sought in vain, was sent over for an ineffectual effort. At nine o'clock things looked a bit better; the Americans were mostly along the road; and had left only weak outposts on the hill. But at 9.20 the telephone operator called out that the Americans had found the dugout and were demanding surrender; then the line went out. The entire force at artillery headquarters and the division advanced station were captured.³²

But the Jäger regiments were withstanding all attacks of the French 21st Division. This left the machine guns at Essen Hook free to fire upon the Americans, and each battalion as it passed had to take measures to protect its flank. This situation had been anticipated, however, and the advance was not delayed. According to plan, the rear battalion, as it passed, dropped off a company with machine guns, which attacked westward, surrounded and finally took Essen Hook. The hill was turned over to the French, and the company rejoined its battalion at about noon.³³

The 21st Division did not advance, however, and the Hook was later reoccupied by the Germans. From here, and from all the rear area of the 200th Division, most galling fire reached the flanks of the 4th Brigade. Blanc Mont itself was only partly held; the Germans were still on the western portion of it, in the territory of the French division. As a temporary expedient, the rear battalion formed front to the left, and the 4th Machine Gun Battalion took position to support it and to fire upon the Hook.³⁴

As a more effective measure, the corps commander directed the infantry of the 170th Division, which had just been relieved from the line by the 167th, to move westward across the rear area of the 2d, and take position facing west, parallel to and a thousand yards outside its left boundary. The artillery of the 170th was to remain in place, supporting the 167th; its own division would not require it, since its front would be swept by the artillery of the whole XI Corps. It was expressly stated, however, that the 2d Division must continue to push forward, protecting its own flank until the arrival of the 170th.³⁵

The attack of the 2d Division had been so successful that there seemed a possibility of a complete break through. To take advantage of an opportunity, the French 3d Cavalry was ordered to send its advance guard brigade north of Somme-Py, and its leading squadrons farther to the front, with a view to the use of the whole cavalry division in the direction of Machault. The cavalry division sent an officer to headquarters of the 2d Division to maintain connection, but no occasion for its use was found.³⁶

The 2d Division consolidated the position gained, and began moving artillery forward. One battalion from each American light regiment moved at 9.30 to position north of Somme-Py; the rear battalions followed as soon as these were in position. The American heavy regiment, and one battalion of the French long rifles, also moved to the same vicinity in the course of the day. The artillery of the French 61st Division (nine light and three heavy batteries) was placed under the orders of the XI Corps, and ceased to act with the 2d Division.³⁷

The Blanc Mont-Médéah line had been assigned as a first objective; the original corps order had called for exploitation, and the division attack order had notified the brigade to be ready for further advance. This further advance was made late in the afternoon.³⁸

The 23d Infantry passed through the lines of the 9th, and pushed forward in column of battalions. The 9th followed in support. Similarly, in the 4th Brigade, the 5th Marines passed through the 6th and took the lead. But neither the 167th Division, on the right, nor the 21st, on the left, made any progress, and the Americans received fire from both flanks, besides powerful artillery fire from the front.

The farthest advance was in the center, where the 23d Infantry, bearing a little to the left of its proper direction, gained something over a mile. The only enemy now facing the regiment was the remnant of the 15th Bavarian Division, which had come out of the line at Orfeuil, exhausted, the day before, and was now thrown into the line in desperation—the 31st Bavarian Infantry (Major Reiss), which could assemble 120 men, and about 80 men from the other two regiments of the division.³⁹ But fire from both flanks made any further advance impossible. Two battalions of the 9th came up on the right, covered that flank, and connected with the French at Medeah Farm.4° The left of the 4th Brigade was completely exposed. The division on the left was still back at Essen Trench; the 170th Division was not yet in position to give any support. Any advance on that flank was entirely out of the question, but the 5th Marines succeeded, late in the evening, in working its right forward to connect with the 23d.⁴¹

The advance had been supported by the 12th and 15th Field Artillery, firing rolling barrage. The French 29th Field Artillery and all the howitzers fired in advance of the barrage, and the long rifles fired for counter-battery and upon long range targets. The foothold gained upon Blanc Mont was of the greatest advantage to the artillery. From this elevation, its observers had a good view of the German front lines and of his rear areas for a distance of four miles. Hostile batteries were discovered and silenced, and troops assembling for counter-attack were scattered.⁴²

The situation that night was precarious—the division held a salient a mile and a half deep, a mile wide at the base and only 500 yards wide for the last half mile.

With the whole Allied front now advancing, Marshal Foch was urgently calling for action and more action. On October 4th he wrote to General Pétain estimating the results of the eight days of battle.⁴³ The Fourth Army, he conceded, had done fairly well, but not as well as he had hoped and expected. In particular, he characterized October 3d as "a battle which was not commanded, not pressed, not held together. . . . Some army corps were inert; some did not maneuver; others wore themselves out in gaining successes, but failed to exploit them." He added, that the same remarks applied, in some degree, to other armies than the Fourth. He urged, therefore, that the commanders of armies and groups of armies get farther to the front, see conditions for themselves, and direct operations personally.

General Pétain passed these comments on, in restrained and diplomatic language, to the commanders of his groups of armies. They went to the troops of the XXI Corps in the form of a very brief note—"Marshal Foch orders strong pressure in the directions already assigned; everyone forward, without halt".⁴⁴ Nothing more was necessary, for the same instructions had come through, in a form more directly applicable to this corps, on the afternoon of the 3d:—"Marshal Foch has just learned of the success of the XXI Corps, and of the American 2d Division, attached to it. He directs that this success be exploited to the limit. All must press forward at once, without hesitation. The breach is made; the enemy must not be given time to repair it".⁴⁵

This was received in the 2d Division at 10.25 P.M., on the 3d, together with the corps order for putting it in effect.⁴⁶ These provided for a renewal of the attack at 9.50 the next morning. The 2d Division was to retain its place in the line as the left flank division of the corps; in the center, the 73d Division would relieve the 167th on the night of October 3-4; and on the left, the 124th would relieve the 43d the next night. From Medeah Farm eastward, the line of the XXI Corps was reported as running fairly straight, south of the Médéah-Orfeuil Road; the 2d Division was in a sharp salient with the leading squadrons of the 3d Cavalry Division in its rear area; the XI Corps was still at Essen Trench, and the 170th Division, facing west, connected the two corps.

The XI Corps issued similar orders. Its difficulties, on the 3d, had been not so much with Essen Trench as with the very powerful defense of Notre Dame Des Champs and St. Marie-A-Py, in front of its center and left. As has been explained above, it was not General Pétain's intention that these should be taken by a frontal attack, but rather that they should be flanked out by the Fourth Army on the east and the Fifth Army on the west. Therefore, the 151st Division, on the left of the corps, was to maintain close contact with the enemy, and advance when the flank pressure became effective. The 22d Division was to relieve the 21st, at Essen Trench, attack vigorously to the northwest to maintain connection with the Americans, and prepare to push its left westward north of the Notre Dame des Champs Ridge.⁴⁷

The 2d Division ordered preparation for an advance beyond St. Etienne, but the time for this attack was not fixed. It was out of the question to push the salient any deeper; it was necessary to wait for the divisions on the flanks to come up.⁴⁸ In the course of the morning, however, the 5th Marines continued the advance initiated the evening before, and succeeded in occupying the ridge a mile southeast of St. Etienne, suffering severely from flank fire. In this advance the 3d Battalion (Captain Larsen) led, the other two battalions following and doing what they could to protect the exposed flank. This somewhat relieved the pressure upon the 23d. Infantry, but brought the Marines into an even more precarious position. In the afternoon the attack was continued, but such gains as were made could not be held.⁴⁹

On the eastern flank of the salient, the 3d Brigade had been actively engaged all the morning. Major Reiss' composite command, the fragments of the 15th Bavarian Division, made a dashing attack upon it about six o'clock, which at first gained some ground but was finally repulsed. The 2d Battalion, 9th Infantry (Lieutenant Colonel Arnold) bore the brunt of this attack. About noon, reports as to the progress of the divisions on the right and left were encouraging, and 2.30 P.M. was fixed as the hour for the attack ordered in the morning. The 3d Brigade attempted an advance, the 23d Infantry leading, with the 9th in support. Starting from a narrow salient, this attack had both flanks in the air; it was soon brought to a standstill, and the brigade commander ordered the troops to fall back to their original position. In this withdrawal, serious complications were narrowly avoided; the order had reference to the afternoon's line of departure, but was understood to mean the objective gained in the attack of the day before. The error was discovered before it was too late, and the proper line was reoccupied.⁵⁰

The French 73d Division had made strenuous but unsuccessful efforts to come up on the right. The 22d Division had been directed too much to the west to give direct support to the left. The American 3d Brigade and the 5th Marines could advance no more with exposed flanks. The next thing to do, obviously, was to clear Blanc Mont. This meant the 6th Marines and the French 22d Division.

The 3d Battalion (Major Shuler) of the 6th reconnoitered in force, and approximately located the active machine gun nests on the western end of the ridge. Artillery support was asked for, and an attack started late in the afternoon. The support, as it proved, was inadequate, so the attack was broken off after considerable loss, and postponed until the next day, when more and better directed artillery fire could be secured; but even this partial attack had seriously disorganized the German defenses. The force here was the remnant of the 149th Infantry (Major Grundel), belonging to the 213th Division but serving under the orders of the 2d Jäger Brigade, 200th Division. At about dark the 3d Battalion of the regiment was so completely scattered by a sudden dash of the Americans that up to 11:00 P.M. the battalion commander had been able to collect only ten men, and the 2d Battalion was completely cut off. The regimental commander barely escaped capture. The 2d Battalion remained "lost" until the next afternoon, when a pigeon brought a message from Lieutenant Gerch, its commander, reporting its situation and requesting relief. An attempt was made to establish communication with it by airplane, but Lieutenant Horn, the pilot, returned at 3.45 P.M. with 37 bullets in his plane, and reported that although he had flown over Blanc Mont at a height of fifty meters he had been unable to find any German troops. By that time they were prisoners in American hands.⁵¹

During the afternoon of October 4th General Spire, commanding the French 22d Division, had become more familiar with the situation, and changed the direction of his right regiment from northwest to north. Hence, when Major Shuler's battalion renewed the attack at 6.15 A.M., October 5th, there was not only a powerful artillery support but also cooperation from the French, and Blanc Mont was finally and completely occupied without difficulty. Nearly 300 prisoners, with 80 machine guns and other war material, were taken by the Americans. Elements of the French 170th Division assisted without orders in this advance.⁵²

The fighting of the Germans, on the 5th and 6th was primarily for the purpose of securing their retreat. The Crown Prince issued orders on October 3d for withdrawal to the "fourth line of resistance," which was the westward extension of the Brunhilde position in the Argonne, and here ran through Orfeuil and St. Etienne. This movement was dictated by the general situation; but at this point at least it was dictated also by the condition of the troops. Even after its experiences at Château-Thierry and Soissons, the 2d Division was finding this battle excessively costly and exhausting, but the Germans, tired already when the Americans came in, were dangerously close to the breaking point. All their regimental and battalion reports, during these days, emphasize the exhaustion of the men, and urgently call for the relief which higher authority could not furnish. The 200th Division, opposing the 2d, reported on October 4th that the total rifle strength of its three regiments was only 500; that the artillery had lost nearly all of its gunners and No. 1 cannoneers, and from 60 to 70 per cent of its horses; that the few remaining horses were worn out, a third of the guns unserviceable, and the rest in need of overhaul; that the divisional telephone and radio detachments had lost 25 per cent of their men, and the blinker detachment was annihilated; that only two officers and forty men were left of the divisional engineers; and that the cavalry squadron was totally dismounted.⁵³

Owing to the general disorganization and the disruption of communications, the German artillery fire was very poorly regulated, and the messages of almost every infantry unit contain complaints of shelling by their own artillery. The only fresh divisions available for the XII Corps were the 14th Reserve, just in from Alsace, and the 195th, brought over in haste from the St. Mihiel front.

The divisions of the XII Corps were badly mixed, and the corps commander's orders provided for reorganizing these in the withdrawal to the rear line. The 200th Division was ordered to put its own regiments on the right, and turn over to the 51st Reserve Division, on its left, those elements of the 213th attached to it. The regiments properly belonging to the 51st had been eliminated from action on October 3d, as described above that division was now to regroup the troops under its command, which belonged mostly to the 213th and 17th Divisions and then withdraw its headquarters, turning over its front to those two divisions. The 203d Division and 3d Guard Division would retain their places in line, detachments rejoining them. The movements were ordered for the night of October 4-5.⁵⁴

On the French side, General Naulin ordered a further advance by the XXI Corps. The 124th Division relieved the 43d as the right element of the corps, the 73d in the center and the American 2d on the left retained their places. The 13th, 167th and 170th were in second line. The whole line was ordered to press forward but in particular, the 73d and 124th Divisions were urged to come up abreast of the 2d, "whose brilliant advance has caused the retreat of the enemy, but whose flanks are now exposed." No hour for the attack was fixed, it was to be decided after consultation with the adjacent corps, which were also to advance. In conformity with this plan, the 2d Division ordered an advance in line of brigades in column of regiments, regulating upon the divisions on the right and left.⁵⁵

Until the 73d Division could come up, there was no advance for the 3d Brigade. Its only important action for the day was to rectify its position, shifting the 23d Infantry over from 4th Brigade territory into its proper limits.⁵⁶

In the 4th Brigade, the 5th Marines was ordered to stand fast. The 6th was to reorganize, and then pass through into the front line, conforming to the movement of the 22d Division on its left.⁵⁷

The early morning attack upon Blanc Mont was completed by nine o'clock, connection with the 22d Division was fully established, and the troops were ready to take up the general advance. The 5th Marines was keeping in touch by patrols with the 22d Division, and reported that it was coming up, apparently with no opposition. By noon, its progress had been so good that the 6th Marines began its advance, pushing forward its left and holding back its right to connect with the 3d Brigade.⁵⁸ The 2d Battalion (Major Williams) led, followed by the 3d (Major Shuler) and the 1st (Major Barker) each battalion with a machine gun company attached. Resistance was met at once, and the fighting was severe all day; toward 6.00 P.M. further advance was given up, checked by machine gun and artillery fire about a mile southeast of St. Etienne. The German troops in the immediate front were the partially reorganized 149th Infantry, and a part of the 368th, both of the 213th Division (General Baron von Hammerstein). The advance had been sufficient to give complete protection to the left flank of the 23d Infantry; but the losses had been very heavy, and the whole brigade was worn out.⁵⁹

On the left, the 22d Division made good progress. The Germans had withdrawn without resistance; the left of the division was beyond St. Pierre, and its right pushed patrols into St. Etienne. Fighting in the town was intermittent throughout the day, but the Germans could not be dislodged. A regiment of the fresh 195th Division had been sent to support the worn out 2d Jäger Brigade; and, so long as the Americans were held, the French flank was exposed. The 118th Infantry, the right regiment of the French front line, urgently called upon the Americans to come forward; its commanding officer said he was confident that the Germans were falling back to the line Machault-Cauroy, and would offer little resistance, on the Arnes; but it was a condition, not a theory, that confronted the Americans, and no further advance was possible until a concerted attack could be organized. For this it was too late that day.⁶⁰

The summary of the operations for this day, October 5th, prepared at headquarters of the German Third Army is of interest to the 2d Division.⁶¹ It reads in part: "On October 5th the enemy again attacked the Py and Perthes Groups, west of the Aisne, after powerful artillery preparation. His attacks, made in great force, were broken up by the stubborn resistance of our infantry, well supported by the artillery. The enemy's losses were heavy. . . . Captured papers describe the American 2d Division as an exceptionally fine assault division; they indicate that it was selected for employment here for the reason that this is considered the decisive point in the enemy's offensive."

It may be remarked here, parenthetically, that for the French and Americans the day of October 5th was twenty-five hours long; clocks were set back from "summer time" to Greenwich standard that night. The Germans had been using their Central European standard time since September 16th, so French and German clocks had been in agreement during this operation; from now on, both were on winter time, German clocks an hour faster. Here, and throughout this book. discrepancies in time have been eliminated, and German time amended, wherever there was a difference, to accord with French. In 1918, the French used summer time from March 10th to October 5th; the Germans from April 16th to September 15th.

During the night of October 5-6, arrangements were made to clean up the machine gun nests which were holding the Americans. These arrangements were elaborate and thorough; they included an advance on the entire 4th Brigade front by the 3d Battalion, 6th Marines, which passed from the second to first line for this purpose; an auxiliary attack by the 2d Battalion of the 23d Infantry to support Major Shuler's right and fire by all three regiments of the 2d Field Artillery Brigade on the entire division front. The artillery fire included an hour's bombardment of the enemy's line and immediate rear areas, commencing at 5:30 A.M., October 6th, and a rolling barrage. The advance was made and the St. Etienne-Orfeuil road was reached, ultimately, but not without hard fighting; nearly all the 23d Infantry became engaged, and parts of the 9th. Numerous messages were received from the French that they had taken St. Etienne, and wanted to turn it over to the Americans, in whose territory it lay; but these reports were highly optimistic, for while French elements had entered the town it was not yet cleared of Germans. The 2d and 22d Divisions were in connection south of St. Etienne."

Relief for the exhausted 2d Division now came in sight—the 71st Infantry Brigade (General Whitworth). This was the first unit to arrive of the American 36th Division (General W. R. Smith), which, it will be remembered, had been designated at the same time as the 2d for assignment to the French Fourth Army. This brigade had reached Suippes in trucks on the afternoon of October 5th, and a battalion commander had come forward and reported to General Lejeune. The general asked for the brigade at 6:10 P.M.; General Naulin approved the request, and it was granted by General Gouraud at 6:35. Later in the evening, General Naulin directed that the brigade should not be put into line at once, but should be allowed a day's rest."

Relief of the front line was made on the night of October 6-7, the 141st Infantry (Colonel Jackson) taking over the 3d Brigade front and the 142d (Colonel Bloor) that of the 4th Brigade. The 23d Infantry and the 5th Marines were withdrawn to Blanc Mont Ridge; the 9th Infantry and 6th Marines remained with the incoming regiments. Brigade machine gun battalions (the 5th and 6th) remained in position temporarily. The 37 mm. guns and Stokes mortars in the 2d Division front line were turned over to the incoming regiments."

General Naulin had considered making a new attack on October 7th, but had decided to postpone it until the 8th. Meanwhile, he suggested that the 2d Division advance its left beyond St. Etienne. General Lejeune, being consulted, answered that his own troops were exhausted, and in no condition to attack; that the 71st Brigade was in line and might be used, but in that case would not be fresh for the main attack. Further, he pointed out, that the trenches just beyond St. Etienne were a part of the German main line of resistance; if they should be taken, a counter-attack would follow, and then certainly the troops would be in a poor condition for attack on the 8th. After consultation with General Gouraud, General Naulin decided against the St. Etienne operation."

Preliminary instructions for the attack of October 8th had been issued by the XXI Corps on the 6th, and final orders at 8.45 P.M. on the 7th.⁶⁵ The 2d Division orders based upon these called for an attack by the 71st Brigade on the entire division front, for the purpose of taking the high ground two miles north of St. Etienne. The French 7th Division (General Bulot) which had relieved the 22d on the left, was directing its right upon Cauroy; the 73d Division (General Lebocq) on the right, was attacking the high ground north of Bemont Château. When this line had been gained, the whole line was to push forward, the 2d Division taking Machault with its right and the rest of the XXI Corps occupying the line of the Machault-Semide Road.⁶⁶

The flanks of the 71st Brigade were to be protected, and connection maintained with the French divisions, by troops of the 2d Division—one battalion of the 3d Brigade and the 4th Machine Gun Battalion on the right, one battalion of the 4th Brigade on the left. The rest of the infantry of the 2d Division remained in reserve. The 2d Field Artillery Brigade was to furnish the support; besides its own regiments, it had the French 29th Field Artillery, a battalion of the 341st Heavy Artillery (155 mm. howitzers) and one of the 452d Heavy Artillery (120 mm. rifles). The American light batteries were to fire a rolling barrage, French light batteries lay standing barrages and smoke screens, the heavier guns to attack designated targets farther back. There was to be a pause on an intermediate objective a mile north of St. Etienne, during which light batteries were to begin a change of position to the front.

The 71st Brigade had the 141st Infantry on the right, 142d on the left. They formed in column of battalions; the brigade machine gun battalion (the 132d) was divided between the regiments, so that, with the regimental machine guns, each battalion had a machine gun company. A battalion of French tanks was attached to each regiment.

The hour set for the advance was 5.15 A.M. The barrage was to reach the intermediate objective in 50 minutes, and stand there for half an hour at this point the second line battalions were to pass through. The barrage was then to move again, reach the objective at nine o'clock, and stand here another half hour while the third line battalions passed through and consolidated the position.⁶⁷

Little ground was gained, by the 2d Division or either of its neighbors. In the 71st Brigade, the orders reached the troops late, and the advance was consequently ragged. Besides this, the line held by it was irregular, following roughly the St. Étienne-Orfeuil road, but south of it except on the extreme left. This line not being accurately fixed, the initial barrage line was placed some three hundred yards north of the road. Hence German machine gun positions near the road were untouched by the barrage, and disorganized the attack before it had gotten fairly under way.

The 141st Infantry gained and held a position, only slightly in advance of the St. Étienne-Orfeuil Road. The French 73d Division was stopped also, and a gap opened between the two units. To fill this, the 2d Battalion of the 9th Infantry (Lieutenant Colonel Arnold), which had been designated for flank protection here, attacked the German strong point in the gap, and the new line was established.

The 142d Infantry started under the same conditions as the 141st. Nevertheless, its progress at first was good. It crossed the hill on the Medeah Road, southeast of St. Etienne, and captured the weak 2d Battalion (Captain Lottman) of the German 368th Infantry. Its left entered St. Etienne, and, with the French 7th Division, established a line there, suffering severely from fire from the formidable German position at the cemetery at the northeast corner of the town.

The 1st Battalion, 6th Marines (Major Barker) advanced on the left into St. Etienne, but was unable to get beyond. The right flank of the 142d, however, was unprotected.

Late in the afternoon the German 159th Infantry of the 14th Reserve Division, which had arrived in the area on October 4th, made a counter-attack, with powerful artillery support. The 142d was in no condition to withstand this—its right exposed, and all three battalions mixed together in one line. The regiment fell back to the northern slopes of the hill on the Medeah Road.⁶⁸

During the afternoon the 2d Engineers went into line the 1st Battalion (Major Steiner) relieved the exhausted 2d Battalion, 9th Infantry, and the 2d Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel Strong) reinforced the Marines at St. Etienne.⁶⁹

Corps orders for the 9th called for no general attack, but merely rectification of lines and strengthening of connections. Special mention was made of a trench system half a mile north of St. Etienne; the French 7th Division was understood to have reached it, and General Naulin was very anxious to have the Americans connect. Patrols were sent there, and the 71st Brigade was ordered to include this point in its lines, making, if necessary, a formal attack with artillery support. The brigade was in no position to undertake this, and no serious move was made.⁷⁰

The rest of the 36th Division was now near at hand, and was ordered to relieve the 2d on the night of October 9-10, command to pass at 10:00 A.M. Since the 36th was incomplete the 2d was to turn over to it the necessary means of transportation and other equipment, and was to leave its artillery and engineers attached to the incoming division. The relief was made without incident. The Germans were only too glad to be let alone, for they were withdrawing on that night to the Brunhilde position on the Aisne, leaving only one regiment from each division as rear guards.⁷¹

This withdrawal was of course discovered and the last official act of General Lejeune, before he turned over command to General Smith, was to order energetic patrolling by the 71st Brigade to clear up the situation. Special mention again was made of the trench system north of St. Etienne.⁷²

Since the 71st Brigade already occupied the entire front line, the relief did not affect it. The 72d Brigade moved into support and reserve positions, the 153d Infantry relieving the 3d Brigade and the 144th Infantry the 4th Brigade. The habitual 2d Division formation, line of brigades in column of regiments, was thus reversed, and the 36th Division was now in column of brigades in line of regiments. This did not conform to the instructions of the corps commander, who had ordered brigades abreast, but it was the only way in which the relief could be accomplished in the time allowed. The battalions of the front line regiments were thoroughly mixed, and it would have been out of the question to readjust the boundaries and redispose the troops.

The 2d Division units relieved assembled near Navarin Farm, and then marched to the vicinity of Suippes. The division commander and his operations officer, Colonel Myers, remained with the 36th Division for another day, and then rejoined at the new headquarters, Camp Montpelier.

Further operations in this region were under the orders of the 36th Division. For present purposes, it is sufficient to say that the advance was continued to the line of the Aisne, which was reached on October 13th. Here the whole line remained stationary until the end of the month, when the division was relieved and engineers and artillery ordered to rejoin the 2d Division. The last action was a well planned and well executed local attack which cleared the Germans out of a horseshoe bend of the Aisne, where they had held on to a strong position known as Forest Farm when their main line was withdrawn to the north bank.

During this period, the 2d Engineers had performed engineer duty of all kinds chiefly road and bridge work, including thorough reconnaissance and preparation for crossing the Aisne.⁷³ The action of the artillery was mostly by regiment, arranged by direct communication between subordinate infantry and artillery commanders. The only operation requiring detailed dispositions for artillery support was the Forest Farm attack on October 27th. For this, there was a twenty minute preparation by the entire brigade, plus a French battalion of 155 mm. howitizers, followed by a rolling barrage from the light guns and fire of the howitzers upon strong points. The high ground on the north bank of the river which commanded the bend and furnished the Germans excellent observations, was effectively masked by smoke screens. Just before this attack Lieutenant Colonel Sparks, commanding the 17th Field Artillery, was sent to the hospital, and Major W. R. Gruber assumed temporary command.⁷⁴

The losses of the 2d Division during the period from October 2d to 10th had been 41 officers and 685 men killed, 162 officers and 3,500 men wounded, 6 officers and 579 men missing total: 209 officers and 4,764 men. Its captures included 48 officers and 1,915 men, 25 guns, 332 machine guns, and quantities of war material of all kinds. It left the line with General Gouraud's congratulations upon its distinguished service.⁷⁵

In the Blanc Mont operation the 2d Division sustained its accustomed high standards. General Pershing says:

"In the meantime the French Fourth Army on our left had been held up at Blanc Mont. As a consequence, Marshal Foch appealed to me for assistance. Although I was loath to spare any troops from our front, so serious was our own replacement situation, I sent, in accordance with my promise, the 2d Division (General Lejeune) which was followed later by the 36th Division (General W. R. Smith). On October 3d the 2d Division, accompanied by French tanks, in a brilliant maneuver against heavy machine gun resistance stormed and captured the dominating German positions on the Medeah Farm-Blanc Mont Ridge and continued on towards St. Etienne which was taken on October 8th with the assistance of a brigade of the 36th Division. This success carried forward the French divisions on its right and left, and, as reported by General Gouraud, enabled the whole Fourth Army to advance. The importance of this aid to the French Fourth Army is indicated by the following extracts from the French résumé of operations:

" 'The two brigades were side by side, the 4th Brigade of Marines on the left, and the 3d Brigade of Infantry on the right. Each of these two brigades had at its disposition a battalion of light tanks. . . .

" 'After a short but extremely violent artillery preparation the attack started at 5.50 A.M. on the 3d of October. Despite a considerable number of machine guns and heavy artillery fire, the two brigades with admirable dash attained the assigned objective, Blanc Mont-Médéah. In the course of its advance, the 5th Regiment of Marines sent a detachment to the XI Corps to help it clean out the German trenches. During this time the division was subjected to violent artillery fire, as well as machine gun fire upon its left flank.

" 'At 4.00 P.M. the attack started anew. In the woods, filled with machine guns, the advance continued and at 6.30 P.M. the forward movements of the American 2d Division reached the line marked by the Scay Farm and the crossroads at a point one kilometer south of St. Étienne-à-Arnes.

" 'The advance realized by the American 2d Division during the course of the day was remarkable and reached a depth of about six kilometers. Numerous prisoners, cannon, machine guns and material of all kinds fell into its hands.

" 'The rapid advance of the XXI Corps, and in particular that of the American 2d Division, on October 3d, brought about the most favorable results. The enemy, placed by this rapid advance of the center of the Fourth Army in a very difficult position upon the Monts, as well as in the valley of the Suippes, decided to evacuate the Monts and to retreat upon the Arnes and the Suippes. . . .

" 'On the 8th of October a new attack took place on the whole army front the XXI Corps strengthened by tanks, was directed to advance in the direction of Machault. The attack started at 5.15 A.M. The American 2d Division occupied St. Étienne-à-Arnes.' "⁷⁶

From Suippes, the division moved by marching to the Camp de Chalons, and opened headquarters at Vadenay Farm on October 14th. Replacements came in rapidly, and the troops reorganized, refitted and recommenced training work.⁷⁷

The period now commencing, while quiet, proved to be a period of anxiety, for the division seemed to be on the verge of disintegration. The artillery and engineers, with attached services, were already gone, and no one could tell when they would return. Now, on October 19th, orders were received from the Fourth Army sending a brigade back to Suippes, to relieve the French 73d Division. One light regiment and three heavy batteries of the 2d Field Artillery Brigade were to be withdrawn from the 36th Division and sent to join this brigade.⁷⁸

Such an order meant many things. Not only did it separate the two infantry brigades, but it split the artillery in two. Further, it meant the complete disruption of every service—signal battalion, ammunition train, supply train, medical units. It placed the fragments of the division under three different commands—Fourth Army reserve and two different front line corps. The arrangement was announced as temporary, to hold only for a few days until the French 42d Division could arrive to take its place in line, but no one could be very optimistic as to reconstituting a division so thoroughly disrupted in active campaign. Nothing was to be done; the order was formal. The 4th Brigade was designated to go, for it was at the moment the stronger, although 1,500 of its men were new replacements. A report of the circumstances was, however, made at once to the American General Headquarters, with the urgent request that steps be taken to prevent the threatened catastrophe.⁷⁹

The brigade marched on October 21st. General Neville went ahead, reported at headquarters of the French IX Corps, which now held that part of the front, and consulted with General Lebocq of the 73d Division as to the relief. All reconnaissances were made, and dispositions completed; but at 8.45 P.M. the orders were countermanded. Relief of the 73d Division was still to be made, but by troops of the 36th Division.⁸⁰

That division was now the right element of the XI Corps, the 73d Division the left element of the IX Corps; for the XXI Corps had come out of the line. Corps and division boundaries were readjusted; the 36th drew in its left, and extended its right to include the front of the 73d. The 4th Brigade was ordered to rejoin its own division.

But the division—what little was left—was no longer in its former place. The anxiety at headquarters as to its future had been groundless. As soon as it had come out of line the chief of staff of the American First Army had telegraphed to General Headquarters, requesting that "Peggy be returned for duty with the First Army, together with artillery and engineers now with Maude." The request was approved, and Fourth Army orders sending the division to the Argonne were issued on the very day that the 4th Brigade left.⁸¹

Division headquarters moved on October 22d to Herpont, ten miles southwest of Ste. Menehould; the 3d Brigade and other troops were quartered between there and Valmy. The American First Army now assumed jurisdiction, and directed that the march be continued to Les Islettes, on the Aire River within the Argonne Forest this move was made on the 23d, and troops came under the orders of General Cameron, V Army Corps. On the 25th the 4th Brigade with its attached troops moved to Les Islettes, by trucks and by marching, and division headquarters were established there. Continuing the march, division headquarters went on the 26th to Charpentry, north of Varennes, and the troops occupied the area from there to Exermont. Replacements continued to come in, and the division was again brought up to full strength. The artillery, engineers and other troops from the 36th Division had all rejoined here by October 31st.⁸²

During this movement, General Ely was promoted Major General, and relinquished command of the 3d Brigade to assume that of the 5th Division. Colonel Van Horn, who had just relieved Colonel Stuart in the 9th Infantry, took temporary command of the brigade, but a few days later Colonel Rhea was assigned to it, and Colonel Myers, operations officer, was made chief of staff in his place. Lieutenant Colonel Turrill became operations officer.